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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Relevance and Foundations of Probabilistic
Reasoning
Most of our everyday decisions are generally made without definite knowl-
edge of their consequences. The decisions to invest in the stock market, to
undergo a medical operation, to save for retirement, or to go to court are
commonly made without knowing in advance whether the market will go
up, the operation will be successful, how much we need to save, or whether
the court will decide in one’s favor (Tversky and Fox, 1995). More broadly
speaking, virtually all social, economic, or technological decisions involve
some degree of risk or uncertainty. In some instances (such as games of
chance), the probabilities of the alternative consequences can be accurately
determined (Machina, 1987). In other cases, individuals have to rely on ex-
perience or personal estimates that are usually expressed in statements such
as "I think that. . . ", "chances are. . . ", or "it is unlikely that. . . ".
What determines such beliefs and how do people assess the probability
of uncertain events? Most traditional theories in economics and psychol-
ogy assume that agents gather and integrate information in a manner that
will result in a relatively accurate representation of reality (e.g. Morgenstern
and Von Neumann, 1953; Körding and Wolpert, 2004; or Sharot and Garrett,
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2016). Yet, the process of forming accurate beliefs is a challenging cogni-
tive operation as we are constantly flooded with a wealth of information and
new stimuli. To manage the constant flow of new information without being
overwhelmed, individuals tend to rely on a number of heuristic principles
in forming expectations. Generally, such heuristics or “mental shortcuts”
are useful tools which reduce the complex task of assessing probabilities to
simpler judgmental operations (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Despite their
usual efficiency, heuristics have also been found to give rise to the occurrence
of severe and systematic errors in our judgements. Such predictable errors
in thinking can lead to deviations from the normatively expected judgement
with potentially negative effects on the decision outcome.
Particularly in financial decision making, people frequently find them-
selves confronted with decisions that involve uncertainty and which require
a probability assessment in order to form accurate beliefs about future
outcomes. Examples of such decisions involve consumption and saving
choices, investment choices, and financing decisions among many others.
Yet, given the complexity that is often associated with financial decisions,
it is hardly surprising that individuals make systematic errors in forming
accurate expectations. On the individual level for example, biased beliefs
have been associated with non-participation in the equity market (e.g.
Dimmock et al., 2016), systematic mis-valuation of financial assets (e.g.
Shiller, 1981; or De Long et al., 1990), portfolio under-diversification (e.g.
Benartzi, 2001; or Coval and Moskowitz, 1999), as well as undersaving (e.g.
Han et al., 2019; or Heimer et al., 2019). Importantly, systematic errors in
assessing probabilities not only apply to individual consumers or private
households, but also to highly trained professionals. Here, biased beliefs
have been linked to excessive and value-destroying merger activity (e.g.
Malmendier and Tate, 2008), flawed inflation expectations of central bankers
(e.g. Malmendier et al., 2017; or Malmendier and Nagel, 2015), or inaccurate
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analysts’ earnings forecasts (e.g. Clement and Tse, 2005) to name just a few.
Why should politicians be alarmed about these findings? First, and per-
haps most obviously, the above-mentioned examples clearly demonstrate
that the resulting misbehavior can be very costly for households and corpo-
rates alike. Ma et al. (2018) for example find that managerial forecast errors
may lead to sizable welfare losses for the aggregate economy. Goetzmann
and Kumar (2008) conclude that under-diversified households earn up to
3.12 % lower risk-adjusted annual returns compared to diversified house-
holds. On top of that, one particular point of concern refers to long-term
financial decisions, such as the decision of how to save for retirement. Here,
errors in individuals’ judgement can accumulate over multiple years and are
often irreversible. Due to the structural changes in society and the resulting
demographic challenges, less pension contributors will have to pay for an in-
creasing generation of pension receivers. In the light of these developments,
many households can no longer exclusively rely on the public pension sys-
tem. Instead, they will be forced to complement public pension schemes with
private savings. In other words, more and more individuals will have to deal
with financial decisions when it comes to retirement planning and thus can-
not circumvent to form expectations about risk and return characteristics of
financial assets. Especially in this domain, systematic errors in our judge-
ment can not only severely impede our own future financial wellbeing, but
may also affect our family and children.
Given the far-reaching consequences of biased expectations in many of
our everyday decisions, it is and should be an important concern for re-
searchers and politicians alike to understand why and in which way individ-
uals depart from normatively expected judgements. In order to investigate
potential discrepancies, it is, however, necessary in a first step to establish
how modern decision theory defines choices under risk and uncertainty and
then relate observed judgements to normative predictions.
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The topic of how individuals make judgements under risk and uncer-
tainty has been the object of theoretical and empirical investigations for cen-
turies. A decision under uncertainty generally requires an evaluation of
two attributes: the desirability of possible outcomes and the likelihood with
which each outcome may occur (Tversky and Fox, 1995). Economists have
developed various models to study how individuals assess each of these at-
tributes individually and how they should be evaluated jointly.
The neoclassical model of decision-making under risk and uncertainty is
the expected utility framework. Given the importance of choice under un-
certainty in the literature and especially in this thesis, I will briefly describe
the main intuition of the model. The idea of maximizing the expected utility
of a decision outcome was originally developed by Daniel Bernoulli in 1738
(reprinted and translated in Bernoulli, 1954). In this model, the utility associ-
ated with each possible outcome (x1,. . . ,xn) is weighted by its probability of
occurrence (p(x1),. . . ,p(xn)):
E(u(x)) =
n
∑
i=1
p(xi)u(xi).
Under expected utility theory, money and wealth are assumed to dimin-
ish in value the more we receive. More precisely, the utility function – which
maps actual wealth into utility for wealth -– is generally assumed to be con-
cave. The function’s degree of curvature thereby often serves as an index of
an individual’s degree of risk aversion (Weber and Johnson, 2009). The in-
troduction of a parameter describing individuals risk attitude has intuitive
appeal, as some people seem to resolve choices that differ in risk in very cau-
tious ways, while others seem willing to take on greater risks.
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Almost two centuries later, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) for-
mally axiomatized the expected utility maximization. Under the assump-
tion that preferences satisfy the axioms of completeness, transitivity, continu-
ity, and independence, the concept of expected utility maximization became
a normatively attractive decision criterion and served as a foundation for
many alternative choice models such as Savage’s subjective expected utility
theory (1954), regret theory (Bell, 1982; Loomes and Sugden, 1982), or rank-
dependent expected utility (Quiggin, 1982).
Based on the traditional economic choice models, the decision-making
process can thus be described as follows. First, individuals need to assess the
probability of each possible outcome that may result from their initial choice.
Then, individuals need to discern the utility to be derived from each outcome
and subsequently combine both assessments to make a judgement (Gilovich
et al., 2002). Yet, most of our everyday decisions involve situations in which
either the consequences are unclear or the probabilities of the consequences
are unknown. How do individuals form expectations about the probability
of such uncertain events? What assumptions do researchers impose about
this process based on the elementary rules of probability theory? Relatedly
-– and perhaps most importantly — do individuals behave in a manner that
is consistent with these assumptions or do they systematically deviate from
normative predictions?
This dissertation thesis aims to provide answers to these questions. A
special emphasis is put on whether and when individuals’ expectations de-
viate from rational expectations and on uncovering the psychological roots
that drive these processes. In the next paragraphs, I will give a brief introduc-
tion to the core component of the neoclassical theory of probabilistic beliefs,
Bayes’ Theorem, and review what the literature already knows about devia-
tions from Bayesian behavior.
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Degrees of Uncertainty
The economist Frank Knight (1921) was the first to make a conceptual dis-
tinction between risk and uncertainty. A decision under risk typically refers
to situations in which the decision-maker knows with certainty the proba-
bilities of possible choice alternatives. Examples of decisions under risk are
the toss of a coin, or the roll of a fair die, in which we know the possible
outcomes and can assign a unique probability to each outcome. A decision
under uncertainty refers to situations in which the decision-maker cannot
express the likelihood of possible outcomes with any mathematical precision
(Weber and Johnson, 2009). Here, knowledge about the probability distribu-
tion of the outcomes of choice alternatives can lie anywhere on a continuum,
from complete uncertainty (also referred to as complete ignorance), through
various degrees of partial uncertainty, to risk (where the probability distribu-
tion of alternative outcomes is fully specified).
Bayesian Inference
In assessing how individuals make judgements in situations in which the
probabilities of alternative outcomes are not fully known, it is key to un-
derstand how individuals resolve or quantify uncertainty. Generally, uncer-
tainty is reduced by observing, gathering knowledge, and integrating new
information to form more accurate beliefs about a particular subject. The ac-
curacy of our probability estimates thus strongly depends both on the quality
of our present knowledge and the accuracy and content of the information
we acquire. The core component of the neoclassical theory of probabilis-
tic beliefs is the assumption that individuals integrate new information into
their prior beliefs according to Bayes’ Theorem. Bayes’ Theorem, named after
the mathematician Thomas Bayes (1763), is an algorithm for combining prior
knowledge with current information. Based on past experience, a Bayesian
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decision maker begins with a prior belief that some aspect of the world holds,
and then gathers new information that modifies his initial belief to produce
a posterior belief (Efron, 2013).
In more formal terms, Bayes’ Theorem is defined as follows (notation
adapted from McNamara et al., 2006): suppose there are n possible states
of the world, which are labelled S1,S2,. . . ,Sn. The prior probability (based on
knowledge or past experience) that state Si is the underlying objective state
is denoted P(Si). Let A be some event which provides relevant information
about the objective state of the world. The probability that event A occurs
assuming that the state Si is the true state of the world is denoted as P(A|Si).
Then, the overall prior probability that event A occurs is:
P(A) =
n
∑
i=1
P(A|Si)P(Si).
Now assume that based on his prior information about the likelihood that
event A occurs, a decision maker in fact observes that event A has happened.
Given this additional knowledge, Bayes’ Theorem prescribes that the poste-
rior probability that Si is the true state of the world given that event A has
happened can now be calculated as:
P(Si|A) =
P(A|Si)P(Si)
P(A)
.
In other words, Bayes’ Theorem is a way to calculate conditional prob-
abilities based on new information that we integrate into our prior beliefs.
As we continue to gather new information, Bayes’ Theorem can be applied
iteratively. As such, probabilities are updated step by step whenever new
information arrives, until uncertainty is reduced to a tolerable level.
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Deviations from Bayesian Behavior
On a normative level, Bayes’ Theorem provides formidable advice on how
individuals should combine prior knowledge with new information to form
beliefs relevant for the decision process. Yet, even though Bayes’ Theorem is
a cornerstone of modern probability theory, it is not free from critique. Con-
trary to the assumption of traditional models that individuals always follow
the elementary rules of probability when calculating the likelihoods of uncer-
tain outcomes, many studies find that individuals are subject to systematic
errors in their probabilistic reasoning.
This string of literature -– which is often referred to as “heuristics and bi-
ases” -– was introduced by the psychologist Ward Edwards in the 1960s (e.g.
Phillips and Edwards, 1966) and presented the starting point of a large re-
search agenda including the seminal papers by Daniel Kahneman and Amos
Tversky (1971, 1974). The goal of this field of research is to compare intuitive
inferences and probability judgements to the rules and laws of probability
theory. Over the years, many different biases have been identified, including
the gambler’s fallacy (Alberoni, 1962), the conservatism bias (Phillips and
Edwards, 1966), base-rate neglect (Phillips and Edwards, 1966; Kahneman
and Tversky, 1973), a false belief in the law of small numbers (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1971) the representativeness heuristic (Kahneman and Tversky,
1972), and the confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998).
Especially important to our understanding of how individuals reduce or
quantify uncertainty are the biases that affect how individuals revise their
prior beliefs upon receipt of new information. Biased belief updating can
be identified by comparing people’s subjective posteriors with the correct
objective posterior belief as implied by Bayes’ Theorem.
In this literature, much attention is devoted to two types of potential bi-
ases in individuals’ updating behavior. The first type of bias refers to the
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insufficient use of likelihoods in drawing inferences. Whereas Bayes’ Theo-
rem prescribes that individuals update their beliefs in proportion to the in-
formation they observe, many studies point in the direction that individu-
als update their beliefs as if the signals provided less information about an
objective state than they actually do. This tendency to revise prior beliefs
only insufficiently when presented with new evidence was first discussed
by Phillips and Edwards (1966) and is referred to as conservatism bias. The
second type of bias in drawing inference concerns the use of prior beliefs. In-
stead of properly combining the inferential impacts of prior knowledge and
new diagnostic evidence as prescribed by Bayes’ Rule, individuals on aver-
age under-use their prior information. This phenomenon -– also labeled as
base-rate neglect by Kahneman and Tversky (1973) -– may cause individuals
to overinterpret a recent signal indicative of an event that is unlikely given
the base rate.
Besides the biased use of prior knowledge and new diagnostic evidence
in drawing inference judgements, our belief formation is also affected by our
own preferences. In fact, humans tend to form beliefs asymmetrically – we
quickly discount bad news but embrace good news (Sharot et al., 2012). For
example, studies have shown that people readily adjust their beliefs regard-
ing their level of intelligence and physical attractiveness when they receive
favorable information that indicates that they are more intelligent or attrac-
tive than they had previously assumed. However, they fail to adjust beliefs
after information that suggests otherwise (Köszegi, 2006).
Overview of Chapters
This dissertation thesis contributes to ongoing research in financial eco-
nomics and psychology, which investigates individuals’ belief formation
and the mechanisms that underly perception and judgment. Incorporating
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insights from the finance, psychology, and economics literature, each chapter
of this dissertation thesis focuses on one particular aspect of how individuals
form expectations relative to Bayesian behavior and relates the findings to
explain observed judgements. In the following paragraphs, I will give a
brief overview of the main research question covered in each chapter of this
dissertation. Afterwards, Section 1.2 contains a more detailed description
which focuses on the main findings and the contributions to various strings
of literature.
Chapter 2 investigates how biased belief formation may affect investors’
willingness to take financial risks across market cycles. One of the major
puzzles in the financial economics literature is the fact that investors’ risk-
taking varies strongly and systematically across market cycles. In particu-
lar, investors are generally found to take more risks during boom markets
and less risks during bust markets. To account for this pervasive pattern,
researchers have proposed rational expectations models which implicitly as-
sume that investors’ attitude towards risk (or their risk preferences) changes
in tandem with market cycles. Alternatively, investors’ judgement might not
only be affected by their risk preferences — which are often assumed to be
a stable construct -– but rather by their expectations about risk and return
characteristics. Even after decades of research, the underlying drivers of the
observed differences in investors’ risk-taking behavior are still not fully un-
derstood and subjected of heated debates among researchers. One reason
for this long-lasting debate is that even though both the preference as well
as the belief channel are observationally equivalent, they nonetheless offer
vastly different policy implications. Chapter 2 contributes to this debate by
showing that individuals rely on different learning rules when forming their
beliefs across market cycles. The resulting systematic deviations from Bayes’
Rule can not only explain differences in risk-taking over time, but especially
across market cycles, where the underlying learning environments differ.
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The following two chapters of this dissertation thesis focus on how indi-
viduals revise their prior beliefs upon receipt of new information, which ei-
ther disconfirms prior information (Chapter 3) or which is non-diagnostic about
the objective state of the world (Chapter 4). An implicit -– albeit often ne-
glected -– implication of Bayes’ Theorem is that two informationally equiva-
lent signals of opposite direction cancel each other out so that the total value
of the information is much like no information at all. In other words, if in-
dividuals’ judgements about uncertain events conform to principles of logic,
then two opposing signals with the same informational content should not
influence their beliefs. Examples of such opposite-directional signals can of-
ten be found in our everyday life, such as receiving both positive and neg-
ative feedback from two equally trustworthy friends about the quality of a
recently opened restaurant. In Chapter 3, we seek to explore how individ-
uals process such pieces of information by testing experimentally how in-
dividuals revise their prior beliefs after both same-directional and opposite-
directional signals. We contribute to the literature by showing that whenever
a sequence of signals that go in the same direction is interrupted by a single
signal of opposite direction, individuals tend to strongly overreact to the sig-
nal of opposite direction. In other words, individuals appear to process the
opposite-directional signal as if the signal would carry more weight in the
decision process than previous signals.
Non-diagnostic information may not only occur by observing two infor-
mationally equivalent signals of opposite direction, but also by observing
signals which are plainly uninformative about a particular objective state of
the world. An important implication of Bayes’ Theorem is that individuals
should not differentiate between observing no information signals at all and
receiving uninformative signals. Examining whether this is really the case
has important consequences for our understanding of whether our judge-
ment can be influenced by irrelevant pieces of information. Chapter 4 aims
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to add to this research agenda. It shows that individuals revise their prior
beliefs even after observing uninformative signals. Importantly, the direc-
tion in which individuals tend to update their beliefs depends on the valence
of the signal: prior beliefs become more optimistic after desirable uninfor-
mative signals and more pessimistic after undesirable uninformative signals.
This mechanism implies that there is indeed a distinction between receiving
no signals or uninformative signals for drawing inference judgments.
In Chapter 5, the focus shifts from the traditional investigation of biased
belief formation towards an application where biased beliefs are often very
costly: retirement planning. In many articles on financial planning, retire-
ment planning is often used synonymous with wealth accumulation. How-
ever, while wealth accumulation is certainly an important ingredient for suc-
cessful retirement preparation, it is not sufficient to achieve a targeted steady
stream of income during retirement. Individuals close to retirement thus face
the following decision problem: out of one’s accumulated wealth, one must
decide how much to allocate to a savings account (e.g. as protection against
unexpected costs) and how much to consume over the course of one’s re-
tirement to secure a given standard of living. Chapter 5 of this dissertation
thesis adds to this literature by studying how individuals approach this de-
cision problem and which decumulation schemes they find most appealing
to transfer wealth into a stream of income.
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1.2 Contribution and Main Results of this Disser-
tation Thesis
1.2.1 Why so Negative? Belief Formation and Risk-Taking in
Boom and Bust Markets
Chapter 2, coauthored with Jan Müller-Dethard and Martin Weber, presents
an experimental study on the role of biased belief formation for investors’
risk-taking across macroeconomic cycles. One of the major puzzles in fi-
nancial economics is the fact that risk premiums of many asset classes vary
strongly and systematically over time (Shiller, 1981; Campbell and Shiller,
1988a,1988b): risk-premiums tend to be lower during market cycle booms
and higher during market cycle busts. To account for this pervasive find-
ing researchers have proposed rational expectations models which introduce
modifications into the representative agent’s utility function (Campbell and
Cochrane, 1999; Barberis et al., 2001). To generate the empirically observed
time-variation in the equity premium, investors in these models are gener-
ally assumed to be more risk-averse during bust markets, thus demanding
a higher risk premium, and less risk averse during boom markets, thus de-
manding a lower risk premium. Evidence in favor for this "countercyclical
risk-aversion" is found by Cohn et al. (2015) as well as Guiso et al. (2018).
However, the concept that investors exhibit a countercyclical risk aver-
sion is also contested. Rational expectation models typically assume that
agents always correctly updated their beliefs as prescribed by Bayes’ Theo-
rem. This implies that agents are assumed to know the objective probability
distribution in equilibrium and are as such fully aware of the countercycli-
cal nature of the equity risk premium (Nagel and Xu, 2019). In other words,
investors in these models should have more pessimistic return expectations
during boom markets and more optimistic return expectations during bust
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markets. This assumption of rational expectations is troublesome for two
reasons as recently pointed out by Nagel and Xu (2019). First, conceptually it
is unclear how an investor could possess so much knowledge about param-
eters that even econometricians tend to struggle to estimate with precision.
Second, surveys of actual investor return expectations find that investors’
return expectations are at odds with the rational expectations assumption.
Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) show that the reported return expectations
of investors are highly correlated with past returns and as such rather pro-
cyclical instead of countercyclical: investors tend to be more optimistic dur-
ing market booms and more pessimistic during market busts. Similar find-
ings about the procyclicality of investors’ return expectations in survey data
are presented by Amromin and Sharpe (2014) and Giglio et al. (2019).
Alternatively, the time-varying nature of the equity risk premium might
also be caused by changes in investors’ beliefs about risk and return charac-
teristics. Whereas this channel is mostly held constant in traditional models
due to the rational expectations assumption, it presents an equally valid hy-
pothesis which receives increasing attention in the literature in recent years.
In a survey of online-broker customers over the financial crisis in 2008, We-
ber et al. (2013) show that changes in risk taking are mostly attributable to
changes in return expectations and only to a lesser extent to changes in risk
preferences. Nagel and Xu (2019) present a model in which investors have
heterogenous time-varying beliefs. Their model is able to reconcile asset
prices and survey expectations without assuming that investors have unsta-
ble risk preferences. Yet, even after decades of research on the time-varying
nature of the equity premium, the underlying drivers are still not fully un-
derstood. The fact that time-varying beliefs and risk preferences are often
observationally equivalent to researchers makes a clean identification very
challenging.
Chapter 2 contributes to this ongoing debate by showing that distorted
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belief formation rules (i.e. systematic deviations from Bayes’ Rule) can ex-
plain differences in risk-taking across macroeconomic cycles. In an experi-
mental study, we investigate (i) how different learning environments affect
the formation of return expectations; (ii) whether systematic differences in
the employed learning rules affect risk-taking; and (iii) whether the learning
environments only affect beliefs or also investors’ risk preferences. While
recent survey data on expectations is helpful to establish a link between sub-
jective beliefs and investment decisions, it does not allow inference about
how investors depart from rational expectations without imposing strong
assumptions. In an experiment however, we can establish a setting in which
we have direct control over objective (rational) expectations and can compare
them to participants’ subjective beliefs. This allows us to document system-
atic errors in the belief formation process, which we can then relate to sub-
jects’ investment choice. In two experiments, we combine an abstract belief
formation task (Bayesian learning) with an unrelated incentive-compatible
investment task in a financial environment. In the Bayesian updating task
subjects have to incorporate a sequence of information signals into their be-
liefs to make a forecast about the quality of a risky asset. The underlying
learning environment of the updating task either resembles key character-
istics of a boom market (favorable learning environment) or a bust mar-
ket (adverse learning environment). Importantly, the underlying probabil-
ity distribution from which the information is drawn is completely identi-
cal in both learning environments. In other words, a Bayesian agent in our
setting should make identical forecasts irrespective of whether he learns in
the favorable or adverse environment. In the subsequent investment task,
we randomly assign subjects to invest either in an ambiguous lottery with
unknown success probability, or a risky lottery with known success prob-
abilities. In the risky lottery, we have perfect control over subjects’ return
and risk expectations since both probabilities and outcomes are known. In
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the ambiguous lottery, however, we purposefully provide participants room
to form subjective beliefs about the underlying probability distribution. As
such, investments in the ambiguous lottery are affected by both subjects’ risk
preferences and their beliefs about the underlying probability distribution,
while investments in the risky lottery serve as a measurement tool for their
risk preferences. The between-subject comparison allows us to isolate the ef-
fect of belief-induced risk-taking caused by different learning environments.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, we find that adverse learn-
ing environments which resemble key characteristics of bust markets induce
a strong pessimism bias in individuals’ belief formation. Second, the induced
pessimism not only presents a systematic deviation from Bayesian beliefs,
but also translates to lower investments in the ambiguous lottery. In risky
lottery, however, we do not find any difference in risk-taking depending on
the underlying learning environment. In other words, our results suggest
that risk preferences are unaffected by the initial learning environment and
stable across treatments. Effectively, this finding suggests that when indi-
viduals form expectations in adverse learning environments (as is frequently
the case in recessions), they become substantially more pessimistic about fu-
ture prospects. However, this pessimism only translates to lower risk-taking
when there is uncertainty in the investment process.
To conclude, Chapter 2 tests an alternative channel to the countercycli-
cal risk aversion hypothesis which can also explain the empirically observed
time-varying changes in risk-taking. Instead of assuming unstable prefer-
ences, we investigate whether systematic deviations from Bayesian beliefs
can cause similar investment pattern. In our study, we show that individuals
tend to employ different learning rules when forming beliefs in boom and
bust markets. In adverse learning environments, individuals form overly
pessimistic beliefs which subsequently translate to a lower willingness to
take risks. This result is also consistent with recent survey evidence reporting
1.2. Contribution and Main Results of this Dissertation Thesis 17
pro-cyclical beliefs of investors. Our findings have important policy impli-
cations. If bust markets systematically induce pessimistic expectations about
future returns for a substantial subset of investors, this may reduce the ag-
gregate share invested in risky assets of an economy, which in turn generates
downward pressure on prices due to excess supply. Such self-reinforcing
feedback loops may amplify the intensity and length of market trends.
1.2.2 Can Agents Add and Subtract When Forming Beliefs?
Chapter 3, coauthored with Jan Müller-Dethard and Martin Weber, presents
an experimental study on how individuals incorporate information signals
which disconfirm prior information into their beliefs. Standard models of
economic choice assume that individuals update their prior beliefs upon re-
ceipt of new information according to Bayes’ Theorem. Besides the prescrip-
tion of how to calculate posterior probabilities, Bayes’ Theorem has an im-
plicit, fundamental rule of how subjects should incorporate information sig-
nals of opposite direction. In the usual case of updating about two states of
the world from independent binomial signals, two unequal signals should
cancel out. Thus, taken together they should not affect prior beliefs
Many of our everyday decisions which involve uncertainty require that
we collect new pieces of information until uncertainty is reduced to a tol-
erable level. In the simplest case, we observe only signals which point to-
wards the same conclusion. More often, however, we observe mixed pieces
of evidence that sometimes disagree with one another. To illustrate this idea,
imagine you think about visiting a restaurant which recently opened in your
city. Before making a reservation, you call two of your friends who know
the restaurant. Suppose, both of them recommend the new restaurant, mak-
ing you rather optimistic about its quality. Yet, since the restaurant is quite
expensive, you decide to call two more friends. Assume, the first one did
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not like the restaurant, whereas the second did like it. Would you still be
just as optimistic as you were after the first two calls? In other words, are
two recommendations just as good as three recommendations and one cri-
tique? Bayes’ Theorem would prescribe that this is in fact the case. However,
many studies conclude that individuals are often not perfect Bayesian. In-
stead, they sometimes under- or overinfer from new information. As recently
pointed out by Benjamin (2019), it is an important question to understand
when we expect people to update too much and when we expect them to up-
date too little. In this chapter, we take a step in this direction by investigating
whether individuals follow this simple counting-based rule, as implied by
Bayes’ Theorem as well as when and why we may expect them to over- or
underinfer.
To examine our research question, we first develop a simple framework
to derive hypotheses and to guide the experimental design. In the frame-
work, we define any information signal which confirms the objective state of
the world as a confirming signal, and any signal which disconfirms the ob-
jective state as a disconfirming signal. Additionally, we define three phases
of how Bayesian beliefs can evolve over a sequence of information signals.
Phase 1 is characterized by a sequence of at least two same-directional sig-
nals (confirming signals). Phase 2 resembles the moment in which the dis-
confirming signal occurs, while Phase 3 defines the situation when the pre-
viously observed disconfirming signal gets reverted by another confirming
signal. The established framework allows us to test (i) how subjects update
their priors after a disconfirming signal conditional (i.e. opposite-directional
signal) on the number of previously observed confirming signals; and (ii)
the extent to which they revise their priors after the disconfirming signal is
followed by another confirming signal (i.e. corrected). The counting rule
implicit in Bayes’ Theorem makes clear predictions how individuals should
update their beliefs in Phase 2 and Phase 3: an agent should reduce his prior
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probability estimate after a disconfirming signal by the same magnitude than
he increased it after the previous confirming signal.
To test this prediction, we embed our empirical framework into the stan-
dard incentivized Bayesian updating bookbag-and-poker-chip paradigm by
Grether (1980). Participants learn over six periods about the quality of a risky
asset from binary signals which are drawn either from a "good distribution"
or a "bad distribution". Whereas one signal is more indicative for the good
distribution, the other is more indicative of the bad distribution. In the ex-
periment, subjects always observe five confirming signals (depending on the
underlying distribution) and a single disconfirming signal. We exogenously
manipulate the period in which the single disconfirming signal occurs. This
provides us with twelve stratified price paths (six for the good and six for the
bad distribution).
The main findings from Chapter 3 can be summarized as follows. When-
ever individuals observe a single disconfirming signal after a sequence of
confirming signals — or in the example above, receive a single critique after
a few recommendations -– they violate the counting rule and strongly overre-
act. This overreaction is relatively independent of the number of previously
observed confirming signals and occurs already after a sequence of only two
confirming signals. In other words, the overreaction is not triggered by ex-
treme prior beliefs. However, when the disconfirming signal gets revered by
another confirming signal (i.e. Phase 3 in the framework), participants on
average correctly adhere to the counting rule and almost fully correct their
prior overreaction. In contrast to their overreaction when violating the count-
ing rule, we find that individuals generally underinfer whenever they cannot
or do not violate the counting rule. This is frequently the case when there are
only signals of the same direction (i.e. before observing a disconfirming sig-
nal) or if signals alternate (i.e. confirming, disconfirming, confirming).
In summary, Chapter 3 contributes to one important objective in recent
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research on probabilistic beliefs which is -– according to Benjamin (2019) -–
to identify when individuals update too much and when they update too lit-
tle. Within the common paradigm by Grether (1980), our results coherently
suggest that individuals update too much whenever they violate the count-
ing rule implied by Bayes’ Theorem, and too little otherwise. This finding
has important implications for human decision making in general. In envi-
ronments with conflicting information, a perfectly Bayesian decision maker
would eventually be able to identify the objective state with certainty. How-
ever, the overreaction resulting from violating the counting rule implicit in
Bayes’ Theorem, might prevent individuals to be fully confident about a cer-
tain state, causing their beliefs to fluctuate even if the surrounding informa-
tion environment is fundamentally stationary.
1.2.3 Expectation Formation under Uninformative Signals
Chapter 4, coauthored with Martin Weber, presents an experimental study
on how individuals process non-diagnostic information signals when updat-
ing their beliefs. The neoclassical theory of probabilistic beliefs assumes that
individuals update their prior beliefs according to Bayes’ Rule as new (rele-
vant) information arrives. In this model, signals which do not carry relevant
information about the objective state of the world play no role and are treated
as if no signal occurred. Despite this clear prediction, it cannot always be as-
sumed that individuals’ beliefs or inference about uncertain events always
conform to principles of logic. In reality, many information structures are
complex and generate signals which are often noisy and difficult to ascribe
to one particular state of the world. Additionally, new information is rarely
processed as being purely informative. Instead, individuals frequently have
preferences over which state of the world is true, effectively generating an
interaction between beliefs and preferences (Eil and Rao, 2011; Möbius et al.,
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2014). This interaction may lead to environments, in which information sig-
nals carry no information about an underlying state of the world, but which
nonetheless appear either desirable or undesirable in the utility they provide.
Correctly identifying the informational value of new pieces of evidence is
important in almost all decision which require an assessment of probabilities,
including psychologists’ interpretation of diagnostic tests, doctors’ diagnoses
of patients, courts’ judgements in trial, or ideological conflicts and political
discussions. Errors in probabilistic reasoning in such domains are not only
costly, but may also lead to wrong treatments of patients or to mistaken con-
victions of defendants. In the light of these consequences, it is imperative
to obtain a deeper understanding of how individuals process non-diagnostic
information and especially whether individuals can correctly discern belief-
relevant information from their preferences.
In Chapter 4, we first present a stylized reduced-form model which builds
on earlier work by Grether (1980) to guide the design of the experiment and
to structure the main part of the empirical analysis. In the model, we formally
derive predictions about individuals’ updating behavior following both in-
formative and uninformative signals under a Bayesian perspective. This al-
lows us to compare Bayesian beliefs to observed subjective beliefs while also
being able to control for under- and overinference as well as base-rate ne-
glect. To test how individuals process non-diagnostic signals, we employ an
incentivized bookbag-and-poker-chip experiment, in which we exogenously
vary both the informational content and the valence of the observed signals.
Over the course of 10 rounds, participants repeatedly have to incorporate a
series of information signals into their beliefs to forecast the distribution of
a risky asset. The risky asset can generate three outcomes from one of two
distributions, a bad distribution and a good distribution. The outcomes can
be ranked according to their associated payoff (high, medium, and low). In
the good distribution, the high outcome occurs with the highest probability,
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while the low outcome occurs with the lowest probability. In the bad distri-
bution, probabilities of the high and low outcome are reversed. Following
this logic, the high outcome signals that the good distribution is more likely,
whereas the low outcome signals that the bad distribution is more likely. Im-
portantly, the medium outcome always occurs with the same probability in-
dependent of the underlying distribution. In other words, the medium out-
come provides no opportunity to learn about the true state of the risky asset
and is thus referred to as an uninformative signal or a non-diagnostic signal. To
investigate how the valence of uninformative signals affects individuals’ up-
dating behavior, we also exogenously manipulate the payoff of uninforma-
tive signals in a between-subject design. Whereas the uninformative signal
provides positive payoffs for some participants, it provides negative payoffs
for others. Importantly, the distributions from which information is drawn
are constructed in a way, that the medium outcome does not provide any
information about whether subjects are currently drawing from the good or
the bad distribution. As such, a Bayesian agent in our setting should not up-
date his prior beliefs after observing an uninformative signal, independent
of whether the signal is in the positive domain or in the negative domain.
This allows us to disentangle the valence from the informational content of a
signal and to document systematic errors in the belief formation process.
Results can be summarized as follows. First, we find that individuals
strongly and systematically update their prior beliefs after observing sig-
nals that are uninformative of the objective state of the world. In contrast
to Bayesian behavior, individuals fail to fully extract belief-relevant informa-
tion. Second, we find that the direction in which individuals update their
beliefs strongly depends on the valence of the observed signal. In particular,
individuals tend to form more optimistic beliefs about the objective state of
the world after observing positive uninformative signals, whereas they form
more pessimistic beliefs after observing negative uninformative signals. This
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effect becomes even more pronounced when individuals observe uninfor-
mative signals in an environment in which their beliefs matter for a payoff-
relevant decision. Finally, as underlying mechanism we identify that indi-
viduals tend to process noisy information signals in a reference-dependent
manner dictated by their prior beliefs. They fail to correctly identify that un-
informative signals do not carry information about the objective state of the
world and update their beliefs based on the valence of the signal relative to
their current prior expectations.
To conclude, Chapter 4 suggest that individuals appear to struggle dis-
cerning belief-relevant information from their preferences. Such deviations
from Bayesian behavior are particularly severe in situations in which the va-
lence of non-diagnostic signals is at odds with the valence of objective pieces
of information. Even though decision making frequently involves the ac-
cumulation of new pieces of information until uncertainty is reduced to a
tolerable level, such a bias may instead lead to a decline in predictive per-
formance. To illustrate this idea, suppose a judge at court is presented with
undesirable (albeit irrelevant) information about a person that is at odds with
objective information relevant to the legal case. If judges systematically in-
corporate such facts, they might eventually suppress existing information of
possibly greater predictive power, potentially leading to a wrong judgement.
In such environments, our results would imply that for the formation of be-
liefs, more signals are not always superior to less.
1.2.4 When Saving is Not Enough – Wealth Decumulation in
Retirement
Chapter 5, coauthored with Martin Weber, studies individuals’ decision how
to decumulate wealth in retirement. In recent years, the topic of retirement
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planning experiences growing awareness as individuals have been increas-
ingly expected to take responsibility for their retirement security due to de-
mographic changes in society. However, when conducting a simple Google
search on the term "retirement planning" one still finds an overwhelming
share of articles which contain recommendations on saving decisions and on
how to allocate savings to increase financial wellbeing in retirement. Given
this prevailing focus on savings and investment decisions, one could forgive
a typical retiree for believing that retirement planning is synonymous with
wealth accumulation. Yet, while wealth accumulation is certainly a manda-
tory condition for successful retirement preparation, it is not a sufficient con-
dition to achieve a targeted steady stream of income during retirement. In
essence, retirees have not only to decide how much they want to decumu-
late, but also how to decumulate their savings. However, determining how
to draw down his wealth is not an easy task for a person contemplating re-
tirement, as one cannot rely on experience.
Standard economic choice theory pioneered by Yaari (1965) predicts that
individuals should fully convert their accumulated savings into a lifetime
annuity to maximize expected utility by smoothing their consumption. A
lifetime annuity — as typically offered by insurance companies -– guaran-
tees a certain monthly or yearly payment as long as the policyholder is alive
in exchange for a lump sum of money. Despite the attractiveness of annu-
ities as a way to protect against the risk of outliving one’s retirement wealth,
relatively few of those facing retirement actually annuitize a significant pro-
portion of their wealth, a discrepancy coined the annuity puzzle. Over the
past decades, researchers have tried to explain the annuitization puzzle un-
der consideration of both rational and behavioral factors. However, adding
some behavioral factors such as self-control problems, inertia, and a lack of
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financial sophistication only deepened the puzzle (Benartzi et al., 2011), sug-
gesting that many individuals have an inherent aversion against annuitiza-
tion.
In Chapter 5, we investigate the wealth decumulation decision from the
perspective of retirees who are averse to the prospect of fully annuitizing
their accumulated savings. Individuals thus face the following decision
problem upon entering retirement: out of their non-annuitized wealth, they
must decide how much to allocate to a savings account (e.g. as protection
against early unexpected costs) and how much (if anything) to decumu-
late over the course of their retirement. As an alternative to annuities,
we investigate consumers’ preferences for phased withdrawal accounts.
Phased withdrawal accounts typically involve an investment in a balanced
retirement fund from which -– according to some prespecified rule -– part
of the invested money is withdrawn on a regular basis to fund consumption
needs. Whereas phased withdrawal accounts cannot offer protection against
longevity risk, they allow retirees to retain control over their accumulated
savings. In the light of recent findings, which question the benefit of full
annuitization in the presence of stochastic health shocks (e.g. Reichling and
Smetters, 2015; or Peijnenburg et al., 2017), such an analysis might not only
provide valuable insights for the design of complementary products but also
important policy implications.
To examine our research question, we field a large online survey in co-
operation with a national German newspaper, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
(FAZ), in which we elicit preferences for simple drawdown strategies. The
strategies differ across two main dimensions, risky vs. risk-free asset alloca-
tion and constant vs. dynamic withdrawal rates. In the Chapter, we address
the following questions: 1) what hypothetical decumulation products do in-
dividuals find most appealing?; 2) what factors do individuals rate to be most
important in their wealth decumulation decision; 3) how does the demand
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for phased withdrawal products compare to the demand for annuities; and
4) how does retirement preparation affects individuals’ willingness to decu-
mulate wealth?
Our findings presented in Chapter 5 can be summarized as follows.
First, we find that most participants prefer phased withdrawal accounts
with equity-based asset allocation instead of a full risk-free allocation.
Additionally, variable payout-schemes -– which adjust to economic con-
ditions — are strongly preferred over constant payout-schemes. Second,
the two considerations that respondents report being most important for
their withdrawal account choice are sufficient protection against the risk of
depleting the capital stock early, while also achieving relatively high returns
on the invested assets. Taken together with the actual withdrawal account
choice, our results highlight that customers desire flexible payout structures,
which dynamically adjust in states of low returns. Most currently offered
decumulation products (e.g. lifelong annuities) primarily offer constant
income streams, even though there is no economic reason to do so assuming
that major expenses (e.g. vacations or health costs) do not occur on a regular
basis. While such income streams may allow customers to plan ahead, they
could also have detrimental effects on the demand and — relatedly — the
generated returns (guaranteed income streams come at the expense of less
risky investment options). Third, when offered the choice between phased
withdrawal accounts and annuities, a large fraction of individuals decline
to annuitize and instead prefer a phased withdrawal account. This result —
while surprising — is not only in line with subjects’ preference to achieve
higher returns on their accumulated savings while being flexible in the way
they decumulate wealth but also with general findings on the annuitization
puzzle. Finally, we find that participants are willing to decumulate on
average 65 % of their liquid savings over the course of their retirement. In
contrast to this rather high self-reported willingness to decumulate wealth,
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actual spending in retirement is still quite low (e.g. Olafsson and Pagel,
2018). Yet, given the low demand for annuities in our sample, we conjecture
that part of this discrepancy is driven by the lack of alternative wealth
decumulation products.
Taken together, Chapter 5 of this dissertation thesis contributes to the lit-
erature by studying how individuals approach the decision how to decumu-
late wealth and which decumulation schemes they find most appealing to
transfer wealth into a stream of income. Our results have several implica-
tions for the design and the demand for complementary products. Given
the considerably higher demand for phased withdrawal product accounts
compared to lifelong annuities in our sample, we conjecture that offering a
wider array of phased withdrawal solutions would help retirees to decumu-
late more of their savings, without being forced to fully convert their wealth.
Offering combined solutions of phased withdrawals and partial annuitiza-
tion could not only help to increase overall retirement welfare but also grant
protection against longevity risk.
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Chapter 2
Why So Negative?
Belief Formation and Risk-Taking
in Boom and Bust Markets ∗
2.1 Introduction
How do individuals form expectations about future stock returns? The an-
swer to this question is crucial to understand differences in risk-taking over
time and in particular across market cycles. A key assumption in models that
generate time-variation in risk-taking is that investors have rational expecta-
tions, which are immediately updated according to Bayes’ Rule when new in-
formation arrives (Barberis et al., 2001; Campbell and Cochrane, 1999; Gross-
man and Shiller, 1981). Implicitly, these models assume that agents know the
objective probability distribution in equilibrium and are as such fully aware
of the counter-cyclical nature of the equity risk premium (Nagel and Xu,
2019). Yet, a number of recent surveys of investors’ expectations show that
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this is not the case, and that investors – if anything – have rather pro-cyclical
expectations: they are more optimistic in boom markets and less optimistic
in recessions (Amromin and Sharpe, 2014; Giglio et al., 2019; Greenwood and
Shleifer, 2014).
In the light of this inconsistency, it is imperative to obtain a deeper un-
derstanding of how investors incorporate new information when they form
expectations, and whether this could ultimately explain differences in risk-
taking across macroeconomic cycles. Prior research has shown that investors
put too much probability weight on new information, if the information
looks representative of previously observed data (Kahneman and Tversky,
1972). Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010) as well as Gennaioli et al. (2012, 2015)
show that such a representativeness can generate and amplify boom/bust
financial crises based entirely on investors’ beliefs. Besides the representa-
tiveness of the outcome history, Kuhnen (2015) shows that agents learn dif-
ferently from outcomes in the negative domain than from the same outcome
history in the positive domain. Both findings together and individually can
lead to systematic distortions in how investors learn from outcomes and how
they incorporate beliefs in their decision-process.
In this study, we investigate whether distorted belief formation rules (i.e.
systematic violations of Bayes’ Rule) can explain differences in risk-taking
across recessions and boom markets. To examine this relation, we conduct
an experimental study with two different learning environments that closely
resemble key characteristics of financial market cycles. The first learning en-
vironment characterizes a market setting in which subjects exclusively learn
either in the positive (i.e. boom) or in the negative (i.e. bust) domain. The
second learning environment characterizes a potentially more realistic mar-
ket setting in which subjects learn from mixed-outcome distributions with
either positive expected value (i.e. boom) or negative expected value (i.e.
bust). We test 1) how different learning environments affect the formation of
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return expectations, 2) how systematic differences in beliefs resulting from
different learning environments translate to risk-taking, and 3) whether dif-
ferent learning environments not only affect subjects’ beliefs but also their
risk preferences.
While recent survey data on expectations are helpful to establish a link
between subjective beliefs and investment decisions, they do not allow in-
ference about how investors depart from rational expectations without im-
posing strong assumptions. In an experiment however, we can establish a
setting in which we have direct control over objective (rational) expectations
and can compare them to participants’ subjective beliefs. This allows us to
document systematic errors in the belief formation process, which we can
then relate to the subjects’ investment choice.
In our experiment, we combine an abstract Bayesian updating task (sim-
ilar to Grether, 1980; and more recently adopted by Glaser et al., 2013, or
Kuhnen, 2015) with an unrelated incentive-compatible investment task in a
financial environment. In the Bayesian updating task, subjects have to in-
corporate a sequence of information signals into their beliefs to estimate the
likelihood that an asset pays dividends drawn from one of two distributions.
Depending on the learning environment, the information subjects receive is
either exclusively positive (boom treatment) or negative (bust treatment) in
Experiment 1, or both positive and negative but drawn from distributions
with either positive (boom treatment) or negative expected value (bust treat-
ment) in Experiment 2. The underlying probability distribution, however,
from which the information is drawn, is completely identical in both learn-
ing environments. In other words, a Bayesian agent should make identical
forecasts, irrespective of whether he learns in a positive or negative environ-
ment.
After subjects completed the forecasting task, they make an unrelated in-
vestment decision in either a risky or an ambiguous lottery, which serves as
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a between-subject measure of belief- and preference-based risk-taking. In the am-
biguous lottery, we purposefully give participants room to form subjective
beliefs about the underlying true probability distribution. In the risky lot-
tery, we have perfect control over subjects’ return and risk expectations since
both probabilities and outcomes are known. As such, investments in the am-
biguous lottery are affected by both subjects’ risk preferences and their beliefs
about the underlying probability distribution, while investments in the risky
lottery serve as a measurement tool for risk aversion. The between-subject
comparison finally allows us to isolate the effect of belief-induced risk-taking
caused by outcome-dependent learning environments.
Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, we find that subjects
who learn to form beliefs in adverse market environments take significantly
less risk in an unrelated ambiguous investment task than subjects who learn
to form beliefs in favorable market environments. Once there is room to form
subjective beliefs, subjects in the bust treatment invest on average 20 % less
in the ambiguous lottery compared to subjects in the boom treatment. In
line with their lower willingness to take risks, subjects who have learned
to form beliefs in adverse market environments are also substantially more
pessimistic about the success probability of the ambiguous lottery (by about
19 percentage points). In the risky lottery, when expectations are fixed, we
can directly test whether adverse learning environments also affect the sub-
jects’ risk aversion. However, we do not find any significant difference be-
tween treatments on subjects’ investment in an unrelated risky investment
option. This indicates that subjects’ risk preferences (i.e. their risk aver-
sion) remained stable and were unaltered by the environment in which they
learned to form beliefs. Effectively, this finding suggests that when individ-
uals form expectations in adverse learning environments (as is frequently
the case in recessions), they become substantially more pessimistic about fu-
ture prospects. However, this pessimism only translates to lower risk-taking
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when there is uncertainty in the investment process.
Second, we investigate how adverse learning environments induce pes-
simism in subjects’ return expectations. We find that subjects who forecast
the probability distribution of an asset in an adverse learning environment
(bust treatment) are significantly more pessimistic in their average probabil-
ity estimate than those subjects who forecast the identical probability distri-
bution in a favorable learning environment (boom treatment). This indicates
that the frame of the learning environment crucially affects subjects’ belief
formation, although the actual learning task is identical. In other words, in
our setting a Bayesian forecaster would make identical probability forecasts
irrespective of the underlying learning environment. The resulting asym-
metry in belief formation resembles a pessimism bias as subjects’ beliefs in
the bust treatment show larger deviations from Bayesian beliefs compared
to subjects’ beliefs in the boom treatment. This finding is independent of
whether subjects learn exclusively from negative outcome lotteries (Experi-
ment 1) or from mixed-outcome lotteries with negative expected value (Ex-
periment 2), and extends previous work by Kuhnen (2015).
Third, we seek to better understand the link of how forecasting in dif-
ferent learning environments affects risk-taking and for whom the effect is
most pronounced. We find that those subjects who show above-median fore-
casting ability in the learning task of the experiment critically drive the re-
sults. In particular, these subjects show a stronger link between the pes-
simism induced by the initial adverse learning environment and the subse-
quent (lower) risk-taking. However, and importantly, even these subjects
still exhibit a pronounced pessimism bias in their probability assessment,
which subsequently translates to more pessimistic beliefs about the success
probability of the ambiguous asset. To rationalize why the risk-taking of the
seemingly better performing agents is more affected by the learning environ-
ment, we test whether they are more involved in the experimental task. We
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find that above-median forecasters spend significantly more time on reading
the instructions and make significantly less basic, directional wrong updat-
ing errors than below-median forecasters. As such, our analyses rather sug-
gests that the effect reported here might be even stronger in the real economy,
where stakes and involvement are presumably higher.
Finally, we provide evidence that the pessimism induced by adverse
learning environments within our experimental setup even affects subjects’
return expectations in the real economy. When asked to provide a return
forecast of the Dow Jones Industrial Average, subjects in the bust treatment
are significantly more pessimistic about the future performance of the index
than their peers in the boom treatment. In addition to the more pessimistic
expectations, we find that subjects who learn in adverse financial conditions
provide negative return estimates, while those learning in rather favorable
financial conditions provide positive return estimates. Given that we are
able to systematically manipulate return expectations for real world market
indices even in a short-living learning environment as in our experiment,
we believe that the effect reported here is even more generalizable in the real
economy.
Our findings contribute to several strands of literature. Most importantly,
our results provide a direct and causal link of how systematic distortions in
investors’ expectations can affect their willingness to take financial risks. The
most prominent rational expectations models that generate high volatility of
asset prices and the countercyclical equity risk premium introduce modifica-
tions into the representative agent’s utility function, which effectively gen-
erates countercyclical risk aversion (Campbell and Cochrane, 1999; Barberis
et al., 2001). This implies that during bust markets investors become more
risk averse and consequently demand a higher risk premium, and they be-
come less risk averse during boom markets, thus demanding a lower risk
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premium. Recently, Cohn et al. (2015) present experimental evidence sup-
porting this notion, while Guiso et al. (2018) present survey evidence in line
with this argument.1
However, in our experimental design, we can confidently rule out that a
change in preferences can explain our findings. Instead, we show that expec-
tations and how they are formed can generate similar feedback loops as im-
plied by countercyclical risk aversion without having to assume unstable risk
preferences. If bust markets systematically induce pessimistic expectations
about future returns for a substantial subset of investors, this may reduce the
aggregate share invested in risky assets of an economy, which in turn gen-
erates downward pressure on prices due to excess supply. In line with our
results, Amromin and Sharpe (2014) find that households’ lower willingness
to take risks during recessions is rather driven by their more pessimistic sub-
jective expectations than by countercyclical risk aversion. Similarly, Weber
et al. (2013) show that changes in risk-taking of UK online-broker customers
over the financial crisis of 2008 were mainly explained by changes in return
expectations and to a lesser degree by changes in risk attitudes.
Furthermore, our study also relates to the findings reported in recent sur-
veys of investor return expectations (Amromin and Sharpe, 2014; Giglio et al.,
2019; Greenwood and Shleifer, 2014). A common finding is that survey ex-
pectations of stock returns are pro-cyclical (i.e. investors are more optimistic
during boom markets and more pessimistic during recessions), and as such
inconsistent with rational expectation models. A first attempt to reconcile
this puzzling finding was made by Adam et al. (2020), who test whether al-
ternative expectation hypotheses proposed in the asset pricing literature are
in line with the survey evidence. However, they reject all of them. In our
study, we also find that investors’ expectations are pro-cyclical, as they are
1 There are also recent papers who challenge the notion of countercyclical risk aversion as
tested in Cohn et al. (2015) such as Alempaki et al. (2019) and König-Kersting and Trautmann
(2018).
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more optimistic when learning in favorable environments then when learn-
ing in adverse environments. As such, the belief formation mechanism tested
in our study may provide an interesting starting point for alternative theories
of belief updating featuring pro-cyclical expectations.
Finally, our finding also relates to the literature on investors’ experience
(Graham and Narasimhan, 2004; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011, 2015; Mal-
mendier and Tate, 2005; Malmendier et al., 2011). The literature posits that
events experienced over the course of an investor’s life have persistent and
long-lasting effects. In the spirit of this literature, learning rules, if more fre-
quently applied throughout investors’ lives, may exert a greater influence on
the way they form beliefs and ultimately on their willingness to take risks.
For example, investors who experienced the Great Depression in their early
career were more frequently exposed to negative stock returns, which might
have affected the way they form beliefs about future economic events. As
a result, these investors are more pessimistic in their assessment of future
stock returns and less willing to take financial risks compared to those who
experienced the post-war boom until the 1960s in their early life.
The mechanism reported here and its effect on risk-taking may have im-
portant policy implications. For example, if investors exhibit overly pes-
simistic expectations in recessions, they may expect lower returns and reduce
their equity share. As a consequence, the pro-cyclical nature of beliefs result-
ing from partly distorted belief formation rules reported in our study may
amplify the intensity and the length of market phases.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we
outline the experimental design, and briefly discuss the most important de-
sign aspects. In Section 2.3, we state our hypotheses, while in Section 2.4
we describe summary statistics of our sample and randomization checks. In
Section 2.5, we present our findings, and in Section 2.6 we conclude.
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2.2 Experimental Design
Seven-hundred fifty-four individuals (458 males, 296 females, mean age 34
years, 10.3 years standard deviation) were recruited from Amazon Mechani-
cal Turk (MTurk) to participate in two online experiments. MTurk advanced
to a widely used and accepted recruiting platform for economic experiments.
Not only does it offer a larger and more diverse subject pool as compared
to lab studies (which frequently rely on students), but it also provides a re-
sponse quality similar to that of other subject pools (Buhrmester et al., 2011;
Goodman et al., 2013).
2.2.1 Detailed Description of the Experiment
Both experiments consist of two independent parts, a forecasting task
(Bayesian updating) and an investment task. The experiments differ with
respect to the forecasting task, but are identical with respect to the invest-
ment task. In the forecasting task, we create a learning environment which
resembles key characteristics of boom and bust markets (see Figure 2.1).
In Experiment 1, we focus on the domain (positive vs. negative returns)
in which subjects primarily learn across different market cycles. As such, we
let subjects learn from either exclusively positive outcome-lotteries (boom-
scenario) or negative outcome-lotteries (bust-scenario). However, even in
recessions agents occasionally observe positive returns, but the magnitude is
on average smaller than the magnitude of observed negative returns. During
the last two financial crises, the frequency of observing a negative monthly
return of the MSCI AC World index was 66.67 % for the DotCom Crisis and
68.42 % for the 2008 Financial Crisis, while the average realized monthly re-
turn was −1.17 % and −2.11 %, respectively, as displayed in Figure 2.2.2 To
account for this fact, we conduct another experiment with a more realistic
2 Business cycles are defined using the NBER Business Cycle Expansion and Contractions
Classification.
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Figure 2.1: Learning Environments and Treatments
Note: This figure displays the learning environments of the first part, the forecasting task,
of our two experiments. In both experiments, subjects are randomly assigned to either a
Boom or a Bust Treatment. In Experiment 1, subjects learn from subsequently drawn posi-
tive (Boom) or negative (Bust) returns about the underlying state of a lottery (good or bad
state). In Experiment 2, subjects learn from subsequently drawn positive and negative re-
turns, but either from a lottery with positive (Boom) or negative (Bust) expected value about
the underlying state of the lottery (good or bad state).
learning environment. In Experiment 2 subjects learn from mixed outcome-
lotteries, which either have a positive expected value (boom-scenario) or a
negative expected value (bust-scenario).
In the forecasting task of both experiments, subjects receive information
about a risky asset, whose payoffs are either drawn from a “good distribu-
tion” or from a “bad distribution”. Both distributions are binary with identi-
cal high and low outcomes. In the good distribution, the higher payoff occurs
with a 70 % probability while the lower payoff occurs with a 30 % proba-
bility. In the bad distribution, the probabilities are reversed, i.e. the lower
payoff occurs with a 70 % probability while the higher payoff occurs with
a 30 % probability. The actual payoffs depend on both the experiment and
the treatment to which subjects are assigned. In both experiments, subjects
are randomly assigned to either a “boom” treatment or a “bust” treatment.
In the first experiment, the payoffs of the risky asset are either exclusively
positive or negative, which resembles domain-specific learning. The payoffs
in the boom treatment are either +15, or +2, whereas they are −2, or −15 in
the bust treatment. In the second experiment, the payoffs of the risky asset
are drawn from mixed-outcome lotteries, with either a positive or a negative
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Figure 2.2: Characteristics of Boom and Bust Market Phases
Note: This figure documents both the relative frequency of observing a negative monthly
return of the MSCI All Country World Index as well as the average monthly return for the
last two financial recessions. Recessions are defined according to the NBER US Business
Cycle Contraction classification. The left y-axis refers to the relative frequency of negative
returns. The right y-axis (reversed scale) refers to the average monthly realized returns.
expected value. The payoffs in the boom treatment are either +15, or −2,
whereas they are +2, or −15 in the bust treatment. While the payoffs across
treatments are mirrored, the underlying probability distributions of the risky
asset from which outcomes are drawn are identical.
In both experiments, subjects make forecasting decisions in two consecu-
tive blocks each consisting of eight rounds. At the beginning of each block,
the computer randomly determines the distribution of the risky asset (which
can be good or bad). In each of the eight rounds, subjects observe a payoff
of the risky asset. Afterwards, we ask them to provide a probability estimate
that the risky asset draws from the good distribution and how confident they
are about their estimate. As such, subjects will make a total of 16 probability
estimates (8 estimates per block). To keep the focus on the forecasting task
and to not test their memory performance, we display the prior outcomes
in a price-line-chart next to the questions. To ensure that subjects had a suf-
ficient understanding of the forecasting task, they had to correctly answer
three comprehension questions before they could continue (see Appendix
A).
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Figure 2.3: Between-subject Measure of Belief- and Preference-based
Risk-Taking
Note: This figure presents the between-subject measure of belief- and preference-based risk-
taking used in the investment task of our experiments. The ambiguous lottery is character-
ized by unknown probabilities, whereas the risky lottery is characterized by known proba-
bilities.
In the second part of each experiment, the investment task, we introduce
a between-subject measure of belief- and preference-based risk-taking, pre-
sented in Figure 2.3. Subjects were randomly assigned to invest in either an
ambiguous or a risky lottery with an endowment of 100 Cents (Gneezy and
Potters, 1997). In both lotteries, the underlying distribution to win is 50 %.
However, to introduce uncertainty and to provide subjects the freedom to
form beliefs, the success probability remains unknown to them in the am-
biguous lottery. In both lotteries, subjects can earn 2.5 times the invested
amount if the lottery succeeds, whereas they lose the invested amount if the
lottery fails. Subjects can keep the amount not invested in the lottery with-
out earning any interest. In addition to the lottery investment, subjects in the
ambiguous treatment are asked to provide an estimate of the success proba-
bility of the ambiguous lottery. Subjects in the risky treatment are not asked
about a probability estimate as the objective success probability is known and
clearly communicated.
The experiments concluded with a brief survey about subjects’ socio-
economic background, a 10-item inventory of the standard Life Orientation
Test (Scheier et al., 1994), self-assessed statistical skills, stock trading experi-
ence and whether a participant was invested during the last financial crisis.
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Figure 2.4: Structure and Flow of the Experiment
Note: This figure shows a time line of our experiments. Subjects do a forecasting task fol-
lowed by an independent investment task. The forecasting task consists of two blocks. In
each block, subjects have to give eight probability estimates and eight estimates about how
confident they are about their forecasts. Both blocks of forecasting are either in a boom mar-
ket or in a bust market environment. The random assignment of the boom or bust market
environment is done at the beginning of the experiment. After the forecasting task, subjects
invest either in an ambiguous lottery or in a risky lottery. For the ambiguous lottery, they are
in addition asked about an estimate of the underlying success probability. The experiments
end with a short survey which consists of a six-month forecast of the Dow Jones Industrial
Average, a 10-item Life Orientation Test, and socio-demographic questions.
In addition, subjects were asked to provide a 6-month return forecast of the
Dow Jones Industrial Average index on a twelve-point balanced Likert scale.
In summary, Figure 2.4 provides a time line of the experiments, including all
described stages.
Both parts of the experiment were incentivized. In the first part, partici-
pants were paid based on the accuracy of the probability estimate provided.
Specifically, they received 10 cents for each probability estimate within 10 %
(+/− 5%) of the objective Bayesian value. In the second part of the exper-
iment, subjects received the amount not invested in the lottery plus the net
earnings from their lottery investment. Both studies took approximately 9
minutes to complete and participants earned $1.93 on average.
2.2.2 Discussion of Important Aspects
Overall, our design allows us to test whether asymmetric belief formation
in boom and bust markets can account for time variation in risk taking. As
it is imperative for our design to ensure that risk preferences remain con-
stant and are unaffected by the forecasting task, a few aspects warrant a brief
discussion. First, feedback regarding the accuracy of subjects’ probability
estimates was only provided at the very end of the experiment. This was
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done to not only avoid wealth effects, but also to ensure that subjects do not
hedge the lottery investment against their earnings from the forecasting task,
which would inevitably affect their risk-taking. Second, we abstract from
using predisposed words like “boom”, “bust”, or similar financial jargon.
This circumvents evoking negative or positive emotions (such as fear), ex-
perience effects, and other confounding factors, which would distort a clear
identification of belief-induced risk-taking. Third, by exploiting the between-
subject variation in the lottery tasks, we can directly investigate whether the
forecasting task in different domains unintentionally affects risk preferences.
More precisely, we can exclude that learning from adverse market conditions
affects risk preferences.3
2.3 Hypotheses
We have two main hypotheses, one regarding the forecasting task and one
regarding the investment task. First, we test whether forecasting in adverse
learning environments systematically induces pessimism in subjects’ belief
formation. In the first experiment, we investigate the effect of domain-
specific learning environments on subjects belief formation as originally
tested by Kuhnen (2015). In the second experiment, we examine whether
this effect is restricted to domain-specific learning or whether it generalizes
to mixed-outcome learning environments as frequently observed in both
boom markets and in recessions.
H1: Pessimism Bias
Subjects in the bust treatment are significantly more pessimistic in their
average probability forecast both relative to the objective Bayesian fore-
cast and relative to the subjects in the boom treatment.
Next, we investigate the main treatment effect of our study. In particular,
we aim to examine whether asymmetric belief formation in boom and bust
3 Although we can directly control for the effect of positive and negative numbers on risk
preferences in our design, Kuhnen (2015) concludes as well that risk preferences remain
unaffected.
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markets could explain differences in risk-taking. To do so, we introduce a
between-subject measure of belief- and preference-based risk-taking. In the
risky treatment, we have perfect control over subjects’ return and risk expec-
tations since both probabilities and outcomes are known and clearly commu-
nicated. As such, the risky treatment serves as a measurement tool for risk
aversion. In the ambiguous treatment however, we intentionally give partic-
ipants room to form subjective beliefs as there is uncertainty about the true
probability. If the induced pessimism leads to more pessimistic expectations,
we should observe a stronger treatment effect in the ambiguity treatment as
the absence of perfect certainty about the success probability of the ambigu-
ous lottery leaves more room for expectations (Klibanoff et al., 2005).
H2a: Belief-Induced Risk-Taking
Subjects in the bust treatment invest significantly less in the ambiguous
lottery than subjects in the boom treatment.
H2b: Preference-Based Risk-Taking
Investments in the risky lottery should not significantly differ across
treatments.
2.4 Summary Statistics and Randomization
Checks
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics, Panel A for Experiment 1 and Panel
B for Experiment 2. Overall 754 subjects participated in our studies, with
an average age of 35.15 years in Experiment 1 (33.53 years in Experiment
2). Forty-five percent (thirty-four percent) were female. Subjects reported
average statistical skills of 4.19 out of 7 (4.47) and are medium experienced
in stock trading, with a self-reported average score of 3.64 out of 7 (3.94).
Roughly thirty-nine percent (forty-four) were invested during the 2008 Fi-
nancial Crisis.
Additionally, we tested whether our randomization successfully resulted
in a balanced sample. Table 2.1 also reports the mean and standard deviation
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics on Subjects
Panel A: Experiment 1 Full Sample Boom Bust Differ- p-value
Variable (N=350) (N=174) (N=176) ence
Age 35.15 34.76 35.54 0.78 0.76
(11.52) (11.18) (11.86)
Female 0.45 0.47 0.43 0.04 0.44
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Statistical Skills 4.19 4.22 4.16 0.06 0.91
(1.62) (1.51) (1.72)
Experience Stock Trading 3.64 3.73 3.56 0.17 0.42
(1.88) (1.84) (1.92)
Invested Financial Crisis 0.39 0.39 0.39 0 1
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
Panel B: Experiment 2 Full Sample Boom Bust Differ- p-value
Variable (N=403) (N=207) (N=196) ence
Age 33.53 32.73 34.37 1.63 0.07
(9.03) (8.46) (9.55)
Female 0.34 0.33 0.35 0.02 0.69
(0.48) (0.47) (0.48)
Statistical Skills 4.47 4.40 4.55 0.15 0.42
(1.67) (1.69) (1.65)
Experience Stock Trading 3.94 3.89 3.98 0.09 0.52
(1.99) (1.95) (2.03)
Invested Financial Crisis 0.44 0.41 0.47 0.06 0.24
(0.50) (0.49) (0.50)
Note: This table shows summary statistics for our experimental data. Reported are the mean
and the standard deviation (in parentheses) for the whole sample (Column 1) and split across
treatments (Column 2 and 3). Column 4 presents randomization checks. Differences in mean
were tested using rank-sum tests, or χ2-tests for binary variables. The p-value is reported in
Column 5. Female is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a participant is female. Statistical
skills denotes participants’ self-assessed statistical skills on a 7-point Likert scale. Experience
in stock trading is the self-reported experience participants have in stock trading, assessed by
a 7-point Likert scale. Invested financial crisis is an indicator that equals 1 if participants were
invested in the stock market during the last financial crisis.
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of each variable split by treatment. Differences were tested using rank-sum
tests, or χ2-tests for binary variables. As we find no significant difference
between our treatments for any variable, our randomization was successful.
As such, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the socio-economic back-
ground of the subjects is balanced between our boom and bust treatment.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Main Result
Distorted Belief Formation
First, we examine whether belief formation in bust markets differs from be-
lief formation in boom markets and to what extend the effect depends on the
underlying characteristic of the learning environment. While participants
learn exclusively from either only positive or negative outcome lotteries (i.e.
domain-specific learning) in Experiment 1, they learn from mixed outcome
lotteries with either positive or negative expected value (i.e. mixed-outcome
dependent learning) in Experiment 2. Figure 2.5 displays the average prob-
ability estimate over eight rounds for good and bad distributions, separated
by treatment and experiment.
In the domain-specific learning environment (Experiment 1), we find that
subjects who forecast the distribution of an asset from negative numbers only
(i.e. bust treatment) are significantly more pessimistic in their average prob-
ability estimate than those who forecast the identical distribution from posi-
tive numbers (i.e. boom treatment). This finding is independent of the type
of distribution subjects witnessed (good or bad) and in line with previous
work by Kuhnen (2015).
Interestingly, and perhaps more importantly for market cycles, this find-
ing is not limited to domain-specific learning environments. Instead, those
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Figure 2.5: Pessimism Bias
Note: This figure documents the pessimism bias. It depicts participants’ average probability
forecasts split by the underlying distribution they had to forecast (good or bad), the treat-
ment they were in (boom or bust), and the experiment in which they participated (domain-
specific forecasting or mixed-outcome forecasting). Displayed are 95 % confidence intervals.
subjects who forecast distributions from mixed-outcome lotteries with neg-
ative expected value (bust treatment) are also more pessimistic in their av-
erage probability assessment than those who learn from mixed-outcome lot-
teries with positive expected value (boom treatment). In contrast, a Bayesian
forecaster would provide completely identical probability estimates irrespec-
tive of the learning environment given the identical underlying distribution
from which outcomes are drawn. To control for the objective posterior prob-
ability, we also run regressions of subjects’ probability estimates on a bust-
indicator and the objective Bayesian probability that the stock is in the good
state. Results for both experiments pooled and individually are reported in
Table 2.2.
Across both experiments, we find that beliefs expressed by subjects in
the bust treatment are on average 6.43 % lower (i.e. more pessimistic) than
in the boom treatment (p < 0.001), confirming Hypothesis H1. This means
that – holding the objective posterior constant – subjects update their priors
differently when learning in adverse market environments compared to fa-
vorable environments. Remarkably, the magnitude of this pessimism bias
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Table 2.2: Pessimism Bias
Dependent Variable Probability Estimate (Subjective Posterior)
Pooled Data Domain-specific Mixed
Bust −6.425*** −6.218*** −6.742***
(−6.16) (−3.86) (−4.88)
Objective Posterior 0.378*** 0.370*** 0.384***
(23.94) (17.21) (17.09)
Constant 46.31*** 45.96*** 47.01***
(10.82) (7.02) (8.24)
Observations 12048 5600 6448
R2 0.262 0.244 0.279
Note: This table reports the results of three OLS regressions on how subjective posterior be-
liefs about the distribution of the lottery depend on the treatment. The dependent variable
in the regression model, Probability Estimate, is the subjective posterior belief that the asset
is paying from the good distribution. Independent variables include the Bust dummy, an
indicator variable that equals 1 if participants were in the bust treatment and zero other-
wise, as well as Objective Posterior, which is the correct Bayesian probability that the stock is
good, given the information seen by the participant up to trial t in the learning block. Con-
trols include age, gender, statistical skills, self-reported experience in stock trading, whether
subjects were invested in the stock market during the last financial crisis, and the order of
outcomes they experienced in the forecasting task. Reported are coefficients and t-statistics
(in parentheses) using robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
does not significantly differ across experiments. In other words, the reported
pessimism bias does not critically depend on whether subjects observe exclu-
sively negative outcomes or mixed outcomes drawn from a distribution with
negative expected value. In essence, our results imply that the way subjects
form beliefs is different in bust markets than in boom markets.
Belief Formation and Risk-Taking
So far, we have shown that belief formation is systematically distorted by
whether subjects learn during boom periods or during bust periods. Next,
we investigate whether the induced pessimism resulting from biased belief
formation in bust markets translates to lower risk-taking, without altering
risk preferences. Table 2.3 summarizes subjects’ average investment in the
ambiguous and risky lottery, split by treatment.
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Table 2.3: Risk-Taking Across Macroeconomic Cycles I
Treatment
Bust Boom Difference p-value
Investment Ambiguous 36.31 44.82 -8.51*** < 0.01
Investment Risky 42.57 39.38 3.19 0.32
Note: This table summarizes the average investments (0 - 100) of participants in the ambigu-
ous lottery and the risky lottery split by the treatment variable. Differences in investment
between the treatments with the respective p-values from two-sided t-tests are also reported.
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
The results reported in Table 2.3 provide a simple first test for our main
hypothesis. In particular, while subjects in the bust treatment invest on av-
erage 36 out of 100 Cents into the ambiguous lottery, subjects in the boom
treatment invest roughly 45 Cents into the ambiguous lottery (p < 0.01, two-
sided t-test). As such, we find a significant treatment effect of learning to
form beliefs in adverse market conditions on subjects’ willingness to take
risks. That is, subjects in the bust treatment invest on average 20 % less in the
ambiguous lottery than subjects in the boom treatment. However, we find
no such effect for investments in the risky lottery. While subjects in the boom
treatment invest on average 39 Cents in the risky lottery, subjects in the bust
treatment invest roughly 43 Cents, with no significant difference between
the two (p = 0.32, two-sided t-test). Effectively, this result indicates that
the pessimism induced by adverse market environments only translates to
significantly lower risk-taking when there is room to form subjective expec-
tations (i.e. the decision involves ambiguity). However, when expectations
are fixed, risk-taking is not affected, which implies that asymmetric learning
in different market environments does not alter individuals’ inherent risk
preferences.
To jointly test our main hypotheses while controlling for demographics
and other potentially confounding factors, we specify the following regres-
sion model:
Investmenti = β0 + β1Busti + β2Ambiguousi + β3BustixAmbiguousi +
n
∑
j=1
β jXij + εi
(2.1)
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where the dependent variable Investmenti is the amount individual i invested
in the risky/ambiguous asset. Busti is a dummy that denotes if a subject
learned to form beliefs in the bust treatment, while Ambiguousi is a dummy
that denotes that the investment decision was made under ambiguity (i.e.
unknown probabilities in the investment task). The interaction Busti x
Ambiguousi allows us to examine our main hypothesis, i.e. that subjects
who learned to form beliefs in adverse environments invest significantly
less in the ambiguous lottery where they have room to form subjective
expectations. Finally, Xij is a set of control variables including gender, age,
statistical skills, stock trading experience, a life orientation test, the order of
good and bad distributions in the forecasting task, and an indicator whether
subjects were invested in the last financial crisis. We estimate our regression
model using OLS with robust standard errors. However, results remain
stable if we use a Tobit model instead.
In Table 2.4, we report our main finding for each experiment pooled and
separately. In the pooled data, the negative interaction term indicates that in-
dividuals in the bust treatment invest significantly less in the ambiguous lot-
tery compared to those in the boom treatment (p = 0.011), providing further
evidence in favor of Hypothesis H2a. In the risky lottery, when expectations
are fixed, we can directly test the effect of our forecasting task on subjects’
risk aversion. However, we do not find any significant difference between
treatments on subjects’ investment in the risky lottery (p = 0.47), confirm-
ing Hypothesis H2b. This means that we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that risk aversion for subjects who learned to form beliefs in adverse market
environments is similar compared to subjects who learned to form beliefs in
favorable market environments.
When looking at the results of each experiment separately, we find a
strong and similar-sized effect for the domain-specific learning environment
and a weaker – albeit statistically insignificant – effect for the mixed-outcome
learning environment. Moreover, and consistent with the pooled data, we
find no effect on subjects’ risk preferences in neither the domain-specific nor
the mixed-outcome learning environment. To better understand whether the
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Table 2.4: Risk-Taking Across Macroeconomic Cycles II
Dependent Variable Investment
Pooled Data Domain-specific Mixed
Bust 2.271 3.948 −0.948
(0.72) (0.86) (−0.21)
Ambiguous 5.149* 5.540 4.473
(1.71) (1.26) (1.04)
Bust x Ambiguous -11.23** -13.57** -8.229
(-2.54) (-2.21) (-1.25)
Constant 15.82* 20.32* 10.69
(1.70) (1.67) (0.74)
Observations 753 350 403
R2 0.060 0.080 0.069
Note: This table examines subjects’ risk-taking across treatments. We report the results of
OLS regressions for the whole sample, and for each experiment individually (Experiment
1: Domain-specific; Experiment 2: Mixed). The dependent variable is Investment, which
denotes participants’ invested amount (0 - 100) in the lottery they were assigned to. Bust is
an indicator variable that equals 1 if participants were in the bust treatment. Ambiguous is an
indicator variable that equals 1 if participants were asked to invest in the ambiguous lottery,
and 0 if they invested in the risky lottery. Controls include age, gender, statistical skills, self-
reported experience in stock trading, whether subjects were invested in the stock market
during the last financial crisis, and the order of outcomes they experienced in the forecasting
task. Reported are coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) using robust standard errors.
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
effect in the pooled sample is primarily driven by domain-specific outcomes,
or whether other factors are at play, we will run further regressions in Section
2.5.3.
Mechanism
In this section, we test whether expectations are indeed the driving mecha-
nism behind our main effect. We designed the ambiguous treatment in such
a way that we can assess participants’ subjective beliefs about the success
probability of the lottery and directly relate them to their investment deci-
sion. If expectations are the main driver of differences in risk-taking, we
should observe that subjects who learned to form beliefs in in the bust treat-
ments are more pessimistic about the success probability of the ambiguous
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lottery. In addition, we would expect a positive correlation between the sub-
jective probability estimate of the success chance of the ambiguous lottery
and the amount invested in the ambiguous lottery. In order to directly test
the implied mechanism, we estimate the following two OLS regression mod-
els for our pooled sample and for each experiment separately:
Probabilityi = β0 + β1Busti +
n
∑
j=1
β jXij + εi (2.2)
InvestmentAmbiguousi = β0 + β1Probabilityi +
n
∑
j=1
β jXij + εi (2.3)
where Probabilityi is the subjective success probability of the ambiguous
lottery of subject i, and InvestmentAmbiguousi is the investment of subject i in
the ambiguous lottery. Findings for the first model are reported in Table 2.5
and for the second model in Table 2.6.
Table 2.5: Relation Between Treatment Variable and Probability Estimates
Dependent Variable Success Probability Estimate of Ambiguous Asset
Pooled Data Domain-specific Mixed
Bust -18.86*** -11.83*** -25.59***
(-8.59) (-3.74) (-8.57)
Constant 55.83*** 68.72*** 41.10***
(6.15) (5.25) (3.59)
Observations 377 177 200
R2 0.241 0.176 0.349
Note: This table examines the underlying mechanism of how our treatment variable affects
subjects’ beliefs about the success probability of the ambiguous lottery. We report the results
of OLS regressions for the whole sample, and for each experiment individually (Experiment
1: Domain-specific; Experiment 2: Mixed). The dependent variable is Success Probability,
which denotes participants’ beliefs about the success probability of the ambiguous lottery.
Bust is an indicator variable that equals 1 if participants were in the bust treatment. Controls
include age, gender, statistical skills, self-reported experience in stock trading and whether
subjects were invested in the stock market during the last financial crisis. Reported are
coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) using robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicates
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
In the pooled data, we find a strong and highly significant effect of our
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treatment indicator on the subjective success probability of the ambiguous
lottery. In particular, those subjects who learned to form expectations in the
bust treatment are about 19 percentage points (p < 0.001) more pessimistic
about the success probability than subjects who learned to form beliefs in the
boom treatment (average success probability estimate for boom treatment:
68 %; for bust treatment: 49 %). The finding remains stable and statistically
highly significant for each learning environment separately, even though the
effect seems to be stronger in the mixed-outcome learning environment. As
such, the induced pessimism resulting from distorted belief formation trans-
lates to other – independent – investment environments.
Table 2.6: Relation Between Beliefs About Success Probability and
Investment
Dep. Variable Investment in Ambiguous Asset
Pooled Pooled Domain- Domain- Mixed Mixed
Data Data specific specific
Success Probability 0.412*** 0.409*** 0.365*** 0.341*** 0.470*** 0.521***
(6.45) (5.70) (3.88) (3.42) (5.47) (4.83)
Bust -0.372 -3.846 4.571
(-0.11) (-0.93) (0.82)
Constant -3.304 -2.985 -5.350 -2.458 2.166 0.00936
(-0.26) (-0.23) (-0.36) (-0.16) (0.10) (0.00)
Observations 377 377 177 177 200 200
R2 0.146 0.146 0.162 0.166 0.157 0.160
Note: This table examines whether subjects in our experiment act upon their beliefs about
the success probability of the ambiguous asset. We report the results of OLS regressions for
the whole sample, and for each experiment individually (Experiment 1: Domain-specific;
Experiment 2: Mixed). The dependent variable is Investment Ambiguous, which captures
subjects’ invested amount in the ambiguous lottery. Success Probability denotes participants’
beliefs about the success probability of the ambiguous lottery. Bust is an indicator variable
that equals 1 if participants were in the bust treatment. Controls include age, gender, sta-
tistical skills, self-reported experience in stock trading and whether subjects were invested
in the stock market during the last financial crisis. Reported are coefficients and t-statistics
(in parentheses) using robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
In Table 2.6, we test whether differences in subjective expectations regard-
ing the success probability of the ambiguous lottery also translate to changes
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in risk-taking. In essence, we test whether subjects adhere to a basic eco-
nomic principle: keeping everything else constant, do subjects increase their
investment in an ambiguous asset when their beliefs about the outcome dis-
tribution are more optimistic? Our results across all specifications confirm
that subjects act upon their beliefs. In other words, the more optimistic they
are about the success probability of the ambiguous asset, the more they invest
(p < 0.01). In addition, in Columns (2), (4), and (6), we include the Bust indi-
cator as an additional control variable to exclude the possibility that our ma-
nipulation affects factors unrelated to expectations. Even after including the
Bust indicator, the effect of subjective probability estimates on investments
remains of similar magnitude and statistical significance. Moreover, we find
no additional effect of our manipulation on the investment decision. Effec-
tively, this means while our manipulation does induce pessimism, it does not
affect factors unrelated to expectations.
Taken together, our main findings suggest that: 1) Learning to form be-
liefs in adverse market environments induces pessimism caused by system-
atic errors in the belief updating process. 2) This pessimism translates to
lower risk-taking even in independent investment environments when there
is room to form beliefs. 3) Pessimism causes agents to assign lower proba-
bilities to more favorable outcomes. 4) Learning in adverse market environ-
ments and the resulting errors in the belief updating process do not affect
risk preferences.
2.5.2 Boundaries and External Validity
In this section, we seek to test both the external validity and the boundaries
of the induced pessimism resulting from asymmetric learning in boom and
bust markets, we analyze subjects’ responses to two additional set of ques-
tions, which deal with expectations outside the experimental setting. The
first question tests to which extent the induced pessimism translates to ex-
pectations in the real economy. We gave subjects the at the time current level
of the Dow Jones Industrial Average, and asked them to provide a 6-month
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return forecast on a balanced 12-point Likert scale (see Appendix A). The sec-
ond set of questions tests to which degree the induced pessimism from the
underlying learning environment permeates to different contexts. As a mea-
sure of dispositional optimism/pessimism across different life situations, we
included a 10-item general Life Orientation Test borrowed from Scheier et al.
(1994), which is frequently used in psychological research (see Appendix A).
The results for the Dow Jones return estimate are reported in Figure 2.6 Panel
A, whereas the results for the Life Orientation Test are reported in Panel B.
For the Dow Jones return estimates, we consistently find across all learn-
ing environments that subjects in the bust treatment are significantly more
pessimistic in their return expectations. More strikingly, subjects in the bust
treatment provide not only lower return estimates but also negative return
estimates, while those in the boom treatment provide positive return esti-
mates on average. Moreover, the effect seems to be stronger in absolute mag-
nitude for the negative return estimates, consistent with a pessimism bias.
It remains to stress, that even in such a simple and short-learning environ-
ment as in our experiment, we are able to systematically manipulate return
expectations for real world market indices.
Finally, we investigate the boundaries of how the pessimism induced by
adverse learning environments affects subjects overall psychological well-
being. Across all experiments we do not find any significant difference in
dispositional optimism/pessimism depending on whether subjects were in
the boom or bust treatment. Taken together, our results suggest that the envi-
ronment in which subjects learn strongly affects their return expectations for
even unrelated financial investments, but does not affect subjects’ inherent
psychological traits such as neuroticism, anxiety, self-mastery, or self-esteem
as assessed by the Life Orientation Test.
2.5.3 Further Analyses and Robustness Checks
In this section, we seek to establish a more profound understanding of how
subjects’ forecasting abilities in the first part of the experiments affect their
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Figure 2.6: Dow Jones Estimates and Life Orientation Test
Note: Panel A of the figure displays subjects’ self-reported return expectations of the Dow
Jones Industrial average. Dow Jones return expectations were assessed on a 12-point Lik-
ert scale. Results are displayed separately for subjects across treatments (boom / bust) and
across experiments. Panel B of the figure displays subjects’ answers to a general life orienta-
tion test. The life orientation test (Scheier et al., 1994) is a 10-item inventory where subjects
rate statements on a 7-point Likert scale. Displayed is the cumulated score separated by
treatment (boom / bust) and by experiment. Displayed are 95% confidence intervals.
subsequent risk-taking. To investigate this relation, we define the squared
deviation of subjects’ probability estimate in each round from the objective
posterior probability as a measure of forecasting quality. Next, we conduct
median splits with respect to this measure to distinguish above-median fore-
casters from below-median forecasters. To assess the validity of our measure,
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we compare the number of correct forecasts (defined in the payment scheme
by being in the range of 10 % of the objective forecast) between below- and
above-median forecasters. Across both experiments, those subjects who are
classified as "above-median" have on average three more correct forecasts
than those classified as "below-median" (p < 0.001, t-test). Moreover, both
measures are highly correlated (Pearson correlation of 0.57, p < 0.001).
Table 2.7: Risk-Taking Across Macroeconomic Cycles Split by Forecasting
Quality
Dependent Variable Investment
Pooled Data Domain-specific Mixed
Above Below Above Below Above Below
Median Median Median Median Median Median
Bust 6.126 -1.109 6.424 0.652 3.437 -2.713
(1.38) (-0.25) (0.86) (0.11) (0.59) (-0.41)
Ambiguous 10.94*** -1.448 11.48* -1.582 10.56* -2.073
(2.65) (-0.33) (1.92) (-0.24) (1.75) (-0.34)
Bust x Ambiguous -21.49*** -1.454 -22.15** -4.501 -19.14** 1.881
(-3.54) (-0.23) (-2.44) (-0.52) (-2.25) (0.19)
Constant 1.238 22.65 1.822 37.77** 5.365 4.365
(0.10) (1.58) (0.11) (2.09) (0.29) (0.20)
Observations 377 376 169 181 208 195
R2 0.095 0.072 0.139 0.070 0.119 0.114
Note: This table examines subjects’ risk-taking across treatments split by above and below
median forecasting ability as defined in the text. We report the results of OLS regressions for
the whole sample, and for each experiment individually (Experiment 1: Domain-specific;
Experiment 2: Mixed). The dependent variable is Investment, which denotes participants’ in-
vested amount (0 - 100) in the lottery they were assigned to. Bust is an indicator variable that
equals 1 if participants were in the bust treatment. Ambiguous is an indicator variable that
equals 1 if participants were asked to invest in the ambiguous lottery, and 0 if they invested
in the risky lottery. Controls include age, gender, statistical skills, self-reported experience
in stock trading, whether subjects were invested in the stock market during the last finan-
cial crisis, and the order of outcomes they experienced in the forecasting task. Reported are
coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) using robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
To better understand to what extent the resulting pessimism through
learning from adverse market outcomes is a necessary condition for belief-
induced changes in risk-taking, we repeat the previous analyses and split by
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the forecasting ability of our participants. Table 2.7 reports our main finding.
Interestingly, we find that the previously reported effect is both stronger
in absolute terms and in terms of statistical significance but only for partici-
pants with above-median forecasting ability. In other words, the risk-taking
of those agents who achieve more correct forecasts is stronger affect by the
learning environment than the risk-taking of agents who achieve less correct
forecasts. While this effect is roughly twice as big as for the full sample, it is
also independent of the learning environment and even slightly stronger for
the mixed-outcome learning environment.
In a next step, we investigate whether the learning environment affects
the estimated success probability of the ambiguous asset differently depend-
ing on the forecasting ability. The results are reported in Table 2.8.
Table 2.8: Relation Between Treatment and Probability Estimates Split by
Forecasting Quality
Dep. Variable Success Probability Estimate of Ambiguous Asset
Pooled Data Domain-specific Mixed
Above Below Above Below Above Below
Median Median Median Median Median Median
Bust -25.58*** -13.38*** -13.55*** -11.40** -35.34*** -15.48***
(-8.20) (-4.50) (-3.09) (-2.51) (-8.57) (-3.75)
Constant 57.97*** 53.54*** 84.00*** 50.75** 33.84** 54.92***
(4.19) (4.33) (4.75) (2.57) (2.14) (3.40)
Observations 187 190 85 92 102 98
R2 0.333 0.194 0.228 0.185 0.516 0.244
Note: This table examines the underlying mechanism of how our treatment variable affects
subjects’ beliefs about the success probability of the ambiguous lottery split by above and
below median forecasting ability as defined in the text. We report the results of OLS regres-
sions for the whole sample, and for each experiment individually (Experiment 1: Domain-
specific; Experiment 2: Mixed). The dependent variable is Success Probability, which denotes
participants’ beliefs about the success probability of the ambiguous lottery. Bust is an in-
dicator variable that equals 1 if participants were in the bust treatment. Controls include
age, gender, statistical skills, self-reported experience in stock trading and whether subjects
were invested in the stock market during the last financial crisis. Reported are coefficients
and t-statistics (in parentheses) using robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicates statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Across all specifications, we consistently find that subjects in the bust
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treatment are significantly more pessimistic in their assessment of the suc-
cess probability of the ambiguous asset. For the mixed-outcome learning en-
vironment, we find that above-median forecasters are even more pessimistic
in their probability assessment than below-median forecasters, which is con-
sistent with our previous findings. Across both experiments, above-median
forecasters rate the success probability on average 25 percentage points lower
if they are in the bust treatment than their peers in the boom treatment. This
effect shrinks substantially to only 15 percentage points for below-median
forecasters. Similar to previous analyses, we also find that independently
of their forecasting ability subjects act upon their beliefs by investing more
in the ambiguous asset if they rate the success probability to be higher (see
Table A.1 in the Appendix A).
But how is it possible that the risk-taking of the seemingly better perform-
ing agents (i.e. the better forecasters) is more affected by the learning envi-
ronment? One possible explanation could be that our proxy might capture
participants’ involvement in the experimental task. Effectively, this would
suggest that the documented effect is more generalizable outside of the ex-
perimental environment but limited by the difficulty of the Bayesian updat-
ing task. To test whether subjects with above-median forecasting ability are
more involved in the experiment, we investigate the time it took to finish the
experiment and the strength of the pessimism bias.
Interestingly, we find that above-median forecasters spent on average 112
seconds to read the instructions of the forecasting task, while below-median
forecasters only spent roughly 86 seconds (p < 0.05). Additionally, the over-
all time to finish the experiment is roughly 580 seconds for above-median
forecasters, and about 553 seconds for below-median forecasters (p < 0.10).
The difference is largely driven by the additional time above-median fore-
casters spent to read the instructions more carefully. Besides investigating
the time subjects take to read the instructions, we also look at the number of
basic errors subjects make during the forecasting task. We define a basic er-
ror as a situation in which a participant updates his prior belief in the wrong
direction (i.e. reporting a lower posterior probability after observing a high
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outcome signal or reporting a higher posterior probability after observing a
low outcome signal). While above-median forecasters make basic errors in
roughly 11 % of their forecasts, below-median forecasters make such errors in
roughly 30 % of their forecast (p < 0.001, two-sided t-test). In other words,
below-median forecasters make a basic error in approximately every third
forecast, even though a comprehension question following the instructions
exactly tested this relation (see Appendix A). Taken together, the lower time
below median-forecasters take to read the instructions paired with the large
frequency of basic errors they make, hint at a significantly lower involvement
in the experimental task.
We also investigate the strength of the pessimism bias in both groups. The
results are reported in Table A.1. As expected the bias is less pronounced for
subjects with above-median forecasting ability (who also have more correct
forecasts). However, and more importantly, the pessimism bias still persists
and is statistically highly significant. Across all experiments, we consistently
find that above-median forecasters exhibit a 34 % less pronounced pessimism
bias. Nevertheless, these findings show that even the above-median forecasts
suffer from a pessimism bias which subsequently translates to lower risk-
taking. One indication of this might be that the above-median forecasters
are more involved in the overall experiment and in particular the forecasting
task given the additional time they need to finish the experiment. The higher
involvement is also reflected in the high explanatory power for this partic-
ular subgroup as seen by the relatively high R2 of roughly 0.70 compared
to the rather low R2 of around 0.10 for the subgroup of below-median fore-
casters. Given the strength of the pessimism bias even in the group of more
sophisticated forecasters paired with the higher involvement of the afore-
mentioned group in our experiment, we believe that the effect of different
learning environments on risk-taking might be even more pronounced in the
real economy.
Finally, we examined whether differences in the forecasting quality also
affect our measures of external validity. The results are reported in Figure
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Figure 2.7: Dow Jones Estimates and Life Orientation Test Split by
Forecasting Ability
Note: Panel A of the figure displays subjects’ self-reported return expectations of the Dow
Jones Industrial average split by above- and below-forecasting ability. Dow Jones return
expectations were assessed on a 12-point Likert scale. Results are displayed separately for
subjects across treatments (boom / bust) and across experiments. Panel B of the figure dis-
plays subjects’ answers to a general life orientation test split by above- and below-forecasting
ability. The life orientation test (Scheier et al., 1994) is a 10-item inventory where subjects rate
statements on a 7-point Likert scale. Displayed is the cumulated score separated by treat-
ment (boom / bust) and by experiment. Displayed are 95% confidence intervals.
2.7. We first analyze subjects’ Dow Jones estimates. When split by forecast-
ing quality, we observe that the effect is again mainly driven by subjects with
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above-median forecasting ability. As such, even while above-median fore-
casters show a less pronounced pessimism bias overall, their pessimism still
translates to lower return expectations in the real economy and thus out-
side the experimental setting. For the below-median forecasters however,
we do not find significant differences even though they also suffer from a
pessimism bias. This fact paired with a potentially lower involvement may
explain why we cannot observe differences in risk-taking in the ambiguous
lottery between treatments for this subgroup. Second, when analyzing sub-
jects’ answers to the Life Orientation Test split by forecasting quality, we do
not find any significant difference in dispositional optimism/pessimism de-
pending on whether subjects were in the Boom or Bust treatment.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we present experimental evidence on an alternative channel
to countercyclical risk aversion for time-varying risk-taking. While ratio-
nal expectations models introduce modifications in the representative agent’s
utility, we test whether systematic deviations from rational expectations can
cause the same observed investment pattern without assuming time-varying
degrees of risk aversion.
We place subjects in a learning environment which resembles key char-
acteristics of boom and bust markets and measure their risk-taking under
risk (i.e. known probabilities) or under uncertainty (i.e. unknown probabili-
ties) in an independent investment task. Subjects who learned to form beliefs
from adverse outcomes (resembling a bust market) take significantly less risk
in investments under uncertainty. However, we do not find any significant
difference in their level of risk aversion.
Overall, the mechanism described in our experiment implies that agents
may form pro-cyclical return expectations, i.e. they are more optimistic in
boom markets and more pessimistic in recessions. These results are consis-
tent with recent survey evidence on investors’ return expectations. While
traditional models (i.e. rational expectations models) assume that agents are
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fully aware of the implied counter-cyclical nature of the equity premium,
these surveys find that – if anything – investors form rather pro-cyclical ex-
pectations.
Additionally, the investigated systematic deviation from rational ex-
pectations can produce similar self-reinforcing processes as countercyclical
risk aversion. The countercyclical nature of risk preferences implies that
investors are more risk averse during recessions, which leads investors to
reduce their equity share. This process then generates additional downward
momentum for prices. Yet, similar dynamics can also be generated assuming
time-varying changes in expectations. If bust markets systematically induce
pessimistic expectations about future returns for a substantial subset of
investors, this may reduce the aggregate share invested in risky assets of
an economy, which in turn generates downward pressure on prices due to
excess supply.
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Chapter 3
Can Agents Add and Subtract
When Forming Beliefs? ∗
3.1 Introduction
Probabilistic beliefs are essential to decision-making under risk in various
economic domains, including investments in financial markets, purchasing
insurance, attaining education, or when searching for employment. Standard
models assume that individuals update their prior beliefs according to Bayes’
Theorem. Besides the prescription of how individuals should form posterior
probabilities, Bayes’ Theorem has an implicit, fundamental rule of how sub-
jects should incorporate information signals of opposite direction. In the usual
case of updating about two states of the world from independent binomial
signals, two unequal signals should cancel out. Thus, taken together they
should not affect prior beliefs. Importantly, this relation is independent of
whether individuals’ prior beliefs are consistent with Bayes.
To illustrate this idea, imagine you think about visiting a restaurant which
recently opened in your city. Before making a reservation, you call two
equally trustworthy friends who know the restaurant. Suppose, both of them
recommend the restaurant, making you rather optimistic about its quality.
Yet, since the restaurant is quite expensive, you decide to call two more
∗ Authors: Pascal Kieren, Jan Müller-Dethard, and Martin Weber. All authors are at the Uni-
versity of Mannheim. We gratefully acknowledge funding by the German Research Foun-
dation (DFG grant WE993/15-1).
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friends. Assume, the first one did not like the restaurant, whereas the sec-
ond did like it. Would you still be just as optimistic as you were after the
first two calls? In other words, are two recommendations just as good as three
recommendations and one critique, as prescribed by Bayes’ Theorem?
In this article, we ask whether individuals follow this simple, counting-
based rule when updating their beliefs. To test this, we create an environ-
ment in which subjects repeatedly observe binary signals to learn about an
underlying state of the world. While such a binary decision-making prob-
lem appears to presents a specific, commonly used and simplified setting in
experimental research, it applies to many every-day decision problems (e.g.
are we in a good or bad stock market regime, should I take an umbrella for
the walk or not, or as in our example above, is the restaurant good or bad?).
Throughout this paper, we refer to signals that are in line with the true
underlying state of the world as confirming signals and otherwise as discon-
firming signals. We exogenously manipulate the number of subsequent con-
firming signals that gets interrupted by a single disconfirming signal. This
setup allows us to test (i) how subjects update their priors after a disconfirm-
ing signal conditional on the number of previously observed confirming sig-
nals; and (ii) the extent to which they revise their priors after the discon-
firming signal is followed by another confirming signal (i.e. corrected). In
both cases, Bayes’ Rule makes a simple, yet important prediction: An agent
should reduce (increase) his prior after a disconfirming (confirming) signal
by the same magnitude than he increased (reduced) it after the previous con-
firming (disconfirming) signal.
To implement this framework, we conduct three bookbag-and-poker-chip
experiments in the spirit of Grether (1980) with 1800 participants. All exper-
iments follow the same basic design. Over the course of six periods, we pro-
vide subjects with information signals about a risky asset which can either
draw from a "good distribution" or from a "bad distribution". Both distribu-
tions are binary with a high outcome of +5 and a low outcome of −5. In the
good distribution, the higher payoff occurs with 70 % probability while the
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lower payoff occurs with 30 % probability. In the bad distribution, the proba-
bilities are reversed, i.e. the lower payoff occurs with 70 % probability while
the higher payoff occurs with 30 % probability. To create situations which
are consistent with our framework, we use a stratified sample of price paths.
More precisely, we examine six price paths for the good distribution and six
price paths for the bad distribution. In each of the six periods of a price path,
subjects subsequently observe payoffs of the risky asset. After each payoff,
we ask them to provide a probability estimate that the risky asset draws from
the good distribution and how confident they are about their estimate.
In Experiment 2 and 3 we run variations of our baseline experiment to
test the robustness and underlying drivers of our findings. In Experiment
2, we change the informational content of the positive signal (i.e. the diag-
nosticity). In Experiment 3, we reduce the uncertainty about the underlying
distribution by providing subjects with the full outcome history in advance.
For comparability, the price paths we use in both variations remain identical
to the baseline experiment.
To detect whether subjects follow a simple, counting-based heuristic
when updating their beliefs after a disconfirming signal, we compare the
change in probability estimate after a disconfirming signal to the change
in probability estimate after a confirming signal which is directly observed
prior to the disconfirming signal. The same logic applies to the case when
the disconfirming signal is reverted (i.e. corrected).
Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, we consistently find
that subjects strongly overreact whenever a sequence of confirming signals
is interrupted by a single disconfirming signal. Across all experiments, sub-
jects update their prior beliefs on average by 3.54 % immediately before ob-
serving the disconfirming signal, whereas they update their prior beliefs on
average by 15.38 % after the subsequent disconfirming signal. In relative
terms, subjects update their priors by 334 % too much after a disconfirming
signal, thereby acting as if one single disconfirming signal would carry the
weight of up to three confirming signals.
Second, we find that this overreaction is almost entirely corrected once
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subjects observe another confirming signal following the disconfirming sig-
nal. More precisely, after observing a confirming signal directly following the
disconfirming signal, they update their prior beliefs again by 13.65 %, com-
pared to their initial overreaction of 15.38 %. In other words, subjects almost
completely correct their initial overreaction if the disconfirming signal gets
reverted.
Third, we find that both the overreaction and the subsequent correction
do not critically depend on subjects having extreme priors. Even with a di-
agnosticity of only 60 %, two subsequent confirming signals are sufficient to
observe a pronounced overreaction after a disconfirming signal. In such a
setting not only the experimentally observed subjective priors, but also the
objective Bayesian probabilities are low with on average 72 % and 69 %, re-
spectively.
Fourth, the observed overreaction after a disconfirming signal becomes
stronger the more confirming signals individuals previously encountered.
Even though – in absolute terms – the observed overreaction should become
smaller as subjective priors converge to one, we find that a single discon-
firming signal can completely revert up to five confirming signals the later it
occurs. This implies that – in contrast to the Bayesian prediction – signals are
not invariant to the order in which they occur. In other words, observing one
single disconfirming signal followed by five confirming signals is different
compared to observing five confirming signals that are followed by a single
disconfirming signal. Whereas subjects mostly correct their strong overreac-
tion if they can, the violation of the counting heuristic is most severe when
subjects have no opportunity to collect further information.
Motivated by previous work showing that agents react most strongly to
unexpected events, we finally investigate whether the observed overreaction
still exists if subjects (i) have little uncertainty about the underlying distribu-
tion and (ii) know in which period the disconfirming signal will occur. How-
ever, even under these circumstances subjects still strongly overreact after a
disconfirming signal.
Overall, our findings suggest that when observing a disconfirming signal
3.1. Introduction 67
after a sequence of confirming signals subjects fail to follow the simple count-
ing heuristic implied by Bayes’ Theorem. Instead of reverting one previous
signal, they revert up to five signals. In other words, they strongly overre-
act. Interestingly however, this is not the case, if a disconfirming signal is
immediately reverted. Then, subjects appear to follow the counting heuris-
tic and fully correct their prior overreaction. Referring to our introductory
restaurant example, a single critique would cancel out both prior recommen-
dations, while another recommendation following the critique would be con-
sidered as two recommendations.
Our paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, we contribute
to the various studies that document biases and heuristics in probabilistic
reasoning (for an overview see Camerer, 1987, 1995; Benjamin, 2019). A com-
mon finding, by and large is that people update too little, with three excep-
tions as noted by Benjamin (2019): (i) People overinfer from signals if the
diagnosticity is low, (ii) people may overinfer when signals go in the same
direction of the priors (i.e. prior-biased updating), and (iii) people may over-
infer when priors are extreme and signals go in the opposite direction of the
priors (due to base-rate neglect). Especially, (ii) and (iii) push in opposite
directions which makes it important to understand when one or the other
dominates. Our study suggests that whenever subjects violate the simple
counting heuristic implied by Bayes’ Theorem, individuals generally overre-
act to signals of opposite direction of their priors. A violation occurs when-
ever a sequence of signals that go in the same direction is interrupted by a
signal of opposite direction. Importantly, we find that this overreaction is in-
dependent of subjects having extreme priors and requires only a sequence of
two signals that go in the same direction. Conversely, we find that subjects
generally underinfer in situations in which they cannot or do not violate the
counting heuristic. This is either because there are (i) only signals of same
direction, or (ii) positive and negative signals alternate.
Second, our study also contributes to the recent literature on tipping
points. In psychology, a tipping point describes “the point at which people
begin to perceive noise as signal” (O’Brien and Klein, 2017, p. 161). In
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other words, a tipping point defines the first point when people infer that
a pattern is no longer an anomaly and thus believe that one state of the
world is more likely to be the true state (O’Brien, 2019). So far, research
has uncovered two robust findings: tipping points are asymmetric across
valence (i.e. people reach conclusions faster for negative events than for
positive events) and asymmetric across time (i.e. people predict slower
tipping points than they actually express). Our findings suggest that tipping
points regarding probabilistic beliefs about an underlying state of the world
(i.e. one of two possible probability distributions) are symmetric across
domains. One possible reason for this difference is both, the signal structure
and the underlying stochastic process. Whereas our study employs objective
and randomly distributed signals with a predefined underlying stochastic
process, previous studies employ more realistic (and thus more subjective)
signals with no clear underlying stochastic process. This distinction is in
line with the discussion on the use of neutral versus more realistic quantities
in the experimental literature on information processing (see Eil and Rao,
2011). Interestingly, our findings also suggest that individuals are quick to
revise their priors once they observe a disconfirming signal, which might
be important for the formation of tipping points and the persistence of
subsequent beliefs.
Finally, we also contribute to the literature on over- and underreactions
to unexpected news in financial markets (Bondt and Thaler, 1985; Barberis
et al., 1998; Daniel et al., 1998; Hong and Stein, 1999). Our results suggest that
the violation of a simple counting heuristic implied by Bayes’ Rule presents
a potential mechanism underlying over- and underreactions. In situations
in which agents observe a sequence of signals that go in the same direction
(e.g. consensus favorable earnings forecasts) agents initially underreact. If
such a sequence is interrupted by a single signal that goes in the opposite di-
rection (e.g. an unfavorable earnings surprise), they strongly overreact and
partly neglect previous signals. Interestingly, our findings also suggest that
the strength of the overreaction only partly depends on the underlying signal
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being unexpected. In other words, the violation of a simple counting heuris-
tic in probabilistic belief updating does not crucially depend on the fact that
agents are surprised.
Our paper is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, we present an empirical
framework, briefly review the existing literature and state our hypotheses.
In Section 3.3, we describe the experimental design and summary statistics.
Finally, in Section 3.4 we discuss our results and conclude in Section 3.5.
3.2 Empirical Framework and Hypotheses
In this section, we describe the framework which serves as a basis for our
hypotheses and the later empirical analyses and then relate the existing liter-
ature to our established framework. Suppose there is an agent who wants to
learn about the quality of a risky asset. The risky asset can either be in a good
or bad state. Over a number of periods, the agent may receive good (+) or
bad (−) signals from which he can learn about the quality of the risky asset.
This framework of how the agent’s beliefs about the asset being in the good
state should evolve can best be illustrated using the following graph.
Figure 3.1 illustrates three phases of how Bayesian beliefs evolve over
a sequence of four outcomes. The first phase ("confirming signals") resem-
bles a sequence of same-directed signals. A signal which (i) confirms the
underlying distribution and (ii) follows another same-directed signal will be
referred to as a confirming signal. Thus, if a signal is to be referred as a con-
firming signal, an agent must have observed at least two signals. The second
phase ("disruptive signal") defines the situation when a sequence of confirm-
ing signals (phase 1) is disrupted by a signal of opposite direction than the
previously observed signal. A signal which disrupts a sequence of same-
directed signals will be referred to as a disconfirming signal. The third phase
("correction") resembles the case when a previously observed disconfirming
signal is reverted. A signal which follows on a disconfirming signal and has
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Figure 3.1: Empirical Framework
Note: The figure illustrates the empirical framework of this study. We examine subjects’
belief updating behavior over three phases: Phase 1 describes a sequence of signals that
go in the same direction (i.e. confirming an underlying distribution). Phase 2 describes a
situation in which a sequence of previously observed same-directional signals is interrupted
by a single signal of opposite direction (i.e. disconfirming signal). Finally, Phase 3 defines
the situation when a disconfirming signal is immediately reverted (i.e. correction). The blue
dots present the objective probabilities (i.e. the beliefs according to Bayes’ Theorem) that the
asset pays from the good distribution given the sequence of signals.
the opposite direction than the previously-observed disconfirming signal is
referred to as a correction.
In our framework with binary information signals, an agent should up-
date his prior beliefs according to the following formula:
PBayest = P(G|δt)
Bayes =
θδt
θδt + (1− θ)δt
, δt = gt − bt (3.1)
where PBayest is the posterior probability that the risky asset pays from the
good distribution (G) and θ refers to the diagnosticity of the good signal. The
number of good signals observed until period t is referred to as gt, while the
number of bad signals observed until period t is referred to as bt.
Applying the formula to our described framework from Figure 3.1 pro-
vides several implications on how agents should update their beliefs. Over-
all, note that the Bayesian agent in our setting is indifferent regarding the
order of the signals, since only the difference δt is relevant. This feature
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of the described framework has implications which are especially relevant
for the second and the third phase in Figure 3.1. For the second phase this
implies that an agent should reduce the probability estimate after a discon-
firming signal by the same magnitude than he increased it after the previous
confirming signal. In other words, a Bayesian agent would report the same
probability estimate than he did two signals ago. As such he simply cancels
the previously observed confirming signal. Referring to the framework in
Figure 3.1, the Bayesian agent would state the same probability estimate as
he did after observing the first positive signal. For the third phase, a similar
logic applies. In particular, after observing a correction (i.e. the reversion of
the disconfirming signal) agents should also only cancel the previously ob-
served disconfirming signal and should again, end up with the same proba-
bility estimate as they did two signals ago. In both scenarios (disruption and
correction), a Bayesian agent would follow a counting heuristic which means
that one positive and one negative signal simply cancel out.
In contrast, agents in the first phase cannot rely on a simple counting
heuristic in determining the precise probability estimate. That means after
observing two same-directional signals, the counting heuristic does not pro-
vide any insight by how much they need to adjust the prior estimate. In other
words, to state the correct magnitude of the change in probability estimate,
the agent needs to know Bayes’ Rule.
Based on the established framework, we formulate the following
hypotheses:1
Hypothesis H1: Disruption (Phase 2)
After observing a disconfirming signal, an agent should reduce his
prior probability estimate by the same magnitude than he increased it
after the previous confirming signal.
Hypothesis H2: Correction (Phase 3)
After a previous disconfirming signal got reverted, an agent should
1 The hypotheses are formulated for the good distribution. In the bad distribution, subjects
should adjust their priors in the opposite direction.
72 Chapter 3. Can Agents Add and Subtract When Forming Beliefs?
cancel the previously observed disconfirming signal and end up with
the same probability estimate as he did two signals ago.
It is important to stress that our framework and the later experimental
design do not crucially depend on agents being Bayesian. Instead, it is suf-
ficient for agents to know that two directionally inconsistent signals cancel
each other out. In other words, for the basic updating rule we are testing, it
is not essential that agents state the correct absolute Bayes estimate. We are
rather interested in the changes in probability estimates after subjects incor-
porate new signals into their prior beliefs.
As discussed, Bayes Theorem provides clear and testable predictions on
how individuals should revise their beliefs after a sequence of confirming
signals is interrupted by a single disconfirming signal as well as after its sub-
sequent reversal (i.e. correction). While this is perfect normative advice,
the literature on probabilistic reasoning has identified various situations in
which individuals systematically deviate from Bayes and either over- or un-
derinfer. Using bookbag-and-poker-chip experiments, some studies find un-
derinference when a new signal confirms the prior hypothesis and no or only
very little revision of beliefs when a new signal disconfirms the prior hypoth-
esis, consistent with prior-biased inference (Pitz et al., 1967; Geller and Pitz,
1968; Pitz, 1969). In contrast to this, DuCharme and Peterson (1968) observe
in experiments with normally distributed signals overinference in response
to a disconfirming signal. However, Eil and Rao (2011) as well as Möbius
et al. (2014) find no evidence for prior-biased inference at all. Recently, Char-
ness and Dave (2017) establish a conceptual framework which combines both
under- and overinference and test it experimentally. They find prior-biased
inference. In particular, they observe overinference after a confirming signal
in updating problems with equal prior probabilities of the states and high
diagnosticity of 70 %. However, and opposing to Charness and Dave (2017),
Pitz et al. (1967), find for the identical level of diagnosticity underinference
after a confirming signal. In brief, while there are several studies showing
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that individuals deviate from Bayes, the evidence in which way and when they
deviate is mixed and apparently inconsistent.
3.3 Experimental Design
One-thousand-eight-hundred-and-seven individuals (1159 males, 648 fe-
males, mean age 34 years, 10 years standard deviation) were recruited from
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to participate in three online experi-
ments. MTurk advanced to a widely used and accepted recruiting platform
for economic experiments. Not only does it offer a larger and more diverse
subject pool as compared to lab studies (which frequently rely on students),
but it also provides a response quality similar to that of other subject pools
(Buhrmester et al., 2011; Goodman et al., 2013).
An environment to study the role of disconfirming information signals
requires (i) a sequential set-up with room for subjective belief formation, (ii)
control over Bayesian beliefs, (iii) variation in the number of confirming sig-
nals prior to a disconfirming signal, and (iv) an incentive-compatible belief
elicitation. Our design accommodates all of these features.
3.3.1 Baseline Design
To study the role of disconfirming information signals, we provide subjects
with information about a risky asset. In all of our experiments, the risky asset
has an initial value of 50 which either increases or decreases over the course
of six periods depending on the asset’s payoffs. The payoffs are either drawn
from a "good distribution" or from a "bad distribution". Both distributions
are binary with a high outcome of +5 and a low outcome of −5. In the good
distribution, the higher payoff occurs with 70 % probability while the lower
payoff occurs with 30 % probability. In the bad distribution, the probabilities
are reversed, i.e. the lower payoff occurs with 70 % probability while the
higher payoff occurs with 30 % probability.
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Since we only focus on a single disconfirming signal within six periods,
we differentiate between six possible price paths per distribution. These price
paths resemble our treatments. The first treatment dimension depicts the
underlying distribution and therefore the domain (good or bad), while the
second treatment dimension depicts the period in which the disconfirming
signal occurs (from period one to period six). Table 3.1 provides an overview
of all twelve treatments.
Table 3.1: Overview of Treatments
Good Distribution
Treatment 1 2 3 4 5 6
G-1 − + + + + +
G-2 + − + + + +
G-3 + + − + + +
G-4 + + + − + +
G-5 + + + + − +
G-6 + + + + + −
Bad Distribution
Treatment 1 2 3 4 5 6
B-1 + − − − − −
B-2 − + − − − −
B-3 − − + − − −
B-4 − − − + − −
B-5 − − − − + −
B-6 − − − − − +
Note: This table provides an overview of all treatments in our experiments. Overall, there
are twelve treatments, six in the good distribution and six in the bad distribution, defined
by the period in which the disruptive signal occurs. The "−" sign represents a negative (bad)
signal and the "+" sign a positive (good) signal.
For example, in treatment G-3, the risky asset pays from the good distri-
bution and the disconfirming signal appears in period three after two con-
firming signals (i.e. the sequence would be: positive, positive, negative, pos-
itive, ... signal). A key feature of our design is that we shift the single dis-
confirming signal between a sequence of six signals. That allows us to test
how subjects update their beliefs after observing a single disruptive, discon-
firming signal conditional on the number of previously observed confirming
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signals. Additionally, the design makes it possible to investigate how sub-
jects update their beliefs after the disconfirming signal is reverted.
Across all experiments, subjects make forecasting decisions in six consec-
utive periods. At the beginning of the experiment, the computer randomly
determines the distribution of the risky asset (which can be good or bad) and
the period in which the disconfirming signal will occur (which can be from
one to six). In each of the six rounds, subjects observe a payoff of the risky
asset. After each round, we ask them to provide a probability estimate that
the risky asset draws from the good distribution and how confident they are
about their estimate. To keep the focus on the forecasting task and to not test
their memory performance, we display the prior outcomes in a price-line-
chart next to the questions. To ensure that subjects have a sufficient under-
standing of the forecasting task, they had to correctly answer four compre-
hension questions before they could continue (see Appendix B.1).
The experiment concluded with a brief survey about subjects’ socio-
economic background, self-assessed statistic skills, as well as a measure of
risk preferences and financial literacy adopted from Kuhnen (2015). Subjects’
belief elicitation was incentivized. Participants were paid a participation
fee and a variable fee based on the accuracy of the probability estimates
provided. Specifically, they received 25 cents for each probability estimate
within 10 % (+/− 5%) of the objective Bayesian value. Across all studies, it
took participants approximately 7 minutes to complete the experiment and
participants earned $1.50 on average.
3.3.2 Experimental Variations
We conducted two variations of our baseline experiment, referred to as Re-
duced Diagnosticity and Reduced Uncertainty. The two additional experiments
are designed to identify whether the belief updating after a disconfirming
signal depends on (i) the diagnosticity of the signal (i.e. its informational
content), (ii) subjects’ uncertainty about the distribution (i.e. whether the
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asset turns out to be good or bad), and (iii) whether subjects do not antici-
pate the disconfirming signal (i.e. are surprised about the disruption of the
sequence of confirming signals).
Experiment Reduced Diagnosticity: In the experiment Reduced Diagnos-
ticity we change the informational content that subjects can infer from a pos-
itive signal. This means, we change the probability of the higher outcome in
the good distribution from 70 % to 60 % and of the lower outcome from 30
% to 40 %, respectively. In the bad distribution, we change the probability of
the lower outcome from 70 % to 60 % and of the higher outcome from 30 %
to 40 %, respectively. On the one hand, we expect to observe – as Bayes’ The-
orem implies – lower (higher) absolute levels of probability estimates in the
good (bad) distribution given the reduced diagnosticity of signals. On the
other hand, we expect to observe no impact of diagnosticity on the funda-
mental counting rule we are testing. Within our empirical framework, the in-
crease (decrease) in posterior probability after a confirming signal in the good
(bad) distribution should remain exactly as much as the decrease (increase)
in posterior probability after a subsequent disconfirming signal, irrespective
of how informative the signal is.
Experiment Reduced Uncertainty: In the experiment Reduced Uncertainty
we combine aspects (ii) and (iii) from above. To do so, we change the previ-
ously framed forward-looking updating task to a backward-looking updat-
ing task. In detail, subjects in the baseline experiment are asked to make a
forecasting decision without knowing the future outcome history. In the Re-
duced Uncertainty experiment, we show subjects the full outcome history be-
forehand. Then, we ask them to provide probability estimates period by pe-
riod as in the baseline experiment for exactly the same outcome history they
have seen in advance. Importantly, subjects were still incentivized to provide
probability forecasts which only incorporate the information subjects had in
each period. In other words, the objective Bayesian probabilities are identical
to the baseline experiment. By showing subjects the entire outcome history
beforehand, we already eliminate most of the uncertainty regarding the un-
derlying distribution and any of the potential surprise related to the period
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in which the disruptive signal occurs. Additionally, before the first period,
we directly ask subjects two questions: (i) we ask them to count the number
of positive and the number of negative payoffs in the outcome history and
(ii) we ask them to state the period in which the disconfirming signal occurs.
3.3.3 Summary Statistics
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics for all our three experiments. Over-
all 1807 subjects participated in our studies, with an average age of 33.79
years in Experiment 1 (33.59 years in Experiment 2; and 35.01 years in Ex-
periment 3). Thirty-five percent (forty-one percent; thirty-two percent) were
female. Subjects reported average statistical skills of 4.46 out of 7 (4.42; 4.42)
and their level of risk aversion, measured by how much of an endowment of
10,000 they are willing to invest risky in a broad equity index, is as follows.
Subjects invest on average 4,470 (4,420; 5,000) in the risky asset. Across all ex-
periments subjects report medium financial literacy. In particular, they make
1.73 (1.70; 1.70) out of three possible basic errors.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Main Results
In this section, we first present results of our baseline experiment of how
individuals update their beliefs after disconfirming signals as well as of how
they revise their probability estimates after a correction. Then, we test the
robustness of our findings with respect to the diagnosticity of the information
signals and finally examine how the reduction of uncertainty with respect to
the underlying distribution affects subjects’ updating behavior.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics on Subjects
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Baseline Reduced Reduced
Diagnosticity Uncertainty
Variable (N=601) (N=602) (N=604)
Age 33.79 33.59 35.01
(9.89) (9.17) (9.83)
Female 0.35 0.41 0.32
(0.48) (0.49) (0.47)
Statistical Skills (1-7) 4.46 4.42 4.42
(1.64) (1.64) (1.68)
Risk Preferences 44.7% 44.2% 50.0%
(2.94) (2.89) (2.98)
Financial Literacy (1-3) 1.73 1.70 1.70
(0.93) (0.91) (0.93)
Note: This table shows summary statistics for our experimental data. Reported are the mean
and the standard deviation (in parentheses) for each experiment individually. Female is an
indicator variable that equals 1 if a participant is female. Statistical skills denotes participants’
self-assessed statistical skills on a 7-point Likert scale. Risk preferences are elicited by asking
subjects to split an endowment between a risky and a risk-free asset (reported is the frac-
tion invested risky). Financial literacy was assessed by asking subjects to identify the correct
formula for calculating the expected value of the portfolio they selected. Through multiple
choice answers, participants could make three basic errors (reported is the number of basic
errors).
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Baseline Results
Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 present subjects’ average updating tendency over
all periods for each treatment G-3 to G-6 and B-3 to B-6 of our baseline exper-
iment. Figure 3.2 shows the results of those treatments in which the underly-
ing distribution is good and Figure 3.3 shows the results of those treatments
in which the underlying distribution is bad.
Figure 3.2: Subjects’ Average Updating Behavior in the Good Distribution
– Experiment 1
Note: The figure displays subjects’ average probability estimates over six consecutive pe-
riods in the good distribution for each treatment G-3 to G-6 individually. The dashed line
shows the objective Bayesian posterior probabilities and the solid line shows subjects’ aver-
age probability estimates. Displayed are 95% confidence intervals.
To be consistent with our framework in Section 3.2, we focus our analysis
on the treatments in which subjects observe at least two subsequent same-
directional signals before a disconfirming signal occurs. This is the case for
our treatments G-3, G-4, G-5, and G-6 (B-3, B-4, B-5, and B-6). We will ana-
lyze the results of treatments G-1 and G-2 (B-1 and B-2) in a separate section
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Figure 3.3: Subjects’ Average Updating Behavior in the Bad Distribution –
Experiment 1
Note: The figure displays subjects’ average probability estimates over six consecutive pe-
riods in the bad distribution for each treatment B-3 to B-6 individually. The dashed line
shows the objective Bayesian posterior probabilities and the solid line shows subjects’ aver-
age probability estimates. Displayed are 95% confidence intervals.
at the end of this chapter. From Figure 3.2, we observe that subjects in the
good distribution increase their prior beliefs by 6.44 % on average after a
confirming signal, whereas they decrease their prior beliefs by 18.63 % on
average after observing a disconfirming signal. In the bad distribution, the
findings look similar as seen in Figure 3.3. Subjects decrease their prior be-
liefs by 5.38 % on average after a confirming signal, while they increase their
prior beliefs by 16.94 % on average after observing a disconfirming signal. In
relative terms, this means that subjects in the good distribution update their
prior beliefs after a disconfirming signal with a magnitude that is approxi-
mately three times as large as if they update after a confirming signal. This
ratio is more or less independent of the distribution, albeit a little bit stronger
in the bad distribution. Given the difference in updating behavior, Figure
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3.2 suggests that subjects strongly overreact after a disconfirming signal. In
particular, subjects update their beliefs after a disconfirming signal as if they
failed to incorporate up to three previously observed confirming signals.
Next, we investigate how individuals update their prior beliefs after a
disconfirming signal gets reverted. In particular, we examine whether and to
what extent subjects correct the observed overreaction after a disconfirming
signal. We find that subjects in the good distribution increase their probabil-
ity estimate on average by 17.11 %. Similarly, in the bad distribution, sub-
jects decrease their probability estimates on average by 14.16 %. In essence,
the previously observed overreaction after a disconfirming signal is almost
entirely corrected. This finding holds independent of the distribution.
From these descriptive statistics alone, it becomes already evident that
subjects fail to follow a simple counting heuristic when they incorporate in-
consistent signals in their beliefs. In other words, they do not adhere to the
simple updating rule in which they count the difference between positive
and negative signals. Instead, they strongly overreact after a disconfirming
signal. Interestingly however, this is not the case, if an inconsistent (i.e. dis-
confirming) signal is reverted. Then, subjects appear to follow the counting
heuristic implied by Bayes’ Rule and fully correct their prior overreaction.
Besides the descriptive analysis, we also run regressions, in which we can
control for the objective posterior probability. To investigate how individuals
update their prior beliefs both in response to disconfirming signals and sub-
sequent confirming signals (i.e. the correction of the disconfirming signal),
we estimate the following model2:
∆pi,t = β1∆ObjectivePriori,t + β2Discon f irmi,t + β3Correctioni,t + εi,t, (3.2)
where ∆pi,t is the difference in subjects’ probability estimates between two
subsequent periods and ∆ObjectivePriori,t is the difference in the objective
2 Since we investigate changes in subjective probability estimates, we estimate the model
without constant to be consistent with the theoretical benchmark. However, results are
qualitatively similar if we estimate the model on levels or with constant. For the ease of
interpretation, we report the specification without constant.
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Bayesian probability between two subsequent periods. Finally, Discon f irmi,t
and Correctioni,t are two indicator variables which equal one if subject i ob-
serves a disconfirming signal or a correction in period t, respectively. In the
above specification we can test both for Bayesian behavior and in which way
individuals depart from it. If subjects were perfect Bayesian, we would ex-
pect that β̂1 = 1, and β̂2 = β̂3 = 0. In other words, subjects always update
their prior beliefs according to Bayes’ Rule, while neither a disconfirming sig-
nal (which disrupts a sequence of confirming signals) nor a subsequent cor-
rection would explain any additional variation. Conversely, β̂1 < (>)1, β̂2 <
(>) 0, and β̂3 < (>) 0 would signal underinference (overinference) to sub-
sequent confirming signals, to disconfirming signals, and to corrections, re-
spectively. The results are reported in Table 3.3.
The findings support our previously drawn conclusions. Even after con-
trolling for the objective posterior, we find an economically strong and sta-
tistically highly significant overreaction after a disconfirming signal. Addi-
tionally, we find that the initial overreaction is almost entirely corrected if the
disconfirming signal is reverted. While in the bad distribution, both effects
are of similar magnitude and thus cancel out, we find a slightly asymmetric
effect in the good distribution. Whereas the correction is of similar strength
as in the bad distribution, the overreaction is stronger. As such the overreac-
tion in the good distribution is not entirely corrected.
Next, we examine how our model in which we explicitly control for a
disconfirming signal and a subsequent correction performs compared to the
standard Bayesian model. When comparing the explanatory power of the
two models, we find that the standard Bayesian model explains roughly 14
% (10 %) in the good (bad) distribution, while our model explains roughly
22 % (14 %). Irrespective of the distribution, our model explains roughly 50
% more of the variation of subjects’ probability estimates than the standard
Bayesian model.
Moreover, Table 3.3 implies that subjects generally underinfer which is
consistent with several studies on Bayesian updating (see Benjamin, 2019).
Interestingly, our results suggest that the observed underinference is mostly
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driven by subsequent confirming signals. When differentiating between the
good and the bad distribution, we find that the observed underinference is
stronger when subjects update their beliefs from a sequence of confirming
bad signals than when updating their beliefs from a sequence of confirming
good signals. This finding is consistent with the recently identified good
news-bad news effect reported by Eil and Rao (2011) as well as Möbius et al.
(2014). However, for our main finding, it remains to stress that we do not
find such an asymmetric effect across domains.
Table 3.3: Updating Behavior After Disconfirming Signal and Correction –
Experiment 1
Dependent Variable Change in Posterior Probability Estimate
Good Distribution Bad Distribution
Change in Bayes 0.770*** 0.377*** 0.718*** 0.384***
(14.64) (8.02) (13.03) (7.51)
Disconfirm −15.94*** 12.38***
(−9.15) (7.37)
Correction 11.57*** −11.05***
(7.36) (−6.76)
Observations 1782 1782 1824 1824
R2 0.138 0.218 0.097 0.142
Note: This table reports the results of four OLS regressions on how subjects update their
posterior beliefs after a disconfirming signal and a correction in the baseline experiment.
We report the results of OLS regressions for each distribution individually (good and bad
distribution). The dependent variable in the regression model, Change in Posterior Probability
Estimate, is the change in subjective posterior beliefs that the asset is paying from the good
distribution between period t and period t-1. Independent variables include the Disconfirm
dummy, an indicator variable that equals 1 if participants observe a disconfirming signal and
zero otherwise, the Correction dummy, an indicator variable that equals 1 if a disconfirming
signal is subsequently reverted, as well as Change in Bayes, which is the change in the correct
Bayesian probability that the stock is good between period t and period t-1. Reported are
coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) using robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Reducing the Diagnosticity of Information Signals
In this section, we report results of our second experiment in which we vary
the informational content of the signals. Like in our baseline experiment,
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Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 present subjects’ general updating behavior in the
good and the bad distribution, respectively, over all periods for each treatment
G-3 to G-6 and B-3 to B-6.
Figure 3.4: Subjects’ Average Updating Behavior in the Good Distribution
– Experiment 2
Note: The figure displays subjects’ average probability estimates over six consecutive pe-
riods in the good distribution for each treatment G-3 to G-6 individually. The dashed line
shows the objective Bayesian posterior probabilities and the solid line shows subjects’ aver-
age probability estimates. Displayed are 95% confidence intervals.
Overall, the findings look very similar to our baseline experiment. In
particular, we find that subjects in the good distribution increase their prior
beliefs by 7.15 % on average after a confirming signal, whereas they decrease
their prior beliefs by 14.81 % on average after observing a disconfirming sig-
nal. In the bad distribution, the findings look similar. Subjects decrease their
prior beliefs by 3.65 % on average after a confirming signal, while they in-
crease their prior beliefs by 7.15 % on average after observing a disconfirm-
ing signal. Like in our baseline experiment, subjects update their beliefs after
a disconfirming signal as if they failed to incorporate up to three previously
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Figure 3.5: Subjects’ Average Updating Behavior in the Bad Distribution –
Experiment 2
Note: The figure displays subjects’ average probability estimates over six consecutive pe-
riods in the bad distribution for each treatment B-3 to B-6 individually. The dashed line
shows the objective Bayesian posterior probabilities and the solid line shows subjects’ aver-
age probability estimates. Displayed are 95% confidence intervals.
observed confirming signals. Despite the lower diagnosticity in the second
experiment, the observed overreaction after a disconfirming signal persists.
This finding even holds after controlling for the objective Bayesian proba-
bility as to be seen in Table 3.4. The observed overreaction after a disconfirm-
ing signal remains economically large and statistically significant. In compar-
ison to the results from our baseline experiment, the magnitude with which
subjects update their prior after a disconfirming signal is smaller. However,
this is to be expected since the updating magnitude strongly correlates with
the diagnosticity. Consistent with our previous findings, we find that sub-
jects correct their priors after a disconfirming signal is reverted. Interestingly,
we find that in contrast to the baseline experiment, subjects seem to not suffi-
ciently correct their previous overreaction which can especially be seen in the
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bad distribution. Overall, even in a setting with lower diagnosticity subjects
still do not follow the simple counting heuristic when observing a discon-
firming signal. Instead, they show a strong overreaction which they partly
correct subsequently.
Table 3.4: Updating Behavior After Disconfirming Signal and Correction –
Experiment 2
Dependent Variable Change in Posterior Probability Estimate
Good Distribution Bad Distribution
Change in Bayes 0.860*** 0.430*** 0.877*** 0.524***
(16.47) (9.08) (13.98) (8.84)
Disconfirm −11.53*** 10.06***
(−8.82) (6.74)
Correction 9.355*** −6.649***
(6.57) (−4.18)
Observations 1872 1872 1740 1740
R2 0.112 0.169 0.087 0.116
Note: This table reports the results of four OLS regressions on how subjects update their
posterior beliefs after a disconfirming signal and a correction in Experiment 2 with lower
diagnosticity than in the baseline experiment. We report the results of OLS regressions for
each distribution individually (good and bad distribution). The dependent variable in the
regression model, Change in Posterior Probability Estimate, is the change in subjective posterior
beliefs that the asset is paying from the good distribution between period t and period t-1.
Independent variables include the Disconfirm dummy, an indicator variable that equals 1 if
participants observe a disconfirming signal and zero otherwise, the Correction dummy, an
indicator variable that equals 1 if a disconfirming signal is subsequently reverted, as well as
Change in Bayes, which is the change in the correct Bayesian probability that the stock is good
between period t and period t-1. Reported are coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses)
using robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
Reducing the Uncertainty About the Underlying Distribution
In the following, we discuss the results of our third experiment in which we
reduce subjects’ uncertainty about the underlying distribution. This varia-
tion of the design allows us to exclude the possibility that subjects falsely in-
fer trends or price reversals. Additionally, we control for the possibility that
subjects do not anticipate (i.e. are surprised by) the disconfirming signal as
they observe the full outcome history in advance. The results on individuals’
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updating behavior are reported in Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7. Again, Figure
3.6 shows the results of those treatments in which the underlying distribu-
tion is good and Figure 3.7 shows the results of those treatments in which the
underlying distribution is bad.
Figure 3.6: Subjects’ Average Updating Behavior in the Good Distribution
– Experiment 3
Note: The figure displays subjects’ average probability estimates over six consecutive pe-
riods in the good distribution for each treatment G-3 to G-6 individually. The dashed line
shows the objective Bayesian posterior probabilities and the solid line shows subjects’ aver-
age probability estimates. Displayed are 95% confidence intervals.
We find that both, overreaction after a disconfirming signal and subse-
quent correction even persist in a setting in which the uncertainty about the
underlying distribution is dramatically reduced. In particular, the Bayesian
probability of the asset being in the good distribution is 96.74 %. As such
after subjects observe the full outcome history there should be barely any
uncertainty left about the distribution. Besides almost no uncertainty about
the underlying distribution, there is also no uncertainty about the period in
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Figure 3.7: Subjects’ Average Updating Behavior in the Bad Distribution –
Experiment 3
Note: The figure displays subjects’ average probability estimates over six consecutive pe-
riods in the bad distribution for each treatment B-3 to B-6 individually. The dashed line
shows the objective Bayesian posterior probabilities and the solid line shows subjects’ aver-
age probability estimates. Displayed are 95% confidence intervals.
which the disconfirming signal will occur. First, the graphical representation
of the full outcome history in the form of a price-line chart is known to sub-
jects and makes the period in which the disconfirming signal occurs easily
identifiable. Second, we also explicitly ask participants to state the period in
which the disconfirming signal occurs prior to the forecasting task. As such
our design should eliminate any potential surprise subjects may experience
when observing a disconfirming signal. In the light of the still persistent
overreaction, we can confidentially rule out that surprise effects or uncer-
tainty about the underlying distribution drive the results. Moreover, we can
also exclude that subjects overreact after a disconfirming signal because they
potentially anticipate a new trend, given that they know that a disconfirming
signal will subsequently be reverted.
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We run the same regression as previously to control for the objective
Bayesian posterior probability, while also investigating potential differences
to the baseline experiment. The results are reported in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5: Updating Behavior After Disconfirming Signal and Correction –
Experiment 3
Dependent Variable Change in Posterior Probability Estimate
Good Distribution Bad Distribution
Change in Bayes 0.603*** 0.294*** 0.666*** 0.362***
(12.89) (6.87) (11.68) (7.03)
Disconfirm −11.77*** 9.559***
(−6.41) (6.10)
Correction 9.978*** −11.03***
(7.53) (−6.77)
Observations 1884 1884 1740 1740
R2 0.088 0.135 0.086 0.122
Note: This table reports the results of four OLS regressions on how subjects update their
posterior beliefs after a disconfirming signal and a correction in Experiment 3. We report the
results of OLS regressions for each distribution individually (good and bad distribution).
The dependent variable in the regression model, Change in Posterior Probability Estimate, is
the change in subjective posterior beliefs that the asset is paying from the good distribu-
tion between period t and period t-1. Independent variables include the Disconfirm dummy,
an indicator variable that equals 1 if participants observe a disconfirming signal and zero
otherwise, the Correction dummy, an indicator variable that equals 1 if a disconfirming sig-
nal is subsequently reverted, as well as Change in Bayes, which is the change in the correct
Bayesian probability that the stock is good between period t and period t-1. Reported are
coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) using robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
A direct comparability is given as Bayes’ probabilities are identical across
treatments in the baseline and the reduced uncertainty experiment. First, we
can confirm all prior findings. Subjects strongly overreact after a disconfirm-
ing signal and subsequently correct the overreaction. Second, when com-
paring the effect sizes between the two experiments, we find that the over-
reaction as well as the subsequent correction are slightly more pronounced
in the baseline treatment. Even though the reduced uncertainty experiment
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was designed to significantly decrease the overreaction resulting from dis-
confirming signals, the effect is still economically strong and statistically sig-
nificant.
Additional Treatments G-1 and G-2 (B-1 and B-2)
Finally, we analyze the results of treatments G-1 and G-2 (B-1 and B-2) for
which – per definition – our empirical framework does not apply. In these
treatments, the single opposite-directional signal occurs either directly in the
first period or in the second period. As such these treatments describe price
paths for which the pre-requisite for Phase 1 of our framework (i.e. at least
two confirming signals prior to the disconfirming signal) is not fulfilled. Nev-
ertheless, they allow us to analyze how subjects update their beliefs (i) in
situations without prior outcome history (G-1 and B-1) and (ii) in situations
with exclusively alternating signals (G-2 and B-2).
Figure 3.8 reports the results for the good distribution split by experiment.
Figure 3.9 reports the results for the bad distribution split by experiment.
Across all experiments, we find that subjects do not significantly update their
beliefs downwards if the first signal is bad.3 In contrast to that, subjects sig-
nificantly update their beliefs upwards if the first signal is good. Their first
probability estimate is almost identical to the objective Bayesian probability
and this finding holds for both, the two experiments with high diagnostic-
ity (70 %) and the experiment with low diagnosticity (60 %). In period 2,
when the bad signal of period 1 is reverted, subjects state probability esti-
mates significantly above the objective probability of 50 %, while when the
good signal of period 1 is reverted, subjects are almost perfect Bayesian. In
other words, subjects in the B-1 treatment almost perfectly adhere to the in-
vestigated counting rule implied by Bayes’ Theorem, while subjects in the
G-1 treatment clearly violate this rule. In particular, they seem to violate this
3 We follow the terminology used in the empirical framework section and also refer to a bad
signal in the first period drawn from an asset with a good distribution as a disconfirming
signal, even though subjects cannot know at this point in time that the signal disconfirms
the true underlying distribution. The same logic applies to a good signal in the first period
drawn from the good distribution which we refer to as a confirming signal.
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rule because they ignored or were averse to adjust their beliefs downwards
following the first bad signal.
Figure 3.8: Subjects’ Average Updating Behavior in the Good Distribution
– Treatments G-1 and G-2
Note: The figure displays subjects’ average probability estimates over six consecutive pe-
riods in the good distribution for treatments G-1 and G-2 of experiment 1, 2, and 3. The
dashed line shows the objective Bayesian posterior probabilities and the solid line shows
subjects’ average probability estimates. Displayed are 95% confidence intervals.
This pattern is mirrored when looking at the treatments G-2 and B-2. In
these treatments, the signals alternate up until period 3. Subjects, who ob-
serve first a good, second a bad, and then again a good signal, are almost
perfect Bayesian. Across all experiments, they follow the counting rule and
increase their probability estimate after the good signal in period 3 as much
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Figure 3.9: Subjects’ Average Updating Behavior in the Bad Distribution –
Treatments G-1 and G-2
Note: The figure displays subjects’ average probability estimates over six consecutive peri-
ods in the bad distribution for treatments B-1 and B-2 of experiment 1, 2, and 3. The dashed
line shows the objective Bayesian posterior probabilities and the solid line shows subjects’
average probability estimates. Displayed are 95% confidence intervals.
as they decreased it after the bad signal in period 2 which in turn they pre-
viously increased exactly as much as after the good signal in period 1. In
contrast to that, subjects who first observe a bad, second a good, and then
again a bad signal do only partly follow the counting rule. Like subjects in
the G-1 treatment, they do not significantly adjust the probability estimate
downwards if the first signal is bad, but correctly – as implied by the count-
ing rule – decrease their probability estimate in period 3 by the amount by
which they previously increased it in period 2. This robust pattern can be
found across all experiments.
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Taken together, we can complement our findings from treatments G-3 to
G-6 (B-3 to B-6) as follows: We find that subjects adhere to the counting rule
implied by Bayes’ Theorem in situations with no prior sequence of same-
directional signals and in situations with exclusively alternating signals. In-
terestingly however, subjects seem to have problems following this rule right
at the beginning of the updating task, when the first signal is bad. In these
cases, they act as if they ignore the bad signal and consequently update too
much after the subsequent good signal.
3.4.2 Signal Ordering
One aspect of the counting heuristic we have not discussed so far is that
Equation 3.1 of the established framework also implies that a Bayesian is
indifferent regarding the order in which outcomes occur. In other words, ob-
serving a disconfirming signal followed by five subsequent confirming sig-
nals should lead to the same posterior probability as first observing five sub-
sequent confirming signals followed by a disconfirming signal. Since our
experimental design explicitly varies the round in which the single discon-
firming signal occurs, we can directly test this relation. To do so, we estimate
the following model:
Pi,6 = β0 + β1Di | R=2 + β2Di | R=3 + β3Di | R=4 + β4Di | R=5 + β5Di | R=6 + ε i,t, (3.3)
where Pi,6 is the subjective posterior in round 6, and Di | R=t are indicator
variables denoting the round in which participants encountered the discon-
firming signal (with round 1 being the baseline category). Note that the
Bayesian posterior in our setting is the same for each treatment and only de-
pends on the underlying distribution (good or bad) and the underlying diag-
nosticity. To accommodate this feature, we estimate the model separately for
each distribution and split by diagnosticity of the signal. Results are reported
in Table 3.6.
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Table 3.6: Outcome Ordering
Dependent Variable Posterior Probability Estimate in Period 6
Experiment 1 & 3 Experiment 2
Good Bad Good Bad
Distribution Distribution Distribution Distribution
Disconfirm Round 2 0.912 11.45** −1.755 5.194
(0.39) (2.52) (−0.53) (0.77)
Disconfirm Round 3 −0.374 5.306 1.224 11.09*
(−0.16) (1.36) (0.41) (1.74)
Disconfirm Round 4 −1.070 8.198** −4.059 7.177
(−0.46) (2.17) (−1.21) (1.21)
Disconfirm Round 5 −5.043** 10.63*** −5.145 17.34***
(−2.00) (2.68) (−1.61) (2.76)
Disconfirm Round 6 −16.09*** 21.24*** −16.09*** 19.67***
(−5.15) (5.10) (−4.33) (3.05)
Constant 80.45*** 26.16*** 78.25*** 32.10***
(45.94) (9.72) (34.38) (6.69)
Observations 611 594 312 290
R2 0.094 0.046 0.101 0.049
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions on how subjects updating behavior
after a disconfirming signal and correction depends on their prior beliefs. We report the re-
sults of OLS regressions for each experiment (Experiment 1 and 3 pooled) and distribution
(good and bad distribution) individually. The dependent variable in the regression model,
Posterior Probability Estimate in Period 6, is the absolute subjective posterior belief that the
asset is paying from the good distribution in period 6. Independent variables include Con-
dition t dummies which are indicator variables for each period t. Reported are coefficients
and t-statistics (in parentheses) using robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
We find that the round in which the disconfirming signal occurs plays an
important role in how individuals form their posterior beliefs. In particu-
lar, the later the disconfirming signal occurs, the stronger the overreaction
which ultimately leads to a lower final posterior after round 6. This result
holds independent of the underlying distribution and is of similar magnitude
across different diagnosticities. One potential driver of this further incon-
sistency is that individuals generally overreact after disconfirming signals,
which is mostly corrected after subsequently observing another confirming
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signal. However, if subjects observe the disconfirming signal in the final pe-
riod (where the objective prior in the good distribution is as high as 96.74
%!) subjects can no longer correct their strong overreaction, causing them to
be substantially more pessimistic (or optimistic if the underlying distribution
is the bad one) about the underlying distribution than they should be. This
relation can be especially seen by the considerably higher coefficients of the
disconfirming dummy for round 6.
Overall, this result highlights once more the fact that individuals consis-
tently violate the counting heuristic after they encounter disconfirming sig-
nals. However, whereas they mostly correct their strong overreaction if they
can, the violation is most severe when subjects have no opportunity to collect
further information.
3.4.3 Robustness Checks
In this section we will replicate our main analyses on different subsamples to
validate its robustness against extreme outliers or individuals who are inat-
tentive and as such more likely to suffer from a bias in probabilistic reason-
ing. Besides validating the robustness of our main finding, such an analysis
might also provide valuable insights into which subgroup is most likely to
violate the counting heuristic.
In particular, we conduct splits regarding (i) extreme outliers; (ii) "speed-
ers"; and (iii) below median forecasters. Extreme outliers are individuals
whose subjective priors largely deviate from the Bayesian benchmark. Fol-
lowing the classification of Enke and Graeber (2019), we define extreme out-
liers as individuals who report a subjective posterior ps < 25% (> 75%)
when the Bayesian posterior is pB > 75% (< 25%). Speeders are defined as
subjects who are in the bottom decile of the response time distribution. Fi-
nally, we also investigate whether the here documented effect is only driven
by individuals who lack the statistical skills to correctly perform the forecast-
ing task, or whether even individuals who are closer to Bayesian behavior
exhibit a pronounced bias. To examine this relation, we define the squared
96 Chapter 3. Can Agents Add and Subtract When Forming Beliefs?
Table 3.7: Forecasting Ability and Extreme Outliers
Panel A: Extreme Outliers
Dependent Variable Change in Posterior Probability Estimate
Good Distribution Bad Distribution
No Outlier Outlier No Outlier Outlier
Change in Bayes 0.397*** −0.0964 0.583*** −0.128*
(15.00) (−0.51) (18.76) (−1.72)
Disconfirm −11.41*** −35.85**** 10.45*** 12.19***
(−14.21) (−4.45) (12.32) (5.22)
Correction 8.757*** 36.26*** −9.312*** −10.33***
(11.80) (5.28) (−9.87) (−4.41)
Observations 5238 300 3882 1422
R2 0.181 0.222 0.242 0.031
Panel B: Speeders versus Non-Speeders
Dependent Variable Change in Posterior Probability Estimate
Good Distribution Bad Distribution
Non-Speeders Speeders Non-Speeders Speeders
Change in Bayes 0.370*** 0.149 0.415*** 0.299***
(12.86) (1.63) (12.20) (3.43)
Disconfirm −13.75*** −7.236** 11.25*** 7.325***
(−13.89) (−2.36) (11.46) (3.15)
Correction 10.81*** 5-825 −10.07*** −5.991***
(12.57) (2.08) (−10.37) (−1.90)
Observations 5028 510 4734 570
R2 0.190 0.040 0.143 0.039
Panel C: Forecasting Ability
Dependent Variable Change in Posterior Probability Estimate
Good Distribution Bad Distribution
Above Below Above Below
Median Median Median Median
Change in Bayes 0.625*** 0.0137 0.823*** 0.111**
(23.44) (0.30) (26.97) (2.48)
Disconfirm −6.218*** −21.97*** 5.924*** 13.95***
(−8.90) (−11.48) (7.29) (10.35)
Correction 5.420*** 16.59*** −5.780*** −12.13***
(8.36) (9.71) (−6.62) (−8.42)
Observations 3270 2268 2154 3150
R2 0.267 0.154 0.388 0.079
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions on how subjects update their posterior
beliefs after a disconfirming signal and a correction across all experiments split by extreme
outliers (Panel A), the time it takes subjects to finish the experiment (Panel B), and subjects’
forecasting ability (Panel C). We report the results for each subsample of individuals (with
above-median versus below-median updating ability, no outlier versus outlier, and speeders
versus non-speeders) and for each distribution (good and bad distribution) individually.
Reported are coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) using robust standard errors. *, **,
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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deviation of subjects’ probability estimate in each period from the objective
posterior probability as a measure of forecasting quality and conduct median
splits. The results are reported in Table 3.7. Panel A reproduces the analysis
split by extreme outliers, Panel B splits the sample by speeders, and Panel C
reports results split by forecasting ability.
Overall, results are very similar, with two sets of results warrant a brief
discussion. First, throughout each subsample, we consistently find an eco-
nomically strong and statistically significant overreaction following a dis-
confirming signal, which is mostly corrected after observing a subsequent
confirming signal. While the overreaction is even more pronounced for out-
liers and individuals with below-median forecasting ability, it is mostly unaf-
fected by individuals’ response time. This suggest that systematic violations
of the counting heuristic appear to be a general phenomenon even though
they correlate with participants’ statistical skills. Yet, given that response
time does not play a major role, attention does not appear to be a major
driver. Second, when splitting the sample by extreme outliers, it becomes
apparent that outliers are mostly clustered in the bad distribution. This con-
firms our previous finding, that a greater fraction of individuals struggles
to forecast the bad distribution, even though both tasks should be – at least
from a Bayesian perspective – equivalent.
3.5 Conclusion
The goal of this study is to test whether subjects follow a simple counting
heuristic in belief updating as implied by Bayes’ Rule: two informationally
equivalent signals of opposite direction should always cancel out. However,
our study suggests that this is not the case. Whenever a sequence of signals
that go in the same direction is interrupted by a signal of opposite direction,
subjects violate the simple counting heuristic and strongly overreact to the
signal of opposite direction. In contrast to that, subjects correctly follow the
counting heuristic whenever opposite-directional signals alternate.
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Our results show a clear and robust pattern of over- and underreaction
following violations of a simple counting heuristic. This pattern does not
depend on the diagnosticity of the signals, on individuals’ limited memory
capacity, on signals not being anticipated, and the uncertainty of the under-
lying state. While, we identify when people violate simple counting rules, it
remains an open question why they do so.
Our findings have relevant implications for various fields of research,
among others investors’ belief formation and trading behavior in financial
markets as well as asset prices. In particular, the observation that agents’ ex-
pectations are overly influenced by a single opposite-directional signal after
a sequence of already just two same-directional signals may have valuable
implications for how investors form expectations in financial markets and
consequently act upon them. By and large, one of the most important and
widely-applied ideas in behavioral financial economics is that people put
too much weight on recent past returns, i.e. they over-extrapolate (Hong
and Stein, 1999; Barberis and Shleifer, 2003; Greenwood and Shleifer, 2014;
Barberis et al., 2015, 2018). This finding has important applications for ex-
cess stock market volatility, bubbles, and cross-sectional phenomena of stock
returns such as for example momentum and long-term reversal. In mod-
els of extrapolative returns a crucial input parameter is the relative weight
investors put on recent versus distant past returns. So far, the exact charac-
teristics of this input parameter are still incomprehensively understood. For
example, Cassella and Gulen (2018) recently show that the weight parameter
varies over time, but cannot explain why this is the case. Our findings may
add to a better understanding of the characteristics of this parameter in ex-
trapolative belief formation, as we find that (i) individuals already strongly
over-extrapolate from a single opposite-directional signal which interrupts a
sequence of previous same-directional signals and (ii) that the observed over-
extrapolation is relatively independent of the number of previously observed
same-directional signals. In other words, individuals even over-extrapolate
from a single opposite-directional signal if it occurs after a relatively long
3.5. Conclusion 99
history of same-directional signals which in turn means that they even over-
extrapolate in situations in which they are and should be quite sure about the
underlying state of the world.
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Chapter 4
Expectation Formation Under
Uninformative Signals ∗
4.1 Introduction
Probabilistic judgements are a central feature of any theory that involves
decision-making under risk. As such, errors in probabilistic reasoning matter
for essentially any economic decision that involves risk, including retirement,
investments, purchasing insurance, or attaining various degrees of educa-
tion. In the textbook model of Bayesian Updating, individuals update their
prior beliefs according to Bayes’ Rule upon receipt of new information. In
this model, signals which do not carry relevant information about the objec-
tive state of the world play no role and are treated as if no signal occurred.
In reality however, many information structures are complex, generating
signals that are often noisy and difficult to ascribe to one particular state of
the world. Additionally, new information is rarely processed as being purely
informative. Instead, individuals frequently have preferences over which
state of the world is true, effectively generating an interaction between be-
liefs and preferences (Eil and Rao, 2011; Möbius et al., 2014). This interaction
may lead to environments, in which information signals are non-diagnostic
about an underlying state of the world, but which nonetheless appear either
∗ Authors: Pascal Kieren and Martin Weber. All authors are at the University of Mannheim
(L9, 1-2, 68161 Mannheim). For valuable comments, we thank seminar participants at the
University of Mannheim. The paper is accepted for presentation at the annual meeting of
the American Economic Association 2021. We gratefully acknowledge financial support by
the Reinhard Selten Scholarship by the GfeW. All remaining errors are our own.
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desirable or undesirable. While Bayes’ Theorem would prescribe that indi-
viduals do not update their prior beliefs in response to such uninformative
signals, it is unclear whether individuals can correctly discern belief-relevant
information from their preferences.
Taking this observation as a point of departure, we conduct an experi-
mental study, in which we investigate how agents process signals which are
non-diagnostic about the objective state of the world but which are either de-
sirable or undesirable in the payoffs they generate. In the experiment which
partly builds on Grether (1980), subjects have to incorporate a series of infor-
mation signals into their beliefs to forecast the distribution of a risky asset.
The risky asset can generate three outcomes from one of two distributions,
a bad distribution and a good distribution. The outcomes can be ranked ac-
cording to their associated payoff (high, medium, and low). In the good dis-
tribution, the high outcome occurs with the highest probability, while the low
outcome occurs with the lowest probability. In the bad distribution, proba-
bilities of the high and low outcome are reversed. Following this logic, the
high outcome signals that the good distribution is more likely, whereas the
low outcome signals that the bad distribution is more likely. Importantly,
the medium outcome always occurs with the same probability independent
of the underlying distribution. In other words, the medium outcome pro-
vides no opportunity to learn about the true state of the risky asset and will
subsequently be referred to as an uninformative signal.
Over the course of ten rounds, subjects observe random draws from one
of the two distributions and have to make a probability forecast about the
likelihood that the asset is drawing from the good distribution. In our exper-
iment, we have two key treatment variations which we exogenously vary in
a between-subject design. The first treatment variation allows us to investi-
gate how the valence of uninformative signals affects individuals’ updating
behavior. In the positive treatment, the uninformative signal pays a positive
payoff, whereas in the negative treatment, the uninformative signal pays a
negative payoff. The second treatment variation concerns the motivation to
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provide correct forecasts. In the passive treatment, subjects are asked to fore-
cast the distribution of the risky asset after each draw and are thus only mo-
tivated to be accurate in their probability forecasts. In the active treatment,
subjects additionally decide each round between investing in the risky as-
set or a riskless security which always pays the intermediate outcome. In
this condition, subjects are motivated to be accurate in their forecasts and to
maximize their payoffs.
In our experimental setting, we have direct control over objective expec-
tations and can compare them to participants’ subjective beliefs. Importantly,
the distributions from which information is drawn are constructed in a way,
that the medium outcome does not provide any information about whether
subjects are currently drawing from the good or the bad distribution. As
such, a Bayesian agent in our setting would not update his prior beliefs after
observing an uninformative signal, independent of whether the signal is in
the positive domain or in the negative domain. This allows us to disentan-
gle the valence from the informational content of a signal and to document
systematic errors in the belief formation process.
We find that individuals strongly and systematically update their prior
beliefs after observing signals that are uninformative of the objective state of
the world. In contrast to Bayesian behavior, individuals fail to fully extract
belief-relevant information. Whereas they update their priors in on average
by about 7.45 percentage points after observing informative signals, they also
update their priors by 2.21 percentage points after observing uninformative
signals. In relative terms, individuals adjust their priors with about 30 % of
the strength as if the observed signal would carry information.
Second, we find that the direction in which individuals update their be-
liefs strongly depends on the valence of the observed signal. In particular,
individuals tend to form more optimistic beliefs about the objective state of
the world after observing positive uninformative signals, whereas they form
more pessimistic beliefs after observing negative uninformative signals. This
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effect becomes even more pronounced when individuals observe uninfor-
mative signals in an environment in which their beliefs matter for a payoff-
relevant decision. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first test
of whether individuals can distinguish their preferences from belief-relevant
information in their belief formation. Additionally, we show that the effect is
not driven by a few individuals who overreact to the valence of uninforma-
tive signals, but rather a general phenomenon. After observing informative
signals subjects only occasionally make updating mistakes that are direction-
ally inconsistent with Bayes’ Rule (e.g. becoming more optimistic after a bad
signal). However, after observing uninformative signals, subjects wrongly
update their beliefs in about 68 % of the cases.
Third, as underlying mechanism we identify that individuals tend to pro-
cess noisy information signals in a reference-dependent manner dictated by
their prior beliefs. They fail to correctly identify that uninformative signals
do not carry information about the objective state of the world and update
their beliefs based on the valence of the signal relative to their current prior
expectations. In particular, subjects who hold optimistic prior beliefs about
the state of the risky asset (i.e. subjects who belief the good outcome is
more likely to occur) only weakly increase their beliefs when the uninforma-
tive signal is positive (but in magnitude smaller than the good signal), but
strongly decrease their beliefs when the signal is negative. Similarly, sub-
jects who hold pessimistic prior beliefs about the state of the risky asset only
weakly increase their beliefs when the uninformative signal is negative (but
in magnitude greater than the bad signal), but strongly increase their beliefs
when the signal is positive.
Research on errors in probabilistic reasoning has a long-standing tradi-
tion (Phillips and Edwards, 1966; Tversky and Kahneman, 1971, 1974). Im-
plications of biased reasoning following new information have been studied
in diverse contexts such as in psychologists’ interpretation of diagnostic tests
(Meehl and Rosen, 1955) , doctors’ diagnoses of patients (Eddy, 1982), courts’
judgments in trials (Tribe, 1971), or ideological conflicts and political discus-
sions (Kahan, 2013). This article contributes to the literature by identifying an
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error in how individuals process information signals which provide no rel-
evant learning opportunity about an objective state of the world, but which
are nonetheless desirable or undesirable in the payoffs they generate. Our
findings most closely relate to earlier studies which investigate base-rate ne-
glect in response to uninformative descriptions of personality sketche (see
e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1973; Wells and Harvey, 1978; Ginosar and
Trope, 1980, 1987; Fischhoff and Bar-Hillel, 1984). These experiments typ-
ically consist of instructions which are framed to be irrelevant for judging
the likelihood that a person belongs to a particular job group and find that
individuals by and large draw inferences from such descriptions. Whereas
these studies also examine how uninformative descriptions affect individu-
als’ judgement about underlying probabilities, they are fundamentally differ-
ent from ours as they do not investigate the influence of uninformative sig-
nals in dynamic belief updating problems. Perhaps closest to our study is the
study by Troutman and Shanteau (1977), who investigate the effect of differ-
ent non-diagnostic samples in bookbag-and-poker-chip experiments. They
find that non-diagnostic samples result in less extreme probability assess-
ments, as individuals effectively average across all observed signals, thereby
mixing both informative and uninformative signals. Yet, different from ex-
isting work, our study emphasizes the critical role of preferences in the pro-
cessing of uninformative signals. We show that, depending on the valence of
the signal and individuals’ prior beliefs, non-diagnostic signals can also lead
to more extreme responses. As such, uninformative signals can not only lead
to systematically biased beliefs whenever desired or undesired outcomes are
non-indicative of the true state of the world, but also reinforce wrongly en-
tertained beliefs.
Our paper also relates and contributes to the literature on prior-biased
inference especially in the context of confirmation bias (e.g. Charness and
Dave, 2017) and belief-polarization (e.g. Lord et al., 1979; Kahan, 2013 or
Benoît and Dubra, 2018). This literature finds that individuals have a ten-
dency to seek, interpret, and use evidence in a manner biased towards cur-
rent beliefs. In belief polarization experiments, subjects with different priors
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are typically presented with the same mixed signals, causing their beliefs to
move further apart. In these studies, signals are usually informative although
noisy, effectively giving room for different interpretations. Our results high-
light that even in settings in which signals are non-diagnostic of an objective
state of the world, beliefs might drift apart if individuals have different pri-
ors and assign a different level of valence to the signal. In the presence of
an increasing number of information sources, the mechanism presented here
might further reinforce polarized beliefs.
Finally, our paper also contributes to the broad literature on motivated
beliefs, which argues that beliefs are adjusted differently depending on the
valence of the observed signal. Especially in the context of self-relevant be-
liefs, individuals appear to asymmetrically process self-serving information,
putting more weight on positive than on negative information (see e.g. Eil
and Rao, 2011; Sharot et al., 2011 or Zimmermann, 2020). While the beliefs
we elicit in our study are not self-relevant, they are nonetheless motivated
as participants are motivated to believe that the risky asset is in the good
state, because the good state is more likely to result in greater payoffs. For
informative signals, we find that individuals update their beliefs regarding
the state of the risky asset to a greater extent following positive information
than negative information. However, similar conclusions cannot be drawn
regarding uninformative signals. Here, individuals appear to process the
signals in a rather symmetric manner for priors close to 50− 50, becoming
more optimistic after positive uninformative signals and more pessimistic af-
ter negative uninformative signals. Yet, once individuals become pessimistic,
they also start to asymmetrically update their beliefs, strongly overreacting
to positive uninformative signals and mostly neglecting negative uninforma-
tive signals. As in the model proposed by Bénabou (2013), this mechanism
might suggest that individuals want to quickly revert very pessimistic priors
to preserve anticipatory utility from putting a higher probability on the good
state.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 offers a
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stylized formal framework that motivates the experimental design and struc-
tures the empirical analysis. Section 4.3 presents evidence that subjects up-
date their prior beliefs even after observing uninformative signals based on
the valence of the signal and explores potential mechanisms underlying this
phenomenon. Section 4.4 concludes.
4.2 Conceptual Framework
4.2.1 Setup
This section presents a stylized framework to guide the design of the experi-
ment and to structure the main part of the empirical analysis. The underlying
mechanics of the framework directly build on a reduced-form model origi-
nally introduced by Grether (1980). To keep the focus on the processing of un-
informative signals, we assume only two possible states of the world, a good
state (denoted as G) and a bad state (denoted as B). Consider a decision-
maker (DM) who wants to learn about the current state of the world. The
agent’s prior beliefs are denoted by p(g) and p(b). To decide which state of
the world is more likely, the DM receives a number of signals S, in which
each signal st can either be informative of a good state (signal g) or of a bad
state (signal b). Additionally, the DM may also receive uninformative signals
(signal u), which are neither indicative of a good state nor of a bad state. As
the DM observes a new signal, she updates her prior beliefs according to the
following function:
π (G|S) = p(S|G)
c p (G)d
p(S|G)c p (G)d + p(S|B)c p (B)d
(4.1)
π (B|S) = p(S|B)
c p (B)d
p(S|G)c p (G)d + p(S|B)c p (B)d
(4.2)
where p(.) refers to a true conditional probability, π(.) refers to an agent’s
(potentially biased) belief, and c, d ≥ 0. The parameter c governs the (biased)
use of likelihoods, while the parameter d governs the (biased) use of prior
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beliefs. To interpret the magnitudes of c and d, we follow Benjamin (2019),
and write the model in the posterior-odds form, dividing (4.1) by (4.2):
π (G|S)
π (B|S) =
[
p (S|G)
p (S|B)
]c [ p (G)
p (B)
]d
. (4.3)
In this equation, c < 1 corresponds to updating as if the signals provided
less information about the state (underinference), while c > 1 corresponds to
updating as if the signals provided more informative than they do (overinfer-
ence). Similarly, d < 1 corresponds to treating the priors as less informative
than they are (also referred to as base-rate neglect), while d > 1 corresponds
to the opposite. The model nests Bayes’ Theorem as a special case, in which
c = d = 1.
To infer the underlying state of the world, consider that a DM receives
each period t a new signal, which can either be good, bad, or uninformative.
In a signal structure where only two signals carry information about the un-
derlying state of the world, the conditional probability of being in the good
state given the signal history at time t (π (G|S)) can be calculated as follows:
πBayes (G|S) = θ
zt
θzt + (1− θ)zt
, zt = gt − bt (4.4)
where gt (bt) denotes the number of good (bad) signals that have been ob-
served until period t and zt is the difference between both. The parameter
θ ∈ [0, 1] captures the diagnosticity of an informative signal. Since a Bayesian
DM would neglect uninformative signals, only the difference of good and
bad signals is of relevance. Additionally, note that he is indifferent regarding
the order in which the signals occur.
Following Charness and Dave (2017), we make use of the fact that the
natural logarithm of the odds ratio within a round (ln
(
πBayes(G|zt)
πBayes(B|zt)
)
) for a
Bayesian is given by1:
π
Bayes
t = ln
(
π (G|s1, . . . , st)
π (B|s1, . . . , st)
)
= ln
(
θ
1− θ
)
· zt (4.5)
1 A detailed explanation and derivation is provided in Appendix C.4.
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As such, the Bayesian log-odds ratio is updated by ±θ · zt after each new
signal and − in contrast to Bayes probability − linear in the number of sig-
nals. To make the interpretation easier, we take the first-difference of both
sides of the equation, yielding:
∆πt = πt − πt−1 = ln
(
θ
1− θ
)
· ∆zt, (4.6)
where ∆πt ∈ {−θ, θ} and ∆zt ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. The interpretation of ∆πt
is straightforward. If the DM observes a new good (bad) signal, then the
Bayesian log-odds ratio is updated by θ(−θ). If the DM observes an unin-
formative signal (i.e. ∆zt = 0), then the Bayesian log-odds ratio remains
constant.
To incorporate that a non-Bayesian DM may falsely incorporate an unin-
formative signal in his belief updating process, we consider the possibility
that c may not only depend on the information of a signal, but also on the va-
lence. In our setting, valence can be broadly defined as any signal that does
not help the DM to learn about the current state of the world but which pro-
vides either positive or negative utility (e.g. through a payoff or other factors
that might be relevant for the DM):
π(G|S)
π(B|S) =
[
p(S|G)
p(S|B)
]c0+I{u| desirable}c1+I{u| undesirable}c2 [ p(G)
p(B)
]d
, (4.7)
where I {u| desirable} equals 1 if s = u and the signal is perceived as
desirable and I {u| undesirable} equals 1 if s = u and the signal is perceived
as undesirable. In this case, we obtain three reduced-form parameters which
describe biased inference: c0 captures inference of informative signals, while
c1 and c2 capture uninformative signals which are desirable or undesirable,
respectively.
Equation (4.7) will be the core expression to investigate individuals’
propensity to update after uninformative signals. It nests the Bayesian
prediction that priors are fully incorporated in the belief formation process
(i.e. d = 1) and that individuals respond with a coefficient of c0 = 1 to
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informative signals. Finally, since a Bayesian DM would not update his prior
beliefs after an uninformative signal (i.e. ∆zt = 0), we would expect that
c1 = c2 = 0.
4.2.2 Experimental Design
To study the degree to which individuals’ belief formation process is affected
by uninformative signals, we require an environment in which (i) individuals
repeatedly incorporate signals with varying degrees of information into their
beliefs; (ii) Bayesian beliefs can be clearly identified; (iii) treatment variations
allow the exogenous variation of the desirability of uninformative signals;
(iv) holding positive/negative beliefs has a value in and of itself; and (v)
the belief elicitation is incentive-compatible. The design of our experimental
study was built to accommodate these features.
The experiment consists of two parts, the main task (a forecasting task in
the spirit of Grether, 1980) and a brief survey. In the forecasting task, sub-
jects receive information about a risky asset, whose payoffs are either drawn
from a "good distribution" or from a "bad distribution". Both distributions
have three outcomes, which are identical across distributions but differ with
respect to the probability with which they occur. All three outcomes can be
ranked based on the payoff they generate and are thus labeled high, medium,
or low. In the good distribution, the high payoff occurs with a 50 % proba-
bility, while the low payoff occurs with a 20 % probability. In the bad dis-
tribution, probabilities are reversed, i.e. the low payoff occurs with a 50 %
probability, while the high payoff occurs with only 20 % probability. Impor-
tantly, and crucial for the experimental design, the medium payoff always
occurs with 30 % probability, irrespective of whether the distribution is good
or bad. This ensures that the medium outcome does not provide any infor-
mation about the underlying distribution, from which outcomes are drawn.
We introduce a 2x2 between-subject design with respect to the forecast-
ing task. The first treatment dimension to which subjects are assigned de-
picts the potential payoffs of the two distributions. In particular, subjects are
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Table 4.1: Payoff Distribution
Payoffs Good Signal Uninformative Bad Signal
Signal
Positive Treatment +5 +1 −3
Negative Treatment +3 −1 −5
Note: This table reports the payoffs associated with good, uninformative, and bad signals,
split by positive and negative treatment.
randomly assigned to either a "positive" condition or a "negative" condition.
The three possible payoffs in the positive condition are +5 (high outcome),
+1 (medium outcome), or -3 (low outcome). In the negative condition, all
outcomes are shifted by -2 to keep the higher moments of the distribution
constant while reducing the mean. As such, the three possible payoffs in the
negative condition are +3 (high outcome), -1 (medium outcome), or -5 (low
outcome). Table 4.1 provides a brief overview of possible outcomes across
treatments.
The second treatment dimension relates to the set of questions subjects
have to answer in the forecasting task. Subjects can be assigned to an "active"
or a "passive" condition. In both conditions, subjects observe a payoff of the
risky asset in ten consecutive rounds. Before the first round, the computer
randomly determines the distribution of the risky asset (which can be good
or bad). In the active condition, subjects decide before the beginning of each
round whether they want to invest in the risky asset (whose distribution they
have to forecast) or a bond, which always pays the medium outcome (-1, or
+1; depending on the treatment) for sure. The payoff of the bond is thus
equal to the expected value of the risky asset when no information about
the underlying distribution is available. If the good distribution becomes
more likely (i.e. occurs with a probability of greater than 50 %), the expected
value of the risky asset is greater then the expected value of the bond, and
vice versa. After their decision to invest in one of the two securities, sub-
jects observe the payoff of the risky asset (irrespective of their choice) and
are reminded of how much they have earned so far given their prior choices.
Finally, subjects are asked to provide an estimate of the probability that the
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risky asset was paying from the good distribution and to rate their confidence
in this estimate (assessed on a seven-point Likert scale). In the passive con-
dition, subjects do not make any investment decision and start each round
by observing the payoff of the risky asset in that trial. Afterwards, they are
immediately asked to provide an estimate of the probability that the risky
asset was paying from the good distribution and to rate their confidence in
this estimate (also assessed on a seven-point Likert scale). An overview of all
questions and the order in which subjects answer the questions is provided
in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Overview of the Updating Task
Note: This figure provides an overview of the questions subjects have to answer in the fore-
casting task. Subjects in the passive treatment have to answer three questions in each round,
whereas subjects in the active treatment have to answer five questions in each round (de-
noted with [active only]). Subjects make forecasting decisions in 10 consecutive rounds.
To avoid potentially confounding factors resulting from biased memories
(see Gödker et al., 2019), we explicitly display the prior outcomes in a ta-
ble next to the questions. Additionally, we recognize that belief updating is
an abstract task for many individuals. To ensure that subjects have a suf-
ficient understanding of the forecasting task, they had to correctly answer
three comprehension questions before they could continue (see Appendix
C.2 for the exact wording).
The experiment concluded with a brief survey about subjects’ socio-
economic background, self-assessed statistic skills, as well as a measure of
risk preferences and financial literacy adopted from Kuhnen (2015). The
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latter two measures were obtained by asking subjects two questions regard-
ing a portfolio allocation problem. In the first question, participants had to
allocate $10, 000 between a broadly diversified index fund and a savings
account. This answer provides a proxy for their risk preferences. The second
question asked subjects to identify the correct formula for calculating the
expected value of the portfolio they selected. Through multiple-choice
answers, we can detect whether people lacked an understanding of proba-
bilities, of the difference between net and gross returns, or of the difference
between stocks and savings accounts. This yielded a financial knowledge
score between zero to three (exact wording of questions is provided in the
Appendix).
In the active condition participants were paid based on their investment
payoffs and the accuracy of the probability estimates provided. Specifically,
they received one twentieth of their accumulated payoffs (in the negative
condition, all outcomes were shifted by +2 for the final calculation to make
payment equivalent), plus 10 Cents for each probability estimate within 5 %
of the objective Bayesian value. As such, subjects were motivated to be accu-
rate in their forecasts and to maximize their payoffs. In the passive condition
participants were paid based on the accuracy of the provided probability es-
timates, with the same rules as in the active condition.2
4.2.3 Hypotheses Development
To obtain parameter estimates for our main specification in the conceptual
framework, we estimate a regression based on the natural logarithm of Equa-
tion (4.7).3
2 While the resulting payment for the passive condition was lower on average, participants
also completed the experiment faster.
3 The detailed derivation can be found in Appendix C.4.
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ln
λ(G|s1, . . . , st)
λ(B|s1, . . . , st)
= β̂1 · Din f ormative + β̂2 · ln
λ(G|s1, . . . , st−1)
λ(B|s1, . . . , st−1)
+ β̂3 · Dunin f ormative|desirable + β̂4 · Dunin f ormative|undesirable + εt (4.8)
Note that within a round t, the natural logarithm of subject’s i odds ra-
tio, based on her stated probability Pit (G|s1, . . . , st) that the asset is paying
dividends from the good state is:
λit = ln
(
λ (G|s1, . . . , st)
λ (B|s1, . . . , st)
)
= ln
(
Pit (G|s1, . . . , st)
1− Pit (G|s1, . . . , st)
)
(4.9)
which may differ from the objective Bayesian probability (πit). To make
sure that the above ratio is defined for all observations, we truncated the data
to lie in the [0.01, 0.99] interval. The interpretation of λit is straightforward.
If λit is greater than (less than) zero, then person i beliefs in round t that the
asset is more (less) likely to draw from the good state.
In the regression specification, we replaced ln p(S|G)p(S|B) with a dummy
Din f ormative taking the value 1 if the tth signal is g, 0 if the tth signal is u,
and -1 if the tth signal is b (see Appendix C.4). While this specification
is equivalent (see Benjamin, 2019), we need to interpret the coefficient β̂1
relative to
(
θ
1−θ
)
instead of 1. Even though we have three possible outcomes
in our experimental environment, which occur with 50 % (signal g or b), 30
% (signal u), and 20 % (signal g or b), only two of them are informative about
the objective state of the world (signal g and signal b). Thus, the diagnosticity
of an informative signal is set to θ = 0.50.5+0.2 = 0.714 in our experiment and
we need to interpret the coefficient β̂1 relative to
(
θ
1−θ
)
= 0.7141−0.714 ≈ 0.916.
The regression specification allows us to control for several deviations
from Bayesian behavior simultaneously, while testing whether individuals
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systematically incorporate uninformative signals into their beliefs. More pre-
cisely, if individuals are subject to conservatism (overreaction), one would ex-
pect β̂1 < (>) 0.916. Similarly, if individuals put too little (much) weight on
their priors, one would expect β̂2 < (>) 1. Importantly, if people falsely in-
corporate uninformative signals in their belief formation process, one would
observe that both β̂3 and β̂4 predict log-odds. In contrast, a test of Bayesian
behavior would be:
β̂1 = ln
(
θ
1− θ
)
= 0.916; β̂2 = 1; β̂3 = β̂4 = 0
4.2.4 Summary Statistics
Table 4.2 presents summary statistics. Overall, six-hundred forty-one indi-
viduals (420 males, 221 females, mean age 33 years, 8.8 years standard devi-
ation) were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to participate
in an online experiment. MTurk advanced to a widely used and accepted
recruiting platform for economic experiments. Not only does it offer a large
and diverse subject pool compared to lab studies (which frequently rely on
students), but it also provides a response quality similar to that of other sub-
ject pools (Buhrmester et al., 2011; Goodman et al., 2013). Participants re-
ported average statistic skills of 4.71 out of 7 and would invest roughly 49
percent of their hypothetical endowment into a risky fund, which will serve
as a proxy of risk aversion. Moreover, participants achieved a financial liter-
acy score of approximately 1.34 out of 3.
Additionally, we tested whether the randomization from our between-
subject design successfully resulted in a balanced sample. Table 1 also reports
the mean and standard deviation for each control variable split by whether
the uninformative signal was positive or negative (Panel A) and whether par-
ticipants played the active or passive version of the forecasting task (Panel B).
Differences were tested using rank-sum tests, or χ2-tests for binary variables.
Generally, we barely find any significant difference between our treatments,
suggesting that our randomization was successful. The only exceptions are
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics
Panel A Full Negative Positive Differ- p-value
Sample Treatment Treatment ence
Variable (N=641) (N=321) (N=320)
Age 33.00 33.00 33.00 0.00 1.00
(8.79) (9.04) (8.55)
Female (1 = Yes) 0.34 0.36 0.33 0.03 0.38
(0.48) (0.48) (0.47)
Statistic Skills (1-7) 4.71 4.76 4.66 0.10 0.47
(1.76) (1.73) (1.78)
Risk Preferences (% 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.01 0.51
invested in risky asset) (0.31) (0.30) (0.31)
Financial Literacy 1.34 1.43 1.26 0.17 0.01
(0.91) (0.88) (0.93)
Panel B Full Passive Active Differ- p-value
Sample Treatment Treatment ence
Variable (N=641) (N=330) (N=311)
Age 33.00 33.49 32.48 1.01 0.15
(8.79) (8.47) (9.11)
Female (1 = Yes) 0.34 0.36 0.32 0.04 0.30
(0.48) (0.48) (0.47)
Statistic Skills (1-7) 4.71 4.55 4.87 0.31 0.02
(1.76) (1.83) (1.67)
Risk Preferences (% 0.49 0.48 0.51 0.03 0.18
invested in risky asset) (0.31) (0.28) (0.33)
Financial Literacy 1.34 1.35 1.34 0.01 0.85
(0.91) (0.92) (0.89)
Note: This table shows summary statistics for our experimental data. Reported are the mean
and the standard deviation (in parentheses) for the whole sample (Column 1) and split across
treatments (Panel A for Positive/Negative; Panel B for Active/Passive). Column 4 presents
randomization checks. Differences in mean were tested using rank-sum tests, or χ2-tests for
binary variables. The p-value is reported in Column 5. Female is an indicator variable that
equals 1 if a participant is female. Statistic skills denotes participants’ self-assessed statistical
skills on a 7-point Likert scale. Risk Preferences is the percentage of their initial endowment
that subjects invested in a risky investment option. Financial Literacy is a score between zero
(lacking basic understanding) to three (correctly answered each question).
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minor differences in financial literacy for the first treatment dimension (Panel
A) and minor differences in self-reported statistic skills for the second treat-
ment dimension (Panel B). Due to the random allocation across treatments,
these differences arise most likely due to chance. Nevertheless, we control
for these factors in all our further analyses. For the remaining variables, we
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the socio-economic background of the
subjects is balanced between our treatments.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Belief Updating after Uninformative Signals
Before we delve into the statistical analysis, Figure 4.2 visualizes participants
general updating tendency after good, bad, and uninformative signals and
compares it to Bayesian behavior. The figure displays results separately by
whether the uninformative signal was positive (positive treatment) or nega-
tive (negative treatment).
Figure 4.2: General Updating Tendency
Note: This figure illustrates subjects’ general belief updating after observing good, uninfor-
mative, and bad signals about the state of the risky asset. Displayed are actual changes in
prior beliefs as well as the correct Bayesian change in probability. Results are displayed sep-
arately by whether subjects encountered the uninformative signal in the positive or negative
domain. Displayed are 95% confidence intervals.
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As can be inferred, subjects’ beliefs adjust in the appropriate direction af-
ter both good and bad (informative) signals. Relative to Bayesian beliefs, we
observe conservatism on average as subjects generally update too little both
after good and after bad news. However, even after uninformative signals,
subjects’ beliefs adjust substantially and in the direction of the domain of the
uninformative signal. While a Bayesian decision maker would not update
his prior beliefs at all, subjects increase their priors after observing a posi-
tive uninformative signal, whereas they decrease their priors after observing
a negative uninformative signal. Additionally, the strength with which they
update their priors is symmetric for positive and negative uninformative sig-
nals.
While the pattern in Figure 4.2 provides first insights into subjects’ updat-
ing behavior it is, of course, insufficient to justify a causal interpretation. To
provide more formal evidence of how individuals update their priors after
observing uninformative signals, we estimate OLS regressions of Equation
(4.8):
λi,t = β̂1 · Din f ormative; i,t + β̂2 · λi,t−1
+ β̂3 · Dunin f ormative; i,t + β̂4 · Dunin f ormative; i,t x negativei + εt (4.10)
where participants’ subjective log-odds ratio is the dependent variable,
and Din f ormative;i,t is a variable taking the value 1 if the tth signal of subject i is
good, 0 if the tth signal is unin f ormative, and -1 if the tth signal is bad. λi,t−1
denotes the use of priors (i.e. the base-rate) and is defined as ln λ(G|s1,...,st−1)
λ(B|s1,...,st−1)
.
Dunin f ormative; i,t is a dummy if the tth signal of subject i is uninformative,
whereas negativei is a dummy if participant i is in the negative treatment
(and zero otherwise). The interaction term thus displays whether participant
i encountered a negative uninformative signal in round t. Finally, Xij is a set
of control variables including age, gender, statistic skills, risk-aversion, and
financial literacy. Results for the full sample and split by active and passive
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treatment are reported in Table 4.3.4
Table 4.3: Uninformative Updating
Dependent Variable Log Odds Ratio (Subjective) λi,t
Full Sample Active Passive
Din f ormative; i,t (Inference) 0.472*** 0.369*** 0.569***
(15.22) (9.06) (12.39)
λi,t−1 (Use of Priors) 0.697*** 0.758*** 0.624***
(32.99) (27.91) (19.60)
Dunin f ormative; i,t 0.256*** 0.329*** 0.152**
(5.89) (5.16) (2.56)
Dunin f ormative; i,t x −0.514*** −0.563*** −0.443***
negativei (−7.19) (−5.40) (−4.54)
Observations 5769 2799 2970
R2 0.538 0.611 0.468
Note: This table reports the results of three OLS regressions on how information signals and
their valence affect individuals’ beliefs. We report results for the full sample and split by ac-
tive and passive treatment. The dependent variable is participants’ subjective log-odds ratio
as defined in Section 2. Din f ormative; i,t is a variable taking the value 1 if the tth signal of sub-
ject i is good, 0 if the tth signal is uninformative, and -1 if the tth signal is bad. Dunin f ormative; i,t
is a dummy if the tth signal of subject i is uninformative, whereas negativei is a dummy if
participant i is in the negative treatment (and zero otherwise). The interaction term thus
displays whether participant i encountered a negative uninformative signal in round t. Con-
trols include age, gender, statistical skills, risk aversion, and participants’ financial literacy.
Reported are coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses). All standard errors are clustered
at the individual level. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
Our results suggest that Bayesian behavior is not predominant in the data.
Specifically, we observe that β̂1 6= 0.916, β̂2 6= 1, and that both β̂3 and β̂4 6= 0.
To interpret in which way individuals depart from Bayesian behavior, it is
instructive to review what it would mean for individual coefficient estimates
to vary from their Bayesian counterparts. Since β̂1 < 0.916 and β̂2 < 1,
individuals suffer both from conservatism (i.e. they underinfer) and base-
rate neglect (i.e. they under-use prior information). Most importantly how-
ever, we find that β̂3 > 0, whereas β̂4 < 0. In other words, even though a
Bayesian would not update his prior beliefs after observing an uninformative
4 Regression specifications are chosen to be identical to theory (i.e. estimated without a con-
stant). However, other specifications yield similar results. We opt to present the simplest
possible evidence.
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signal, both positive and negative uninformative signals predict log-odds ra-
tios. More precisely, controlling for both conservatism and base-rate neglect,
individuals on average increase their priors after observing a positive unin-
formative signal with about half the strength as if the signal would contain
information. Given the magnitude of both β̂3 and β̂4, this effect is mostly
symmetric, suggesting that individuals also decrease their priors with about
half the strength as if a negative uninformative signal would contain infor-
mation. Lastly, we observe stronger effects when individuals have the oppor-
tunity to invest in the asset compared to when they simply state their beliefs.
Taken together, this suggests that having stakes in the task exacerbates the
bias resulting from uninformative signals, potentially because individuals
hope to observe positive payoffs to maximize their earnings.
4.3.2 Frequency of Updating Mistakes
Thus far, we have established that individuals on average incorporate even
uninformative signals into their beliefs based on the valence of the signal.
However, these average patterns may mask a substantial amount of hetero-
geneity. In particular, it is not clear whether our results are driven by a few
individuals who neglect the informational content but strongly focus on the
valence or whether the here reported updating tendency applies to a large
share of individuals, thus being a rather general phenomenon. To draw in-
ference about the relation between the informational content and the valence
of signals and to determine which aspect is most prevalent when processing
uninformative signals, we examine how frequently individuals falsely up-
date their beliefs after observing uninformative signals. To investigate the
frequency, we define any belief update that is directionally inconsistent with
the observed signal as an updating mistake. In the case of informative sig-
nals, an updating error is thus defined as a decrease (increase) in prior beliefs
that the asset is drawing from the good state after subjects observed a good
(bad) signal. Similarly, for uninformative signals, an updating error is de-
fined as any update in prior beliefs after having observed an uninformative
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Figure 4.3: Basic Updating Mistakes
Note: This figure illustrates the number of directionally inconsistent belief updates relative
to the overall number of observed signals. Results are displayed separately for good, unin-
formative, and bad signals.
signal. Importantly, the definition above does not rely on the magnitude of
the error, but only on the occurrence of such an error.
Figure 4.3 plots the absolute number of good, uninformative, and bad
signals, as well as the number of mistakes after observing any of the three
signals.
Across all rounds and subjects, there are a total of 2,281 good signals, 1,929
uninformative signals, and 2,200 bad signals. Looking at informative signals,
subjects only made basic errors in about 20 % of the cases (18 % and 23 %,
for good and bad signals, respectively). However, the rate at which subjects
perform basic errors is substantially higher for uninformative signals. Here
subjects updated their beliefs in 68 % of the cases, even though the signal
did not provide any learning opportunity about the underlying distribution.
While Figure 4.3 already shows that the frequency of errors is substantially
different for informative and uninformative signals, we further validate the
robustness of the finding in a linear probability model. To do so, we estimate
the following model5:
5 While we estimate the model using OLS, results remain unchanged if we use a logit model
instead.
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Errori,t = β0 + β1Dunin f ormative; i,t + β2Objective Priori,t
+ β3Subjective Priori,t + β4Con f idencei,t +
n
∑
j=1
β jXij + εi,t, (4.11)
where Errori,t is defined as individual i performing an updating er-
ror that is directionally inconsistent with the observed signal in round
t. Objective Priori,t is the rational prior for individual i as prescribed by
Bayes’ Theorem given the observed outcome history in round t, while
Subjective Priori,t is subjects’ probability estimate in round t. Finally,
Con f idencei,t is subjects’ self-reported confidence in their ability to provide
correct probability forecasts. Results are reported in Table 4.4.
Consistent with our prior conjecture, we find that observing an uninfor-
mative signal in a given round substantially increases the likelihood of con-
ducting an updating error. More precisely, we find that the likelihood of
conducting an error is roughly 50 percentage points higher after observing
an uninformative signal compared to observing a signal that does carry in-
formation about the underlying distribution. Interestingly, while this effect
does not largely depend on the valence of the signal (Columns 3 and 4) it is
less pronounced in the active treatment and more pronounced in the passive
treatment (Column 2). The latter difference might be driven by the fact that
subjects in the active treatment can derive payoff-relevant information from
inferring the correct state of the underlying asset. As such, they might pay
more attention to the information structure of the signals, thereby reducing
their propensity to update their beliefs in response to uninformative signals.
Besides the treatment, we find that the probability of updating one’s beliefs
in the wrong direction also correlates to participants’ confidence in their own
forecasts. Those individuals who are more confident that their forecast is cor-
rect are also less likely to update their beliefs in response to uninformative
signals, suggesting that individuals are mindful about their own ability to
provide correct forecasts.
4.3. Results 123
Table 4.4: Frequency of Directionally Inconsistent Updating Errors
Dependent Variable Updating Error
Full Sample Full Sample Positive Negative
Treatment Treatment
Dunin f ormative; i,t 0.475*** 0.517*** 0.449*** 0.506***
(33.42) (26.54) (22.35) (25.08)
Objective Posterior −0.00046 −0.00046* −0.00012 −0.00079**
(−1.63) (−1.67) (−0.30) (−2.10)
Subjective 0.00067** 0.00077** 0.00010 0.0014***
Probability Estimate (1.99) (2.31) (−0.20) (3.17)
Confidence Estimate −0.0147*** −0.0153*** −0.0111* −0.0166***
(−3.71) (−3.84) (−1.81) (−3.15)
Active −0.00983
(−0.59)
Dunin f ormative; i,t −0.0850***
x Active (−3.03)
Constant 0.255*** 0.256*** 0.275*** 0.241***
(5.34) (5.37) (3.90) (3.63)
Observations 6410 6410 3210 3200
R2 0.224 0.227 0.204 0.250
Note: This table reports the results of four OLS regressions on how frequently individuals
perform directionally inconsistent updating mistakes. We report results for the full sample
and split by positive and negative treatment. The dependent variable is Updating Error, a
dummy that equals 1 if participants perform a updating mistake that is directionally incon-
sistent with Bayes’ Rule. Dunin f ormative; i,t is a dummy taking the value 1 if the tth signal
is uninformative, and 0 otherwise. Objective Posterior is the correct Bayesian probability that
the risky asset is in the good state, given the information seen by the participant up to trial
t in the learning block. Subjective Probability Estimate and Confidence Estimate are partici-
pants’ estimates of the probability that the risky asset is in the good state and their assessed
confidence, respectively. Controls include age, gender, statistical skills, risk aversion, and
participants’ financial literacy. Reported are coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses). All
standard errors are clustered at the individual level. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Taken together, the analysis reinforces our prior evidence that individu-
als face difficulties in discerning the informational content of a signal from
its valence. Additionally, the effect appears to be a general and quite robust
phenomenon, as individuals more frequently update their beliefs after infor-
mationally irrelevant signals than they do not.
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4.3.3 Mechanism: Reference-dependent Belief Updating
One common and persistent finding so far is that individuals not only face
difficulties in correctly identifying the informational content of signals but
also that they struggle to discern it from the valence of the signal. In this
section, we explore potential mechanisms underlying this pattern.
To do so, we focus on the influence of participants’ prior beliefs about the
state of the risky asset. Prior beliefs have previously been shown to affect
updating mistakes and biased inference in multiple ways and thus serve as
a natural starting point for our analysis. Testing the implications of a model
by Rabin and Schrag (1999) both Charness and Dave (2017) and Pouget et al.
(2017), find evidence that individuals draw inference in a manner that is bi-
ased in favor of current beliefs about the objective state of the risky asset. A
related body of research documents that people update their beliefs about
future outcomes in an asymmetric manner: they tend to neglect undesir-
able information, and overweight desirable information (Eil and Rao, 2011;
Möbius et al., 2014; Sharot and Garrett, 2016). In our experiment, prior be-
liefs are important for two reasons. First, when deciding between investing
in the risky asset or choosing the risk-free alternative, holding a particular
belief has direct consequences for the investment decision. As such, beliefs
have a value in and of themselves, as positive beliefs about the state of the
risky asset are related to higher potential payoffs. Second, and perhaps even
more important, extreme priors (both optimistic and pessimistic) are usually
the result of observing one particular signal more frequently than the other
signals (i.e. very optimistic beliefs usually develop in response to observing
many good signals). In our environment, good signals are always associated
with the highest payoff, whereas bad signals are associated with the lowest
payoff and uninformative signals with a medium payoff (as illustrated in Ta-
ble 4.1). Thus, extreme priors (which develop in tandem with the associated
high, medium, or low payoffs) might shift participants’ reference point. To
illustrate this idea, consider a participant who frequently observes the good
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signal with the respective high payoff. Such a participant might react differ-
ently when observing a positive uninformative signal (with medium payoffs)
compared to someone who frequently observes bad signals.
To differentiate optimistic from pessimistic priors, we define a prior that
the asset is drawing from the good distribution greater than 50 % as positive
prior and a prior that the asset is drawing from the good distribution smaller
than 50 % as negative prior6. Figure 4.4 visualizes participants updating be-
havior after non-diagnostic signals, split by treatment (positive vs. negative)
and by prior.
Figure 4.4: Prior Dependent Updating
Note: This figure illustrates the change in prior beliefs after observing uninformative sig-
nals split by positive and negative prior beliefs and by treatment. Results are displayed
separately for the positive and negative treatment. Displayed are 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 4.4 reveals that priors appear to play an important role in pro-
cessing uninformative signals. Those subjects who hold positive priors only
update their beliefs weakly in response to positive uninformative signals,
whereas they update strongly in response to negative uninformative signals.
Symmetrically, subjects who hold negative priors substantially increase their
priors after observing positive uninformative signals, whereas they only
weakly update their priors after observing negative uninformative signals.
6 This definition is consistent with the point where one of the two assets has a higher expected
value. For priors greater (smaller) than 50 percent, the expected value of the risky asset is
greater (smaller) than the expected value of the riskless security.
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This pattern suggests that not only the domain of the uninformative signal
is important but also how desirable the signal is in relation to what subjects
expect to observe.
To more rigorously investigate how prior beliefs affect our previously re-
ported results, we estimate OLS regressions of our main specification (Equa-
tion 4.8) split by prior beliefs and by whether participants are invested in the
risky asset or not. Importantly, we only include participants from the active
treatment in the analysis, as the decision to be invested in the asset or not
is most likely a deliberate choice that depends on prior beliefs 7. Table 4.5
reports results.
Coefficient estimates for actively invested participants reveal a funda-
mental asymmetry in how the processing of uninformative signal depends
on prior beliefs. Those subjects who hold optimistic prior beliefs about the
state of the risky asset (i.e. subjects who belief the good outcome is more
likely to occur) only weakly increase their beliefs when the uninformative
signal is positive (but in magnitude smaller than the good signal), but
strongly decrease their beliefs when the signal is negative. Similarly, subjects
who hold pessimistic prior beliefs about the state of the risky asset only
weakly increase their beliefs when the uninformative signal is negative
(but in magnitude greater than the bad signal), but strongly increase their
beliefs when the signal is positive. As such, subjects appear to process
uninformative signals not exclusively on the basis of the valence of the
signal, but rather relative to some reference point which is dictated by their
prior beliefs.
Importantly, this finding cannot be explained by prior-biased inference
(or confirmation bias) as tested by Charness and Dave (2017) and Pouget
et al. (2017) as individuals show stronger reactions to the valence uninfor-
mative signals that contradict their prior beliefs. Additionally, this finding
is also different from preference-biased inference (Eil and Rao, 2011; Möbius
et al., 2014) as individuals also overreact to undesirable signals. Subjects both
7 Results for participants in the passive treatment are directionally consistent. However, we
decide to present the results that are undoubtedly affected by participants’ prior beliefs.
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Table 4.5: Reference Dependent Belief Updating
Dependent Variable Log Odds Ratio (Subjective) λi,t
Actively Invested Not Invested
Positive Negative Positive Negative
Prior Prior Prior Prior
Din f ormative; i,t (Inference) 0.354*** 0.459*** 0.214*** 0.592***
(7.13) (6.01) (2.81) (4.85)
λi,t−1 (Use of Priors) 0.797*** 0.755*** 0.748*** 0.814***
(22.55) (11.04) (14.88) (9.77)
Dunin f ormative; i,t 0.213** 0.740*** 0.307** 0.221
(2.38) (3.52) (2.51) (1.00)
Dunin f ormative; i,t x −0.579*** −0.842*** −0.545** −0.302
negativei (−3.58) (−3.21) (−2.52) (−0.79)
Observations 1371 530 533 287
R2 0.698 0.454 0.580 0.538
Note: This table reports the results of four OLS regressions on how information signals and
their valence affect individuals’ beliefs. We report results split by whether participants are
actively invested in the risky asset or not and by participants’ prior beliefs about the state of
the risky asset as defined in Section 3.3. The dependent variable is participants’ subjective
log-odds ratio as defined in Section 2. Din f ormative; i,t is a variable taking the value 1 if the
tth signal of subject i is good, 0 if the tth signal is uninformative, and -1 if the tth signal is bad.
Dunin f ormative; i,t is a dummy if the tth signal of subject i is uninformative, whereas negativei
is a dummy if participant i is in the negative treatment (and zero otherwise). The interac-
tion term thus displays whether participant i encountered a negative uninformative signal
in round t. Controls include age, gender, statistical skills, risk aversion, and participants’
financial literacy. Reported are coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses). All standard er-
rors are clustered at the individual level. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
strongly react to positive uninformative signals that contradict pessimistic
priors as well as to negative uninformative signals that contradict optimistic
priors. Instead, it appears that subjects incorporate uninformative signals in
a reference-dependent manner, dictated by their prior beliefs. They fail to
correctly identify that uninformative signals do not carry information about
the objective state of the world and update their beliefs based on the valence
of the signal relative to their current prior expectations. Yet, given that we
find that individuals react strongest to desirable uninformative signals when
their priors are pessimistic, it appears that they seek to revert very pessimistic
priors most quickly, consistent with the model of Bénabou (2013).
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However, similar conclusions cannot be drawn for subjects who are not
actively invested in the risky asset. While those who hold positive priors up-
date their beliefs rather symmetrically in the direction of the domain of the
uninformative signal, individuals who hold negative priors do not appear to
update their beliefs at all after uninformative signals. One potential expla-
nation for this behavior is that subjects who are rather optimistic about the
state of the risky asset (while not being invested) still follow the outcomes
to invest in a future round once they become more certain of the state. Fi-
nally, individuals who are not invested and hold pessimistic beliefs might
simply not pay enough attention to the outcomes, as they continue to collect
the risk-free payoff.
Taken together, our results suggest that being invested in the risky as-
set appears to be a necessary condition for subjects to engage in reference-
dependent updating following uninformative signals. More generally, there
has to be some intrinsic or extrinsic advantage for holding a particular belief
such as making a payoff-relevant investment decision.
4.3.4 Robustness Checks
The Role of Memory and Learning
Two important concepts related to the formation of probabilistic beliefs are
the role of memory and learning effects. However, our experiment was con-
structed in a way to ensure that neither of the effects can account for our
findings. First, subjects are always provided with the full outcome history
of prior signals. In particular, as can be seen in the Appendix, the history
of prior signals is clearly displayed next to the forecasting question. Addi-
tionally, our experimental design does not provide feedback and hence little
scope for learning. Moreover, it is highly doubtful that subjects would learn
within the course of ten experimental periods even in the presence of feed-
back. To verify that the effect is not driven by initial forecasting errors when
subjects lack the experience and potentially less pronounced the more sig-
nals individuals observe, we separately estimate our main specification for
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the first five and the final five signals that individuals observe. Table C.1
in the Appendix reveals that coefficient estimates for positive and negative
uninformative signals remain relatively stable throughout the experiment.
Together with the fact that we did not provide any feedback, we conclude
that the effect appears to be stable over time.
Sample Splits
Finally, we replicate our main analyses on different subsamples to validate its
robustness. In particular, we conduct splits regarding (i) extreme outliers; (ii)
"speeders"; and (iii) forecasting performance. Extreme outliers are individ-
uals whose subjective priors largely deviate from the Bayesian benchmark
and who frequently update in the wrong direction. Similar to the exclusion
criteria of Enke and Graeber (2019), we define extreme outliers as individuals
who report a subjective posterior ps < 25% (> 75%) when the Bayesian pos-
terior is pB > 75% (< 25%). Speeders are defined as subjects who are in the
bottom quintile of the response time distribution. Finally, we also conduct
splits regarding how subjects overall performed in the forecasting task. To
verify that the effect does not capture those individuals who showed difficul-
ties in understanding the task, we define the squared deviation of subjects’
probability estimate in each period from the objective posterior probability
as a measure of forecasting quality and conduct median splits. Results are
reported in Table 4.6.
Overall, results are very similar across all subsamples and confirm our
previously drawn conclusions. First, we consistently find that uninformative
signals predict log-odds ratios in every subsample. Second, similar to our
main analysis, positive uninformative signals predict an increase in the log-
odds ratio, whereas negative uninformative signals predict a decrease, with
the effect being of similar strength. Lastly, we also find differences between
the different subgroups. In particular, extreme outliers, speeders and indi-
viduals with below-median forecasting performance show more pronounced
effects both for positive and negative uninformative signals.
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Table 4.6: Robustness Checks
Dependent
Variable
Log Odds Ratio (Subjective) λi,t
(1) Outlier? (2) Speeder? (3) Above Median
Forecaster?
No Yes No Yes No Yes
Din f ormative; i,t 0.561*** 0.168** 0.493*** 0.259** 0.263*** 0.610***
(Inference) (17.54) (2.41) (15.69) (2.02) (5.48) (16.71)
λi,t−1 0.734*** 0.533*** 0.715*** 0.547*** 0.545*** 0.800***
(Use of Priors) (35.29) (10.32) (33.48) (6.83) (14.74) (41.65)
Dunin f ormative; i,t 0.238*** 0.383*** 0.226*** 0.702*** 0.418*** 0.161***
(4.88) (4.70) (5.23) (3.41) (5.99) (3.48)
Dunin f ormative; i,t −0.444*** −0.701*** −0.436*** −1.296*** −0.716*** −0.343***
x negativei (−6.09) (−4.18) (−6.15) (−4.31) (−6.43) (−4.47)
Observations 4275 1494 5193 576 2880 2889
R2 0.638 0.340 0.557 0.477 0.747 0.344
Note: This table reports the results of six OLS regressions to investigate the robustness of our
main finding. We report sample splits based on three measures as defined in Section 3.4: (1)
strong outliers; (2) speeder; and (3) forecast quality. The dependent variable is participants’
subjective log-odds ratio as defined in Section 2. Prior Signali,t is a variable taking the value
1 if the tth signal of subject i is good, 0 if the tth signal is uninformative, and -1 if the tth signal
is bad. Unin f ormativei,t is a dummy if the tth signal of subject i is uninformative, whereas
negativei is a dummy if participant i is in the negative treatment (and zero otherwise). The
interaction term thus displays whether participant i encountered a negative uninformative
signal in round t. Controls include age, gender, statistical skills, risk aversion, and par-
ticipants’ financial literacy. Reported are coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses). All
standard errors are clustered at the individual level. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
4.4 Conclusion
This article experimentally studies how individuals update their beliefs after
observing non-diagnostic information signals with varying degrees of desir-
ability. Whereas Bayes’ Rule predicts that such uninformative signals do not
influence inference judgements, we find that individuals systematically in-
corporate them in their belief formation process. Importantly, the direction in
which individuals update their beliefs strongly depends on the valence of the
observed signal. Individuals tend to form more optimistic beliefs about the
objective state of the world after observing desirable uninformative signals,
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whereas they form more pessimistic beliefs after observing undesirable unin-
formative signals. As mechanism we identify that individuals process the va-
lence of new signals in a reference-dependent manner, dictated by their prior
beliefs. Whenever they observe non-diagnostic outcomes which are close to
their prior expectations, they only weakly update their beliefs, whereas when
they observe non-diagnostic outcomes which are at odds with their prior ex-
pectations, they strongly overreact.
Taken together, our findings suggest that individuals appear to struggle
discerning belief-relevant information from their preferences. Such devia-
tions from Bayesian behavior are particularly severe in situations in which
the valence of non-diagnostic signals is at odds with the valence of objective
pieces of information. In such an environment, uninformative signals can
not only lead to systematically biased beliefs whenever desired or undesired
outcomes are non-indicative of the true state of the world. Instead, they may
also reinforce wrongly entertained beliefs based on individuals’ preferences.
Even though decision making frequently involves the accumulation of new
pieces of information until uncertainty is reduced to a tolerable level, such a
bias may instead lead to a decline in predictive performance.
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Chapter 5
When Saving is Not Enough –
Wealth Decumulation in
Retirement ∗
5.1 Introduction
When conducting a simple Google search on the term ’retirement planning’
one finds an overwhelming share of articles which contain recommendations
on saving decisions and on how to allocate savings to increase financial well-
being in retirement. Given this prevailing focus on savings and investment
decisions, one could forgive a typical retiree for believing that retirement
planning is synonymous with wealth accumulation. Yet, while wealth accu-
mulation is certainly a mandatory condition for successful retirement prepa-
ration, it is not a sufficient condition to achieve a targeted steady stream of
income during retirement. However, determining how to draw down his
wealth is not an easy task for a person contemplating retirement, as one can-
not rely on experience.
Rational choice theory predicts that, in the absence of a bequest motive,
households will fully convert their savings into a lifetime annuity (Yaari,
1965). Yet, despite the attractiveness of annuities as a way to protect against
∗ Authors: Pascal Kieren and Martin Weber. All authors are at the University of Mannheim
(L9, 1-2, 68161 Mannheim). For valuable comments, we thank participants at the Experi-
mental Finance Conference 2019, and seminar participants at the University of Mannheim.
All remaining errors are our own.
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the risk of outliving one’s retirement wealth, relatively few of those facing
retirement actually annuitize a significant proportion of their wealth, a dis-
crepancy coined the annuity puzzle.1
In this paper, we seek to investigate the wealth decumulation decision
from the perspective of a retiree who is averse to the prospect of fully annu-
itizing his savings. Such an individual faces the following decision problem.
Out of one’s non-annuitized wealth, one must decide how much to allocate to
a savings account (e.g. as protection against early unexpected costs) and how
much (if anything) to decumulate over the course of retirement. As an alter-
native to annuities, we investigate consumers’ preferences for phased with-
drawal accounts. In the light of recent findings, which question the benefit of
full annuitization in the presence of stochastic health shocks (e.g. Reichling
and Smetters, 2015, or Peijnenburg et al., 2017), such an analysis might not
only provide valuable insights for the design of complementary products but
also important policy implications.2
To study these issues, we field a large online survey in cooperation with a
national German newspaper, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), in which
we elicit preferences for simple drawdown strategies. The strategies differ
across two main dimensions, risky vs. risk-free asset allocation and constant
vs. dynamic withdrawal rates. We examine 1) what hypothetical products in-
dividuals find most appealing, 2) what factors people say are most important
in their wealth decumulation decision, 3) whether standard utility functions
to study consumption decisions adequately capture observed preferences for
phased-withdrawals, 4) how the demand for phased withdrawal products
compares to the demand for annuities, and 5) how retirement preparation
affects individuals willingness to decumulate wealth.
1 Over the past decades, economists have focused on explaining the annuity puzzle under
consideration of both behavioral and rational factors. For a review, see Brown (2007) or
Benartzi et al. (2011).
2 We do not attempt to claim that phased withdrawals are superior to annuities, as they can-
not eliminate longevity risk. Instead, we seek to obtain a more holistic understanding of
the wealth decumulation decision by investigating preferences for phased withdrawals. In
our view, phased withdrawals should be seen as a complement, rather than a substitute,
for those individuals who want to retain control over their wealth and are averse to full-
annuitization.
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Using a survey to investigate our research question has both advantages
and disadvantages. On the positive side, we can use hypothetic choice ques-
tions to measure preferences for specific (non-existing) products, which are
unobservable in field data. Another advantage is the sample from which we
can draw the survey data. While readers of the FAZ are not representative of
the general population (they are on average more educated and have higher
income), they are highly representative of those most affected by the deci-
sion of how much wealth to decumulate. On the negative side, the choices
individuals make do not translate to their actual life outcomes. As a conse-
quence, the results may not correspond to the choices people would make
in a real-life situation. However, even though the resulting choice behavior
might be noisy, it would be surprising if it leads to systematic patterns that
are absent in actual behavior.
From our survey, five main findings emerge. First, we find that most par-
ticipants prefer phased withdrawal accounts with equity-based asset alloca-
tion and dynamic withdrawal rates, which smooth the withdrawal amount
across market phases. Overall, roughly 81 % of our respondents select a
drawdown strategy with an equity-based asset allocation, while only 19 %
prefer a strict risk-free asset allocation. Additionally, out of those partici-
pants who prefer an equity-based decumulation strategy, only 35 % prefer
constant withdrawal rates, which cannot offer protection against depleting
the capital stock early, as withdrawal rates do not adjust for periods of low
returns. Conversely, 65 % prefer dynamic withdrawal rates, which adjust the
withdrawal amount based on realized returns in order to avoid depleting
the capital stock too fast. This choice pattern suggests that while retirees are
highly averse to some risks (namely having to live on a permanently lower
income) they are less risk-averse when it comes to equity investments with
long planning horizons.
Second, the self-reported importance of various withdrawal characteris-
tics is closely in line with participants’ actual choice. The two considerations
that respondents report being most important for their withdrawal account
choice are sufficient protection against the risk of depleting the capital stock
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early, while also achieving relatively high returns on the invested assets.
Taken together with the actual withdrawal account choice, our results high-
light that customers desire flexible payout structures, which dynamically ad-
just in states of low returns. Most currently offered decumulation products
(e.g. lifelong annuities) primarily offer constant income streams, even though
there is no economic reason to do so assuming that major expenses (e.g. va-
cations or health costs) do not occur on a regular basis. While such income
streams may allow customers to plan ahead, they could also have detrimen-
tal effects on the demand and – relatedly – the generated returns (guaranteed
income streams come at the expense of less risky investment options). We
provide new evidence that the latter effect is of importance.
Third, a time-separable power utility function with bequest motives as
frequently employed in life cycle models predicts that a decumulation strat-
egy with equity-based asset allocation and dynamic withdrawal rates is the
utility-maximizing choice for a large number of preference parameter com-
binations. As the predictions of the utility function are closely in line with
participants’ actual choice, our results provide evidence for the suitability of
such utility functions to study not only consumption and savings decisions
but also wealth decumulation topics.
Fourth, we find that only 12 % of all respondents would choose an an-
nuity product to decumulate their wealth while 88 % would rather select
a phased withdrawal solution. This result – while surprising – is not only
in line with subjects’ preference to achieve higher returns on their accumu-
lated savings while being flexible in the way they decumulate wealth but
also with general findings on the annuitization puzzle. According to a sur-
vey conducted by Beshears et al. (2014), many subjects report that "flexibility
in the timing of my spending" is an important factor in their annuitization
decision. Yet, many consumers still seem to neglect that while phased with-
drawals provide more flexibility in the timing of the spending, they cannot
offer protection against longevity risk. In the light of current regulatory ef-
forts, which discuss the benefits and drawbacks of forced annuitization of
defined contribution payments, our results suggest that policymakers should
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consider offering combined solutions. Distributing wealth among annuities
and phased withdrawals could help retirees who are averse to full annuitiza-
tion to insure against longevity risk, while also preserving liquid wealth and
making use of the equity premium.
Finally, we find that participants are willing to decumulate on average 65
% of their liquid savings over the course of their retirement. In contrast to this
rather high self-reported willingness to decumulate wealth, actual spending
in retirement is still quite low (e.g. Olafsson and Pagel, 2018). Yet, given
the low demand for annuities in our sample, we conjecture that part of this
discrepancy is driven by the lack of alternative wealth decumulation prod-
ucts. Additionally, we find two opposing effects of how retirement prepara-
tion affects individuals’ willingness to decumulate wealth. First, individu-
als who successfully prepare for retirement by consulting financial planners
or by sticking to saving plans do not show an increased propensity to draw
down a greater fraction of their savings, even though they accumulated more
wealth on average. Thus, while wealth accumulation is certainly an impor-
tant ingredient for retirement preparation, it does not predict subsequent de-
cumulation. However, we do find that individuals’ attitude towards retire-
ment affects their willingness to decumulate wealth. To capture the fact that
individuals cannot rely on their experience in deciding how much wealth to
decumulate, we investigate the impact of optimism, as research has shown
that these are the decisions most likely to be influenced by emotional dispo-
sitions (Puri and Robinson, 2007). We find that while moderate optimism is
positively related to the wealth participants are willing to decumulate, ex-
treme optimism leads to a strong negative effect. Consistent with the model
of Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), it appears that moderately optimistic in-
dividuals are more inclined to take small risks to increase their wellbeing,
while extreme optimists reduce their spending possibly to protect against
longevity, thereby overestimating their income from non-annuitized wealth.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 5.2 we de-
scribe the design of our online survey and outline how we elicit preferences
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about the properties of retirement products. We then present our key em-
pirical results on respondents’ product choice followed by a utility-analysis
of income drawdown offerings and an analysis of the wealth decumulation
decision in Section 5.3. Finally, in Section 5.4, we conclude with a discussion
of possible policy implications and future research questions.
5.2 Survey Design and Summary Statistics
5.2.1 Survey Design
To investigate the wealth decumulation decision and to derive predictions
about the design of phased withdrawal strategies, we conduct an online sur-
vey in cooperation with the newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ).
The survey was promoted to cover retirement decisions and planning and
was accessible through a link that was posted on their online portal on Au-
gust 16, 2018. The survey and related material can be found in Appendix
D.
Overall, 3598 participants with an age ranging from 18 to 93 completed
the survey. Participants answered hypothetical questions about different re-
tirement products, their willingness to decumulate wealth in retirement, and
rate how the payout structure of a hypothetical income drawdown offering
should look like. Moreover, they answered questions about demographics
and household characteristics, risk preferences, financial literacy, and numer-
acy.
Preferences regarding the payout structure of phased withdrawal prod-
ucts were elicited in two different ways in a within-subject design, which
will be described subsequently. In both elicitation strategies, product-based
and self-reported, we ask respondents to rate the importance of four charac-
teristics related to the shape of the stream of payouts. The first characteristic
resembles participants’ attitude about the size of the payouts. The second
characteristic is what we refer to as the variance in the payout stream. Many
currently offered retirement products (e.g. most annuities) feature constant
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payout streams, which allow consumers to plan ahead with a given budget.
Yet, from an economic perspective, there is no reason to primarily offer
constant payouts, as fluctuating payouts can dynamically adjust to economic
conditions. That is, in states of high returns, consumers can either increase
consumption or increase savings (e.g. by capping the maximal withdrawal
amount) to shift more consumption to states with adverse market conditions.
The third characteristic we assess is the uncertainty in the payout stream.
As phased withdrawals can invest in equities, they are necessarily subject to
capital market risks, which − depending on the payout policy − can lead
to default risk. In our context, we use the term default risk to refer to the
probability of exhausting the capital stock before the end of the planning
horizon. Finally, we also assess to what extent participants view wealth that
is not consumed before they die as an inefficient way of allocating resources
or as an opportunity to benefit future generations. In other words, the last
characteristic resembles bequest motives.
Product-based elicitation
In the product-based elicitation, we seek to measure the importance of the
payout characteristics by presenting participants with three different options
to draw down their retirement savings. As the aforementioned character-
istics are not mutually exclusive, we construct phased withdrawal strategies
that differ across two dimensions, constant vs. dynamic withdrawal amounts
and risky vs. risk-free asset allocation. We label the resulting drawdown
strategies as (1) risk-free − constant consumption, (2) risky − constant consump-
tion, and (3) risky − dynamic consumption.3 To avoid too much complexity
in the decumulation strategies and to ensure that the characteristics are still
clearly differentiable for participants, we use simple heuristics to construct
the strategies (a precise definition is provided in the Appendix):
3 Note that while constructing strategies which differ across two dimensions (2x2) would re-
sult in four different strategies, we only use three of them as the combination fluctuating
withdrawals and risk-free asset allocation would not make sense in a hypothetical choice
scenario.
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1. Risk-free - Constant Consumption. For the first strategy, calculating the
constant amount that can be withdrawn over a fixed number of years
assuming deterministic returns is straightforward and only depends on
participants’ planning horizon and their accumulated wealth.4 For the
risk-free asset allocation, we use the historical inflation-adjusted aver-
age of 1-year German government bonds, which amounts to roughly
1.22 % for the past 30 years (German Federal Bank, 2018).
2. Risky - Constant Consumption. The second strategy combines a constant
yearly withdrawal amount with a risky investment strategy. We imple-
ment these features by withdrawing each year a fixed percentage of the
original retirement wealth (adjusted for inflation), which is invested in
a well-diversified portfolio described subsequently.5 Note that by com-
bining constant withdrawal rates with stochastic returns, the strategy
can neither guarantee that the capital stock is sustained until the end
of the planning horizon (i.e. it can default), nor that the initial wealth
will be fully exhausted in the decumulation process (i.e. it could also
end up with a large terminal wealth). To ensure comparability across
different planning horizons, we selected the fixed percentage such that
the default probability remains constant at 10 % (i.e. a higher with-
drawal amount for shorter horizons). The resulting withdrawal rates
for different horizons are displayed in the Appendix.
3. Risky - Dynamic Consumption. The third strategy features dynamic with-
drawal rates paired with a risky investment strategy. It can be imple-
mented in a similar fashion as the first strategy with one exception.
Once return expectations are stochastic, the realized return will most
likely not equal the expected return. As a consequence, the actual with-
drawal amount for each year has to be recalculated each period, taking
4 The present value of constant income stream that pays a yearly amount y conditional on an
expected return r, a planning horizon of T years, and an initial portfolio value V is calculated
using the following formula: y = V · (1+r)
T−1·r
(1+r)T−1
.
5 Besides its simplicity, a similar decumulation strategy was originally developed by Bengen
(1994) and Cooley et al. (1998).
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the realized return (and as such the actual portfolio value) of the previ-
ous period into account. The resulting relatively high withdrawal rates
(the portfolio value will be fully exhausted at the end of the final pe-
riod) come at the expense of uncertainty about the actual withdrawal
amount.
To allow participants to compare risk and benefit characteristics of each
strategy conditional on survival, we conduct Monte Carlo simulations. To
do so, we assume that retirees decumulate their wealth over a period of a
minimum of 20 years and a maximum of 30 years (i.e. to the age of 95 as-
suming a retirement age of 65). The risky investment strategies assume that
retirees hold their non-annuitized assets in a 60 % stock, 40 % bond portfolio,
as typically offered by balanced funds (e.g. Gomes et al., 2008). The equity
component in our study is represented by the MSCI World Index, while the
bond component is represented by monthly U.S. treasury bills. The plan as-
sets are rebalanced annually within a buy-and-hold approach and returns
are adjusted for inflation. Portfolios are constructed for the period between
February 1970 to February 2018. Return data for the MSCI component was
obtained from Datastream, while the risk-free rate was downloaded from the
union of the CRSP/Compustat database.
To simulate outcomes, we employ a bootstrapping algorithm, which ran-
domly draws (with replacement) 360 return observations (twelve months
over 30 years) from our portfolio data to generate one scenario with 30 years
of data. This process is then repeated 10,000-times to obtain a sufficient num-
ber of scenarios.
Figure 5.1 depicts the order in which questions on the phased with-
drawal choice are presented. The exact wording of the strategies is reported
in Appendix D.2. Before participants observe the withdrawal strategies,
they answer general demographic questions including a forecast of their
wealth level at retirement (assessed by five categories or an exact number)
and the time over which they would want to decumulate their assets (choice
between 20, 25, or 30 years). Afterward, participants can choose one of the
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Figure 5.1: Survey Overview and Timing
Note: This figure illustrates is the order in which the questions regarding demographics, the
withdrawal plan choice, and the annuity choice were presented. Both decumulation strate-
gies and annuities were adjusted for previously reported demographics, including gender,
wealth, and planning horizon.
three decumulation strategies, each tailored to participants’ personal wealth
and their desired planning horizon.
Each withdrawal strategy is described by four key financial variables
(average consumption, default probability, consumption fluctuation, and
consumption in the worst 5 % of the cases) and a brief overview of advan-
tages and disadvantages.6 In a consecutive question, participants decide
whether they prefer a decumulation strategy or a life-long annuity. The
annuity is presented in a similar fashion compared to the withdrawal strate-
gies. The annuity values are calculated assuming a real interest rate of 1.22
% (as for the risk-free decumulation strategy) and using the latest life tables
for Germany. Moreover, due to adverse selection in the annuity market, we
made a downward adjustment to the expected present discounted value of
the fair annuity following Mitchell et al. (1999). This downward adjustment
amounts to 15 % and 10 % of the fair value for male and female participants,
respectively. To avoid potentially confounding framing effects as discussed
by Brown et al. (2008), the variables for the phased withdrawals and the
annuity were both framed in terms of consumption and described periods in
terms of participants’ age in retirement. Finally, after subjects decided which
6 Advantages and disadvantages were chosen to highlight participants the difference between
both constant vs. fluctuating consumption streams as well as a risky vs. risk-free asset
allocation.
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product best suits their preferences, they are asked to answer a question
about how much of their overall wealth they would be willing to decumulate
over the course of their retirement.
Self-reported elicitation
In the self-reported elicitation strategy, we directly ask subjects to assess
the importance of the four payout characteristics on a seven-point Likert
scale. The exact wording is reported in the Appendix. Participants have to
answer these questions after they chose their preferred decumulation strat-
egy. While this was done to ensure that subjects have a profound understand-
ing of what the statements mean, the increased knowledge comes at the ex-
pense of individuals potentially ex-post rationalizing their initial choice. To
avoid that the order in which questions are presented affects our results, we
focus the subsequent analyses on participants’ preferred strategy and use the
self-reported measures as consistency check.
In addition, we also ask participants to provide an estimate of their
life expectancy and health status (adopted from the Survey of Consumer
Finances and Mirowsky, 1999), to indicate which tools they use to prepare
for retirement and whether they have tried to figure out how much their
household would need to save for retirement. Self-reported life expectancy
and health status have been found to be amongst the most important factors
influencing the annuitization decision, while the latter factors are important
determinants for successful retirement planning (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2011).
Controls
We elicit a financial literacy score based on participants’ answers to six
questions, of which three are pure knowledge questions and another three
are related to financial numeracy. We select one of the basic questions from
Lusardi and Mitchell (2007), two advanced questions from Van Rooij et al.
(2011), one question from Schreiber and Weber (2016), one question from
Lusardi and Tufano (2009), and one question from Ensthaler et al. (2018).
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The exact wording of the questions can be found in Appendix D.2. Follow-
ing the suggestion of Behrman et al. (2012) and Fernandes et al. (2014), we
also collect information on parents’ and siblings’ highest level of education
and assess a scale of need for cognition (Epstein et al., 1996) as instruments
for financial literacy not caused by financial behaviors.
To control for risk and loss aversion, we ask participants to rate their risk
and loss attitude on a seven-point Likert scale. Earlier studies on risk-taking
find that self-reported risk attitude is a good predictor of actual risk-taking
(e.g. Nosić and Weber, 2010; Van Rooij et al., 2011). Moreover, we also as-
sess participants’ trust in financial markets on a seven-point Likert scale as a
proxy of participants’ general willingness to invest in financial products.
5.2.2 Summary Statistics
Table 5.1 presents summary statistics on participant demographics, life ex-
pectancy, financial literacy, and risk aversion.
The average age in our sample is 52.1 years (median 54). While this is
higher compared to similar surveys of our kind (e.g. Merkle et al., 2017 or
Müller and Weber, 2014), it is well suited to study hypothetical retirement
choices. Men are overrepresented in our study (85 %), which reflects the fact
that the majority of FAZ readers are male. Participants report a relatively high
after-tax income of about 5440 e, compared to the German average of about
3300 e(German Federal Statistical Office, 2018). Additionally, participants
report having Social Security benefits of roughly 3556 e(retired participants
only), and an average net worth of roughly 455,357 e7. They are well edu-
cated with about 78 % having obtained a university degree. Around 21 % are
already retired, 63 % are married, and participants have on average 1.15 chil-
dren. We also asked respondents about their average life expectancy. While
female participants expect to live on average 86.5 years, male participants
expect to live on average 85.7 years. While these estimates are slightly higher
7 In the survey, participants could either provide interval responses for net wealth or an exact
value. To calculate net wealth for participants with interval responses, we map each interval
to its midpoint except in the case of the final interval without an upper bound, which we
map to a value equal to the lower bound.
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Table 5.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Median Std. dev.
Demographics
Age 52.12 54 13.6
Female 15% 0.36
Income in e(after tax) 5,441 6,000 2011
Social Security in e(only retired participants) 3,556 4,500 1580
Liquid wealth in e 455,357 375,000 924,041
Retired 21% 0.41
Number of children 1.15 1 1.21
Married 63% 0.48
Highest education attained
No high school diploma 11%
High school diploma 11%
College degree 59%
Graduate degree 19%
Controls
Health status (1-5) 4.17 4 0.7
Life expectancy (in years) 85.82 85 6.73
Saving plan 62% 0.49
Knowledge score (0-3) 1.77 2 0.73
Numeracy score (0-3) 1.67 2 0.66
Need for cognition 26.22 27 4.77
Risk aversion (1-7) 3.77 4 1.54
Loss aversion (1-7) 4.16 4 1.63
Note: This table presents summary statistics of our survey. Included are all 3598 participants.
Statistics are split across two categories: demographics, and controls. Reported are mean,
median (whenever applicable), and standard deviation. Female, retired, married, and saving
plan are dummy variables.
than the average life expectancy implied by recent life tables for the respec-
tive cohort, this does not necessarily present evidence for an optimism bias,
since our participants are on average wealthier and more educated which is
positively correlated to life expectancy (Meara et al., 2008).
Participants correctly answer on average 1.77 of the knowledge questions
and roughly 1.67 of the numeracy questions out of 3. Given the level of com-
plexity of the questions, participants do quite good. Need for cognition score
is on average 26.22 out of 35. Asking participants for their risk and loss aver-
sion leads to an average of 3.77 and 4.16, respectively. Overall, one should
emphasize that our sample is most likely not representative of the general
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German population. However, it is highly representative to study wealth de-
cumulation preferences for individuals who have the choice to decumulate a
significant proportion of their accumulated savings.
5.3 Results
We present four set of findings: 1) observed choices and demographic corre-
lates of phased withdrawal accounts, 2) a utility analysis for the demand of
phased withdrawal accounts under a standard time-separable power utility
function, 3) factors differentiating the demand for annuities versus phased
withdrawals, and 4) factors related to the decision of how much wealth one
is willing to decumulate. In all subsequent analyses, we present results for
our full sample. However, the conclusions we draw do not critically depend
on this, as results are similar when restricting our analyses to individuals
close to retirement age.
5.3.1 Preferences on the Structure of Phased Withdrawal Ac-
counts
Figure 5.2 displays both the withdrawal strategies that participants prefer
and the characteristics they deem important on an aggregate level (Panel A)
and across age (Panel B).
From Figure 5.2, it becomes evident that independent of age, the majority
of participants prefer a withdrawal strategy with risky asset allocation and
dynamic withdrawal rates. Given that many currently offered decumulation
products (such as most lifelong annuities) involve constant income streams,
this finding is quite surprising. However, it indicates that consumers are by
no means averse to fluctuating income streams, assuming that they receive
sufficient compensation in return. Regarding the strategies with constant
withdrawals, we observe two opposing effects across different age groups.
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Figure 5.2: Phased Withdrawal Account Choice
Note: This figure displays participants’ preferred withdrawal strategies and their rating of
various decumulation attributes. Panel A displays the strategies and attributes for the whole
sample, while Panel B displays the predictive margins with 95% confidence intervals from
logit regressions on the plan choice or the respective characteristic for age.
While the strategy with risk-free asset allocation is mostly preferred by par-
ticipants who are close to retirement, it is hardly chosen by younger partic-
ipants. Conversely, the strategy with constant withdrawals and risky asset
allocation is popular among younger participants while it loses in popular-
ity among those close to retirement.
When looking at the assessed withdrawal characteristics, this pattern be-
comes even clearer. In particular, avoiding the risk of depleting the capital
stock early gradually becomes the most desired characteristic as individu-
als approach retirement followed by the desire for a high average consump-
tion. However, quite the reverse appears to hold for bequest motives. While
younger participants list bequest motives among the most important char-
acteristics, they are hardly relevant for those close to retirement and become
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more important again as participants approach later stages of their retire-
ment. The latter relation is consistent with participants’ declining demand
for the strategy with risky asset allocation and constant withdrawals, which
is the only strategy that might result in unintended bequests after the final pe-
riod. Finally, a constant consumption stream in retirement is deemed rather
unimportant by most participants, which is not only consistent with the dy-
namic withdrawal strategies participants choose but also further evidence
for the demand for flexible decumulation options.
Besides the descriptive analysis, we also examine how cognitive abilities
and demographic characteristics relate to the choice using multinomial logis-
tic regressions. The dependent variable is strategy that takes on three values,
which capture participants’ preferred withdrawal strategy. The independent
variables are knowledge, numeracy, the log of wealth and various demo-
graphics. Results are reported in Table 5.2.
We can draw several conclusions from Table 5.2. First, it appears that
the more financially savvy individuals are, the more likely they are to se-
lect an equity-based withdrawal strategy (i.e. Strategy 2 or 3). Similarly, the
more trust individuals have in financial markets and the more educated they
are (i.e. having at least a university degree), the more likely they are to se-
lect either the second or the third strategy. Yet, we also observe differences
within the strategies, which invest in equities. That is, more statistically nu-
merate individuals show a higher propensity to choose withdrawal strate-
gies with dynamic withdrawal rates, both relative to the risk-free alterna-
tive and relative to the risky strategy with constant withdrawal rates. Taken
together, these results imply that while financial education is positively re-
lated to a return-oriented investment behavior in retirement, it cannot ex-
plain whether investors prefer dynamic or constant payoff streams. Those
individuals, however, who show – ceteris paribus – also a deeper under-
standing of financial mathematics and compound interest, are significantly
more likely to choose dynamic payoff streams. Consistent with the findings
from Bateman et al. (2018), basic financial literacy helps retirees to manage
decumulation, but it is not sufficient for effective ruin risk management.
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Table 5.2: Determinants of the Phased Withdrawal Account Choice
(1) (2)
Baseline: Strategy 1 Baseline: Strategy 2
Strategy 1
Knowledge −0.211*** −0.0776
Numeracy −0.0219 −0.083
Trust −0.381*** −0.0379
Log(Wealth) −0.360*** −0.071
18<Age<35 −0.992*** −0.21
50<Age<65 0.328** −0.14
Age>65 0.443** −0.177
Female 0.277* −0.151
Married 0.115 −0.121
University −0.338*** −0.123
Kids −0.235*** −0.0473
Strategy 2
Knowledge 0.211*** −0.0776
Numeracy 0.0219 −0.083
Trust 0.381*** −0.0379
Log(Wealth) 0.360*** −0.071
18<Age<35 0.992*** −0.21
50<Age<65 −0.328** −0.14
Age>65 −0.443** −0.177
Female −0.277* −0.151
Married −0.115 −0.121
University 0.338*** −0.123
Kids 0.235*** −0.0473
Strategy 3
Knowledge 0.266*** −0.0698 0.0542 −0.0572
Numeracy 0.256*** −0.0751 0.234*** −0.0639
Trust 0.382*** −0.0347 0.000879 −0.0269
Log(Wealth) 0.273*** −0.06 −0.0866 −0.054
18<Age<35 0.624*** −0.2 −0.368*** −0.126
50<Age<65 −0.271** −0.127 0.0561 −0.102
Age>65 −0.298* −0.158 0.145 −0.136
Female −0.0469 −0.131 0.230* −0.122
Married −0.108 −0.11 0.00701 −0.0901
University 0.352*** −0.109 0.014 −0.0998
Kids 0.106** −0.0447 −0.129 ∗ ∗∗ −0.0356
N 3573 3573
R2 0.062 0.062
Note: This table reports results of two multinomial logit regressions with varying baseline
values. Dependent variable is Strategy, a categorial variable, which denotes participants’
preferred withdrawal strategy (1 – 3). Age is captured by clustering participants in four age
groups, with the medium category (between 36 and 49) as baseline. Results for Strategy 3
as baseline are suppressed as the table is symmetric. Reported are coefficients and robust
standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%-level, respectively.
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Regarding the impact of demographics and household characteristics, we
find a positive relationship between participants’ accumulated wealth and
their willingness to invest in equity products, with no significant difference
between dynamic and constant withdrawal rates. Earlier studies find that
wealthier individuals usually have a higher exposure to financial markets,
are on average more sophisticated, and hold better diversified stock port-
folios (e.g. Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008). Our results suggest that their
familiarity with equity investments also makes them more likely to favor a
return-oriented asset allocation for wealth decumulation post retirement.
5.3.2 Utility Analysis of Phased Withdrawal Accounts
Normative Predictions
To derive normative predictions, we start by assuming that an exemplary
agent enters retirement at the age 658 (t=1) with an accumulated initial
wealth W0 > 0. To decumulate his wealth, the retiree has access to the
three different withdrawal strategies described previously, which ultimately
define the amount Ct he is able to consume at the beginning of each period.
Moreover, we assume that the retiree survives every year with a positive
probability pt,g > 0 (g ∈ {male, f emale}) until the last year of the planning
horizon is reached. If the retiree either dies before the final period or does
not consume all of his wealth before the plan ends, we assume that the
remaining wealth will be transferred to an heir, yielding a (dis-)utility in the
form of a bequest B. Note that this analysis only captures a fixed period of
years and neglects the period after the planning horizon. While simplifying,
the assumption is not unjustified as non-insurance products cannot offer
longevity protection. As such, retirees face both capital markets risk and
longevity risk.
We assume that retirees’ preferences are described by a time-separable
power utility function proposed by Cocco et al. (2005):
8 The average retirement age in Germany is around 65. However, our results do not depend
on this assumption.
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U0 (C, B) =
T
∑
t=1
δt−1
(
t−2
∏
j=0
pj
){
pt−1
C1−γt
1− γ + b(1− pt−1)
B1−γt
1− γ
}
(5.1)
where δ < 1 is the discount factor and γ > 0 is the coefficient of relative
risk aversion. The parameter b controls the intensity of the bequest motive.
While positive values of b translate to retirees’ desire to benefit future gener-
ations, negative values of b correspond to a view that bequests are an ineffi-
cient resource allocation. For simplicity, we assume that the utility function
applied to the bequest is identical to the utility function of the retiree’s own
consumption.
We begin our analysis by restricting our attention to preference parameter
tuples (γ, b) for which γ ∈ [1, 10], and b ∈ [−0.5, 2]. We focus on values of
γ that are below 10, as this is the upper bound for risk aversion considered
reasonable by Mehra and Prescott (1985), and restrict the intensity of the be-
quest motive to not exceed the benefit of own consumption by a factor of
two. We then discretize each of the two intervals (γ, b) into a set of 40 and
25 equally spaced points and study parameter tuples where each parameter
takes a value that corresponds to one of the discrete points. As we repeat the
analysis for four different planning horizons T ∈ {20, 25, 30, 35}, we study
40 · 25 · 4 = 4, 000 different scenarios for each simulated consumption path.
Figure 5.3 presents results. First, we see that the withdrawal strategy with
risky asset allocation and dynamic consumption is the utility-maximizing
choice for the majority of more realistic preference parameter combinations.
Considering all combinations, this strategy is optimal in 2,533 out of the
4,000 parameter tuples. In particular, for medium positive values of the
intensity of the bequest motive (0 ≤ b ≤ 0.5), we find the third strategy
is the utility-maximizing choice for all levels of risk aversion. Yet, as risk
aversion increases, the floor between the third and the other two strategies is
decreasing. This finding is not surprising. As relative risk aversion increases,
the benefit of an additional unit of consumption is strictly decreasing. As
such, the high average consumption of the third strategy becomes relatively
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Figure 5.3: Utility Simulations
Note: This figure displays the utility-maximizing withdrawal plan for the given preference
parameter tuple, as indicated by the colored dots. The y-axis captures in intensity of the
bequest motive for parameter values b ∈ [−0.5, 2]. The x-axis depicts the parameter of
relative risk aversion for values γ ∈ [1, 10]. Each figure displays one planning horizon for
T = {20, 25, 30, 35}
less important.
Observation 1: A withdrawal strategy with risky asset allocation and
fluctuating consumption is the utility-maximizing choice for most realistic
parameter tuples. Its utility is decreasing in the parameter of relative risk
aversion and decreasing the further the intensity of the bequest motive is
away from zero.
Second, we find that a withdrawal strategy with risk-free asset allocation
and constant withdrawals is never optimal as long as b ≥ 0. As risk
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aversion increases and the bequest intensity decreases, this strategy becomes
gradually the optimal choice until it is optimal for any b < 0. In other words,
as long as a retired investor with preferences as described here is at least
indifferent to the prospect of leaving a bequest, he would never choose to
decumulate his wealth using a completely risk-free asset allocation. For
those investors, however, who are both highly risk-averse (and as such do
not value high consumption) and who view bequests as an "inefficient" way
of allocating their retirement resources, such an allocation would be the
utility-maximizing choice.
Observation 2: A withdrawal strategy with risk-free asset allocation is never
the optimal choice unless investors are both highly risk-averse and averse to
the prospect of leaving bequests.
The remaining withdrawal strategy features a risky asset allocation
paired with constant withdrawal amounts. In contrast to the risk-free
strategy, we observe that as the intensity of the bequest motive increases,
this strategy becomes the utility-maximizing choice for both low and high
parameters of relative risk aversion. For medium values of relative risk
aversion however, the strategy with dynamic withdrawal amounts remains
the utility-maximizing choice. The intuition for this finding is as follows.
Both strategies follow the same asset allocation, and as such, generate
the same returns over the respective time horizon. As the consumption
of the constant withdrawal strategy is on average lower compared to the
consumption of the dynamic strategy, more overall wealth is generated.
As bequests rise in importance, so does overall wealth, which explains the
positive relation with the intensity of the bequest motive. The relation with
the parameter of relative risk aversion is a little more subtle. For low levels
of risk aversion, more consumption (or wealth) is always better due to the
low concavity of the utility function. As average wealth is much higher than
average consumption, the lower consumption of Strategy 2 is outweighed
by the high average bequeathable wealth and as such, Strategy 2 is the
154 Chapter 5. When Saving is Not Enough
optimal choice. For intermediate values of risk aversion however, the more
balanced relation between consumption and wealth of Strategy 3 eventually
becomes superior. Yet, for high levels of risk aversion, this relation shifts
once again. Now, the utility function has a fairly high concavity and as such,
even great differences in consumption and wealth translate to only marginal
increases in utility. At this point, the difference in consumption between
both strategies is no longer enough to offset the difference in wealth at later
stages of the planning horizon. In particular, while the wealth profile of
Strategy 3 is decreasing, it is increasing for Strategy 2. As a consequence,
Strategy 2 becomes optimal once again, given a relatively high intensity of
the bequest motive.
Observation 3: A withdrawal strategy with risky asset allocation and con-
stant withdrawals is the utility-maximizing choice for investors with strong
bequest motives who show either a relatively low level of risk aversion or a
relatively high level of risk aversion.
Finally, we can also compare the utility of the withdrawal strategies
across different time horizons. Most notably, we find that while Strategy(3
becomes the utility-maximizing choice for an even greater range of prefer-
ence parameters, Strategy 2 vanishes nearly entirely for very long planning
horizons (T = 35). Only for very low values of relative risk aversion and
a high intensity of bequests, Strategy 2 is still utility-maximizing. This is
partially related to how the second strategy was constructed for different
time horizons. To make the strategy comparable, we adjusted the with-
drawal amounts under the constraint that the probability of default remains
constant across all horizons. As such, average yearly consumption declines
for longer planning horizons while average wealth levels increase. For
higher parameters of risk aversion, the increase in wealth is, however, not
enough to outweigh the drop in consumption compared to other strategies.
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Observation 4: Withdrawal strategies whose withdrawal rates adjust to mar-
ket conditions are increasingly optimal the longer individuals’ planning hori-
zons are compared to strategies who do not adjust withdrawals.
Predicted and Actual Choice
To test how well a time-separable power-utility function with bequest
motives describes participants’ actual choice behavior, we construct three
dummy variables that indicate which of the three withdrawal strategies a
participant prefers, which will be the dependent variables for our subse-
quent analyses. To match participants’ actual choices with the previously
generated predictions, we discretize their self-reported risk-aversion (1− 7)
and their self-reported bequest motive (1 − 7) into seven equally spaced
points to fit the described intervals used for the utility simulations, i.e.
γ ∈ [1, 10] and b ∈ [−0.5, 2]. Since self-reported risk-aversion and bequest
intentions are only noisy measures of the true parameter values, we also
consider alternative limits for both intervals. To assign each participant a
"best-choice"-prediction, we match the simulated utility-maximizing choices
with our survey data based on the two described intervals and based on
participants’ chosen planning horizon. As a result, each participant is
matched with a unique utility-maximizing choice that corresponds to her
parameter triple (γ, b, T), which will serve as the main independent variable.
Table 5.3 reports the marginal effects of five sets of probit regressions with
participants’ chosen decumulation strategy as dependent variable. Each
specification represents a different interval over which parameters were
linearized while the last specification represents a placebo-test, where
participants were matched with random recommendations.
Across all specifications, we reliably find that a time-separable power util-
ity function with bequest motives successfully predicts preferences for the
first and the third withdrawal strategy. For the risk-free strategy (Strategy 1),
we find that when the utility functions predict the first strategy to be the op-
timal choice for a given participant, participants are on average between 11
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Table 5.3: Utility Predictions
Dependent Strategy 1: Strategy 2: Strategy 3:
Variable Risk-free – Constant Risky – Constant Risky – Dynamic
Specific. 1: b ∈ [−0.5, 2]& γ ∈ [1, 10]
CRRA Strategy 1 0.1181***
(6.83)
CRRA Strategy 2 0.0175
(1.02)
CRRA Strategy 3 0.1081***
(6.36)
Specific. 2: b ∈ [−0.5, 1]& γ ∈ [1, 7]
CRRA Strategy 1 0.1958***
(9.75)
CRRA Strategy 2 0.0968**
(2.22)
CRRA Strategy 3 0.1478***
(5.32)
Specific. 3: b ∈ [−0.5, 2]& γ ∈ [1, 7]
CRRA Strategy 1 0.1933***
(8.18)
CRRA Strategy 2 0.0308
(1.60)
CRRA Strategy 3 0.1276***
(6.61)
Specific. 4: b ∈ [−0.5, 1]& γ ∈ [1, 10]
CRRA Strategy 1 0.1137***
(7.32)
CRRA Strategy 2 0.038
(1.52)
CRRA Strategy 3 0.0953***
(5.02)
Specific. 5: Placebo-test with random allocation
CRRA Strategy 1 0.0077
(0.57)
CRRA Strategy 2 0.0188
(1.18)
CRRA Strategy 3 −0.0175
(−1.00)
N 3553 3553 3553
Note: This table reports the marginal effects of probit regressions. Dependent variables are
indicator variables of participants’ chosen withdrawal strategies. The main independent
variables are indicator variables that denote whether our utility specification would recom-
mend a participant to choose a specific strategy, based on self-reported risk-aversion, be-
quest intensity and planning horizon. Self-reported risk-aversion and bequest are linearized
into a set of seven equally spaced points on the intervals denoted in the four specifications.
Our full set of controls is included in every regression. Reported are coefficients and t-
statistics. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%-level, respectively.
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% and 19 % more likely to also select this strategy. Similarly, for the strategy
with dynamic withdrawal rates (Strategy 3), we find that participants are on
average between 10 % and 15 % more likely to also select the strategy if the
utility function would predict it to be the optimal choice. Yet, despite these
consistent results, the employed utility function appears to struggle in pre-
dicting preferences for the strategy with constant withdrawal rates (Strategy
2). While the coefficients are not only economically small, they are also not
statistically different from zero. One potential driver for this inconsistency
is the relation with risk aversion. Instead of the positive relation implied by
Figure 5.3, our data suggests the reverse.9 In our sample, it appears that the
more risk-averse participants are, the less likely they are to select a decumu-
lation strategy with risky asset allocation and constant withdrawals. This
is not entirely unexpected. Due to the nature of how the second strategy is
constructed (constant withdrawals paired with stochastic returns), it cannot
guarantee that wealth levels are always sufficient to sustain the withdrawal
rate. While this strategy only defaults in about 1.2 % of the time five years
before the planning horizon, this risk increases to roughly 10 % until the final
year. Considering that most participants are highly averse to the prospect of
defaulting before the planning horizon (most important characteristic across
all age groups), this fear appears to be reflected in participants’ self-reported
risk aversion.
5.3.3 Determinants of Participants’ Product Choice
In this section, we investigate whether participants rather prefer a lifelong
annuity or a phased withdrawal account. A summary of observed choices is
provided in Figure 5.4.
Overall, we observe that only a small fraction of participants preferred
an annuity over a phased withdrawal plan (12 %). This result is more or
less independent of the actual properties of the phased withdrawal account,
9 Instead of regressing on the individual predictions, we could also regress on participants’
self-reported risk-aversion, their bequest intentions, and on their planning horizon. Results
of these regressions are reported in the Appendix (Table D.1 in the Appendix).
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Figure 5.4: Annuity and Phased Withdrawal Demand
Note: This figure displays participants’ choice between their preferred phased decumulation
option and a lifelong annuity. Displayed are comparisons for the full sample and for each
option individually. All differences are significant at the 1%-level.
although it is smaller for those participants who initially preferred the risk-
free decumulation option (Strategy 1). While consistent with earlier results
on the annuitization puzzle (in which participants rather prefer a lump sum
payment), this finding provides a new perspective to the discussion. More
precisely, it appears that individuals do not exhibit a general aversion to
wealth decumulation but rather a specific aversion to invest in annuities.
Looking at the difference between the risk-free phased withdrawal account
and the annuity, this aversion seems even more surprising. For any wealth
level and any planning horizon except 20 years, the annuity in our study
provides higher monthly payments than the risk-free decumulation option,
which are not only indefinitely, but also guaranteed by an insurance provider.
Conversely, the only benefit of selecting a completely risk-free phased with-
drawal account comes in the form of retaining control over one’s financial
assets, which – depending on the situation – can fulfil both precautionary
and bequest motives. Yet, even for this comparison, roughly 78 % appear to
favor a phased decumulation option.
Next, we investigate potential drivers of this discrepancy. Table 5.4 shows
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Table 5.4: Determinants of Annuity and Phased Withdrawal Demand
Dependent Variable Annuity
Full Sample Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3
Life Expectancy 0.00306*** 0.00491** 0.00382** 0.00246**
(3.57) (2.16) (2.29) (2.25)
Trust in Financial Markets −0.0138*** −0.0108 −0.00743 −0.00346
(3.73) (0.97) (1.08) (0.74)
Financial Literacy 0.00334 0.0290* 0.0151* 0.00659
(0.65) (1.93) (1.86) (1.01)
Age −0.00147*** −0.00157 −0.00140* −0.00235***
(3.20) (1.10) (1.71) (3.74)
Married −0.0324** −0.0347 −0.0485** −0.0243
(2.38) (0.91) (2.16) (1.43)
Kids −0.0166*** −0.0166 0.00941 −0.00247
(3.61) (1.08) (1.02) (0.44)
Log(Income) 0.0151 0.0118 0.0173 0.00256
(1.29) (0.42) (0.83) (0.16)
Log(Wealth) −0.0417*** −0.0683*** −0.0167 −0.0234**
(5.56) (3.62) (1.25) (2.28)
Female 0.00807 0.0053 0.0527 −0.0292
(0.48) (0.13) (1.58) (1.46)
University −0.0105 0.0173 0.0169 −0.0109
(0.77) (0.52) (0.72) (0.61)
High Consumption 0.0266** −0.0117* −0.00746*
(2.28) (1.84) (1.75)
Constant Consumption 0.0231** 0.0237*** 0.0351***
(2.08) (3.48) (6.51)
Low Default Risk −0.0133 0.00814 0.00186
(1.00) (1.49) (0.47)
Bequest −0.0152** −0.0237*** −0.0113***
(1.97) (4.58) (3.29)
N 3593 665 1029 1897
R2 0.035 0.084 0.077 0.069
Note: This table reports results of four OLS regressions. Dependent variable is Annuity, a
dummy variable which equals one if a participant prefers an annuity over a phased with-
drawal account. Column (1) looks at the full sample independent of the previously chosen
phased withdrawal account, while columns (2) to (4) condition the analysis on the chosen
phased withdrawal account. Reported are coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses). All
standard errors are robust. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%-level,
respectively.
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the results of regressing annuity (a dummy that equals one if participants
would prefer an annuity to a phased decumulation product) on participants’
self-reported life expectancy, trust in financial markets, financial literacy and
a set of demographic variables. In columns (2) to (4), we shift the focus on
the trade-off between choosing an annuity versus a specific phased with-
drawal account, which a participant previously preferred. To differentiate
the characteristics of the phased withdrawal accounts, we also include the
self-reported importance of the four self-assessed withdrawal characteristics
as additional explanatory variables.
Across all regressions, we collectively find that higher life expectancy is
positively related to choosing an annuity over a phased withdrawal account.
Given the fact that insurance against longevity risk is one of the primary
benefits of annuities, this finding is not surprising and consistent with ear-
lier studies (e.g. Beshears et al., 2014; Schreiber and Weber, 2016). Relat-
edly, results in column (1) suggest that married individuals and the number
of children are negative predictors of the annuitization decision. Looking at
the individual differences between annuities and specific phased withdrawal
strategies as reported in columns (2) to (4) provides further insights. First, we
consistently find that bequest intentions are negatively related to the annuiti-
zation decision, independent of the phased withdrawal account participants
have selected. The importance of bequest motives for the selection of wealth
decumulation products does not come unexpectedly. Kotlikoff and Summers
(1981) estimated that a large fraction of the U.S. capital stock was attributable
to intergenerational transfer. Similarly, Gale and Scholz (1994) showed that
both bequests and inter vivos transfers are common and can be sizeable. Sec-
ond, we find that consumers who value constant income streams are signifi-
cantly more likely to select an annuity despite having the option to choose a
phased withdrawal account with constant withdrawals. Finally, and perhaps
most interestingly, we find no effect of participants’ desire for safe income
streams on their product choice, independent of their preferred phased with-
drawal account. In other words, even though "avoiding the risk of depleting
the capital stock early" ranks as the most important characteristic for phased
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withdrawals, investors seem to neglect that it is one of the primary benefits
of annuities. While not entirely surprising for the first and the second phased
withdrawal option, this is especially troublesome for the decumulation strat-
egy with constant withdrawal amounts and risky asset allocation which ex-
hibits a rather high risk of exhausting the withdrawal account before the end
of life.
Finally, we also consider the possibility that investor sentiment might
drive the low demand for annuities in our sample. Chalmers and Reuter
(2012) and Previtero (2014) both document that past stock market returns
have a strong effect on the demand for annuities, with high stock market re-
turns generally reducing the demand for annuities. To account for the fact
that past market conditions might drive the demand for equity investments,
we investigate the 3-month and 12-month return of the DAX index prior to
the release of our survey. Yet, even though both returns are positive (approx.
1.6 % and 4 %, respectively), they are below their recent historic averages
(2.1 % and 8 %, respectively). While we cannot fully rule out the possibility
that participants falsely use recent market returns as a proxy for future re-
turns, the mild economic conditions during our sample period would make
the capital market investment appear rather less attractive instead of more
attractive.
5.3.4 The Wealth Decumulation Decision
In this section, we analyze respondents’ general willingness to decumulate
wealth. Figure 5.5 displays the average self-reported amount (in % of to-
tal liquid wealth) that participants would be willing to decumulate over the
course of their retirement.
Overall, participants would be willing to draw down roughly 65 % of
their retirement savings while they would keep 35 % as precautionary sav-
ings. Participants who prefer a lifelong annuity to a phased withdrawal
would decumulate 68 % of their savings, while those preferring a phased
withdrawal account would decumulate 64 % (t-statistic: 2.91, two-sided test).
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Figure 5.5: Willingness to Decumulate Retirement Savings
Note: This figure displays participants’ willingness how much of their retirement wealth
they would be willing to decumulate and how much they would keep as precautionary
savings. Displayed are comparisons for the full sample and split by the product (phased
withdrawal or annuity) they have previously chosen. *** indicates significance at the 1%-
level.
Yet, despite the rather high self-reported willingness to decumulate wealth,
actual spending in retirement appears to be still moderately low (Olafsson
and Pagel, 2018). Given that only 12 % of the respondents in our sample
would select an annuity to begin with, our results suggest that the difference
between observed spending and self-reported willingness to spend is driven
by the lack of demand for annuities and the desire for flexibility.
Next, we seek to obtain a more pronounced understanding of the factors
that affect individuals’ decision of how much wealth to decumulate. In an-
alyzing this decision, we differentiate two sets of variables related to partic-
ipants’ retirement preparedness. First, we look at factors that are related so
successful wealth accumulation (i.e. individuals’ "financial" preparedness).
Second, we investigate factors which capture participants’ attitude towards
retirement (i.e. individuals’ "emotional" preparedness).
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Financial Preparedness and the Wealth Decumulation Decision
To identify factors related to successful wealth accumulation, we follow
Lusardi and Mitchell (2007, 2011). The authors find that both financial liter-
acy and planning are strong predictors for financial wellbeing in retirement.
In particular, it appears that those individuals who successfully develop and
stick to a saving plan not only accumulate more wealth but also make better
investment decisions. Additionally, the authors find that these individuals
are also more likely to follow sound financial advice and less likely to follow
investment recommendations from friends and family members. As such,
we include a dummy variable that equals 1 if participants report sticking
to a saving plan for their retirement, a measure of financial literacy, and
dummy variables that indicate the source of financial advice participants use
for their retirement planning.10 Results of 4 OLS regressions with dissave as
dependent variable are reported in Table 5.5.
Based on the results of Table 5.5, we can draw several conclusions. First,
those participants who report sticking to a saving plan to save for retirement
show a weak tendency to decumulate a greater fraction of their accumulated
savings, even after control for wealth. However, the effect is both econom-
ically small and statistically only marginally significant. Looking at other
indicators of successful wealth accumulation, this relation even appears to
vanish entirely. While financial literacy is a highly significant and positive
predictor of wealth accumulation (both in our sample and in previous stud-
ies; see for example Behrman et al., 2012), it does not appear to be related to
wealth decumulation. Similar results can be found by looking at the source
of financial advice participants take. While we observe a weak negative ef-
fect for those people who take advice from their family and a weak positive
effect for those who use spreadsheets and similar planning tools, none of the
effects is statistically significant at the 10 %-level. One potential reason for
this seemingly non-existent relationship might be that wealth decumulation
10 To ensure the suitability of our proxies for successful wealth accumulation, we test the im-
plications of Lusardi and Mitchell (2007, 2011) in the Appendix (Table D.2). Consistent with
their study, our results leave no doubt that financial literacy and the ability to develop and
stick to a saving plan are important determinants for effective retirement preparation.
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Table 5.5: Financial Preparedness and Wealth Decumulation
Dependent Variable Dissave
Saving Plan 1.811** 1.572*
(-1.96) (-1.66)
Financial Literacy 0.286 0.0932
(-0.67) (-0.21)
Advice_Family (-1.063) (-0.908)
(-1.08) (-0.91)
Advice_Work (-0.246) (-0.218)
(-0.17) (-0.15)
Advice_Tool 0.81 0.48
(-0.89) (-0.52)
Advice_Media 0.752 0.612
(-0.72) (-0.58)
Advice_Advisor -0.703 -0.781
(-0.73) (-0.80)
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3508 3508 3508 3508
R2 0.063 0.063 0.064 0.064
Note: This table reports results of four OLS regressions. Dependent variable is Dissave,
which can take values between 0% and 100%. Main independent variables are Saving Plan (1
= participant follows a saving plan for retirement), Financial Literacy, and five dummy vari-
ables that indicate whether a participant follows financial advice of family members, work
colleagues, planning tools, the media, or from financial planners. Reported are coefficients
and t-statistics (in parentheses). All standard errors are robust. ***, **, and * indicate signifi-
cance at the 1%, 5% and 10%-level, respectively. We control for socio-demographic variables
and household composition whenever indicated.
– in contrast to saving and investment decisions – is still a relatively new
and unexplored topic for the broad population and even for most financial
institutions besides insurance companies. As such, there is relatively little
guidance for consumers about how much wealth should be decumulated.
Emotional Preparedness and the Wealth Decumulation Decision
To capture participants’ attitudes towards retirement (i.e. their "emotional"
preparedness), we include both a measure of optimism and the planning
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horizon over which they would want to decumulate their wealth. With our
measure of optimism, we seek to capture the fact that consumers cannot rely
on their experience when evaluating how much of their wealth they would
be willing to decumulate. According to Puri and Robinson (2007), these are
the decisions which are most affected by attitudes and emotional dispositions
as there is no available data on which to base an opinion. Following Puri
and Robinson (2007), optimism was measured as the difference between par-
ticipants’ self-reported life expectancy and that implied by statistical tables,
adjusted for gender. To differentiate moderate optimism from extreme opti-
mism, we take the right-most 5 % of optimists to be extreme optimists.11 In-
cluding participants’ planning horizon allows us to control for participants’
outlook on their retirement, which is not caused by optimism (i.e. informa-
tion about their health status, general longevity in their family, or aversion
to the prospect of outliving their retirement resources). Yet, longer planning
horizons are likely to have diverse implications for individuals who prefer
phased withdrawals over annuities or vice versa. For individuals who prefer
phased withdrawals, longer planning horizons should be associated with a
decreased willingness to decumulate greater amounts, as there is no protec-
tion against longevity risk. Conversely, for those preferring annuities, one
should expect that longer planning horizons increase the willingness to de-
cumulate greater amounts, as predicted by Yaari (1965) or Davidoff et al.
(2005). Additionally, both optimism and participants’ planning horizon are
likely correlated to their bequest motive (e.g. Ameriks et al., 2011). Follow-
ing this logic, we include both our regular measure of optimism, a dummy
variable for extreme optimists, participants’ bequest motive, their planning
horizon, a dummy for preferring annuities over phased withdrawals and an
interaction between the last two. Results are reported in Table 5.6.
We find that the tendency to plan for a longer retirement is negatively re-
lated to the wealth decumulation decision for participants preferring phased
withdrawals while having a positive impact for those preferring annuities.
11 In our study, extreme optimists overestimate their life expectancy by roughly 20 to 30 years,
similar to the 20 years reported by Puri and Robinson (2007).
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In the absence of a significant proportion of annuitized wealth, households
must decide which fraction of their savings they decumulate and how much
they keep as precautionary savings. The longer they expect to live (or the
more averse they are to the prospect of outliving their resources) the more
precautionary savings they should build. Conversely, participants interested
in annuities have no incentive to keep large precautionary savings in re-
sponse to longer planning horizons. In particular, the longer one expects to
live, the higher are the benefits from livelong pension payments and the more
beneficial it becomes to drawdown a greater fraction of one’s savings (while
keeping smaller precautionary savings as protection against adverse health
shocks). Additionally, participants’ self-reported bequest intentions are a
strong negative predictor of the wealth they would be willing to decumu-
late. Interestingly however, this relation strongly depends on their planning
horizon and is most pronounced for long horizons. While our survey does
not allow us to strictly disentangle strategic bequest motives (e.g. caused by
public care aversion) from intentional bequest motives, this interaction rather
points towards the former explanation, supporting the findings of Ameriks
et al. (2011).
Regarding the impact of optimism, we find that moderate optimism is
positively related to wealth decumulation. This finding is in line with the
view that optimism is generally correlated with positive beliefs about future
economic conditions, as postulated by Puri and Robinson (2007). As such,
more optimistic individuals appear to be attracted by the prospect of a higher
consumption during retirement without worrying too much about the state
of their precautionary savings. In our sample, more optimistic individuals
are willing to decumulate roughly 4 % more of their savings compared to
rather pessimistic individuals (as defined by being one standard deviation
away from the mean). While this difference is hardly decisive for living re-
tirement in luxury or in poverty, it might benefit those retirees who system-
atically overestimate their life expectancy (Heimer et al., 2019). Yet, similar
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Table 5.6: Emotional Outlook and Wealth Decumulation
Dependent Variable Dissave
Optimism 0.136* 0.0743 0.141* 0.137* 0.133*
(1.76) (1.05) (1.82) (1.76) (1.70)
Extreme Optimism -8.918*** -8.986*** -8.967*** -8.875*** -8.893***
(-3.80) (-3.83) (-3.81) (-3.78) (-3.80)
Bequest -5.851*** -5.939*** -5.895*** -5.875*** -1.654
(-26.69) (-27.08) (-26.86) (-26.80) (-1.31)
Horizon -0.346*** -0.333*** -0.414*** 0.250
(-3.00) (-2.88) (-3.52) (1.08)
Annuity -2.808** -2.593* -21.21** -18.31**
(-2.13) (-1.96) (-2.41) (-2.09)
Horizon x Annuity 0.739** 0.614*
(2.15) (1.79)
Horizon x Bequest -0.170***
(-3.34)
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3525 3525 3525 3525 3525
R2 0.254 0.253 0.255 0.256 0.259
Note: This table reports results of four OLS regressions. Dependent variable is Dissave, a cat-
egorial variable, which can take values between 0% and 100%. Main independent variables
are Optimism and Extreme_optimism, which were constructed following Puri and Robinson
(2007). Reported are coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses). All standard errors are ro-
bust. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%-level, respectively. We control
for socio-demographic variables and household composition whenever indicated.
to earlier findings on optimism, we report strikingly different results for in-
dividuals who are overly optimistic. In particular, instead of moderately in-
creasing their consumption, extreme optimists decumulate between 2 % and
5 % less than the average participant. The implications of this finding might
hint at an inherent misunderstanding of how to protect against longevity
risk. Given that extremely optimistic individuals overestimate their life ex-
pectancy by roughly 20 to 30 years, a 2 % to 5 % increase in precautionary
savings is barely relevant to sustain their financial needs until the age of 105.
Instead, those individuals would benefit most by annuitizing an even greater
fraction of their accumulated savings.
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Taken together, our results on optimism are largely consistent with find-
ings from Brunnermeier and Parker (2005). In their model, forward-looking
agents who believe that better outcomes are more likely, are more inclined to
take ex-post optimal actions that others might find too costly ex-ante. Overly
optimistic agents, however, neglect the benefit of those actions and instead
perceive future income as too certain. Similarly, our findings imply that mod-
erately optimistic individuals decumulate a greater fraction of their wealth to
either increase their wellbeing over a shorter horizon (through phased with-
drawals or immediate consumption) or over a longer horizon (through an-
nuities). Extreme optimists – however – decumulate a smaller fraction of
their wealth possibly to protect against longevity risk and as such neglect
the uncertainty in their life expectancy and overestimate their income from
non-annuitized wealth.
5.4 Conclusion
The goal of this study has been to obtain a more holistic understanding of the
wealth decumulation decision from the perspective of an individual who is
averse to fully annuitizing her accumulated savings in retirement. Such an
individual faces the following decision problem. Out of her non-annuitized
wealth, she must decide how much to allocate to a savings account (i.e. as a
protection against unexpected costs) and how much (if anything) to decumu-
late over the course of her retirement. As an alternative way to decumulate
savings, we investigate preferences for phased withdrawal products by field-
ing a large online survey.
Our results have several implications for the design and the demand for
complementary products. In our sample, annuity demand is still relatively
low, as only 12 % of respondents would prefer a lifelong annuity to decu-
mulate savings, while 88 % would prefer some form of phased withdrawal.
Offering a wider array of phased withdrawal solutions would help retirees to
decumulate more of their savings, without being forced to fully convert their
wealth. As flexibility in the timing of spending is among the most important
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factors of the annuitization decision (Beshears et al., 2014), offering combined
solutions of phased withdrawals and partial annuitization could help to in-
crease overall retirement welfare while protecting retirees against longevity
risk. Yet, finding the optimal mix of phased withdrawals and annuitization
remains a significant challenge.
Regarding the concrete design of phased withdrawal products, our re-
sults suggest that even in retirement most people are willing to invest in
equities to sustain higher withdrawal rates. Additionally, the majority of
respondents would choose a product with dynamic withdrawal rates. Given
the current standard of constant payout policies (e.g. as offered by most an-
nuity contracts), our findings highlight once more the importance and the
demand for more flexible retirement solutions. Whereas similar proposals
exist in the variable annuity market (e.g. penalty-free early withdrawals, or
flexible payout streams), annuities face much higher hurdles to implement
such suggestions due to adverse selection, which eventually increases prod-
uct complexity for consumers.
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Appendix A
Why So Negative?
Belief Formation and Risk-Taking
in Boom and Bust Markets
A.1 Further Analyses
In this section we present results of further analyses.
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Table A.1: Pessimism Bias Split by Forecasting Quality
Dependent Variable Probability Estimate (Subjective Posterior)
Pooled Data Domain-specific Mixed
Above Below Above Below Above Below
Median Median Median Median Median Median
Bust -4.529*** -6.813*** -4.261*** -7.247*** -4.997*** -5.661***
(-6.13) (-4.54) (-3.72) (-3.11) (-5.18) (-2.86)
Objective Posterior 0.671*** 0.133*** 0.641*** 0.165*** 0.693*** 0.107***
(48.14) (7.46) (34.13) (6.33) (35.46) (4.37)
Constant 20.92*** 58.92*** 14.88*** 66.86*** 27.49*** 50.78***
(6.75) (9.62) (3.22) (6.82) (6.38) (6.60)
Observations 6032 6016 2704 2896 3328 3120
R2 0.69 0.10 0.68 0.08 0.70 0.12
Note: This table reports the results of three OLS regressions on how subjective posterior
beliefs about the distribution of the lottery depend on the treatment split by above and below
median forecasting ability as defined in the text. We report the results of OLS regressions
for the whole sample, and for each experiment individually (Experiment 1: Domain-specific;
Experiment 2: Mixed). The dependent variable Probability Estimate is the subjective posterior
belief that the asset is paying from the good distribution. Independent variables include the
Bust dummy, an indicator variable that equals 1 if participants were in the bust treatment
and zero otherwise, as well as Objective Posterior, which is the correct Bayesian probability
that the stock is good, given the information seen by the participant up to trial t in the
learning block. Controls include age, gender, statistical skills, self-reported experience in
stock trading, whether subjects were invested in the stock market during the last financial
crisis, and the order of outcomes they experienced in the forecasting task. Reported are
coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) using robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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A.2 Experimental Instructions and Screenshots
Instructions Bayesian Updating (Exemplary for Boom Treat-
ment of Experiment 1)
In this part, we would like to test your forecasting abilities. You will make
forecasting decisions in two consecutive blocks each consisting of 8 rounds.
Suppose you find yourself in an environment, in which the value of a risky
asset can either increase by 2 or by 15. The probability of either outcome (2
or 15) depends on the state in which the asset is (good state or bad state). If
the risky asset is in the good state, then the probability that the risky asset
increases in value by 15 is 70% and the probability that it increases in value
by 2 is 30%. If the risky asset is in the bad state, then the probability that the
risky asset increases in value by 15 is 30% and the probability that it increases
in value by 2 is 70%.
The computer determines the state at the beginning of each block (consisting
of 8 rounds). Within a block, the state does not change and remains fixed. At
the beginning of each block, you do not know which state the risky asset is
in. The risky asset may be in the good state or in the bad state with equal
probability.
At the beginning of each round, you will observe the payoff of the risky asset
(2 or 15). After that, we will ask you to provide a probability estimate that
the risky asset is in the good state and ask you how sure you are about your
probability estimate. While answering these questions, you can observe the
price development in a chart next to the question.
There is always an objective correct probability that the risky asset is in the
good state. This probability depends on the history of payoffs of the risky
asset already. As you observe the payoffs of the risky asset, you will update
your beliefs whether or not the risky asset is in the good state.
Every time you provide us with a probability estimate that is within 5% of
the correct value (e.g., correct probability is 70% and your answer is between
65% and 75%) we will add 10 Cents to your payment.
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Objective Bayesian Posterior Probabilities
This table provides all possible values for the objectively correct probability
that the asset is in the good state for every possible combination of trials and
outcomes. The initial prior for good and bad distribution is set to 50%. The
objective Bayesian posterior probability that the asset is in the good state,
after observing t high outcomes in n trials so far is given by: 1
1+ 1−pp ·(
q
1−q )
n−2t ,
where p is the initial prior before any outcome is observed that the stock is in
the good state (50% here), and q is the probability that the value increase of
the asset is the higher one (70% here).
n (number of t (number of Probability [stock is good
trials so far) high outcomes so far) t high outcomes in n trials]
0 0 50.00%
1 0 30.00%
1 1 70.00%
2 0 15.52%
2 1 50.00%
2 2 84.48%
3 0 7.30%
3 1 30.00%
3 2 70.00%
3 3 92.70%
4 0 3.26%
4 1 15.52%
4 2 50.00%
4 3 84.48%
4 4 96.74%
5 0 1.43%
5 1 7.30%
5 2 30.00%
5 3 70.00%
5 4 92.70%
5 5 98.57%
6 0 0.62%
6 1 3.26%
6 2 15.52%
6 3 50.00%
6 4 84.48%
6 5 96.74%
6 6 99.38%
7 0 0.26%
7 1 1.43%
7 2 7.30%
7 3 30.00%
7 4 70.00%
7 5 92.70%
7 6 98.57%
7 7 99.74%
8 0 0.11%
8 1 0.62%
8 2 3.26%
8 3 15.52%
8 4 50.00%
8 5 84.48%
8 6 96.74%
8 7 99.38%
8 8 99.89%
A.2. Experimental Instructions and Screenshots V
Screenshots of Experiment 1
Figures A.1 to A.3 present the screens of the forecasting task as seen by sub-
jects in the experiment (example block 1, round 5). One round consists of
three sequential screens. First, subjects saw the payoff of the risky asset in
the respective round. Second, the cumulated payoffs of the risky asset are
shown in a price-line-chart and subjects are asked to provide a probability
estimate that the risky asset pays from the good distribution. Finally, subjects
are asked on a 9-point Likert scale how confident they are in their probability
estimate.
Figure A.1: Payoff Screen
VI Appendix A. Why So Negative?
Figure A.2: Probability Estimate Screen
A.2. Experimental Instructions and Screenshots VII
Figure A.3: Confidence Level Screen
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A.3 Experimental Measures
Risky Lottery
Imagine in the stock market there is a risky asset, in which you can invest
100 Cent now. The asset pays you either 2.5 times the amount you invest or
it becomes valueless, i.e. your invested amount is lost. The probability of
either outcome is exactly 50%.
You can keep whatever amount you decide not to invest in the risky asset.
How much of your endowment do you want to invest in the risky asset?
[Dropdown Menu of all possible combinations in 5 Cent steps]
A.3. Experimental Measures IX
Ambiguous Lottery
Imagine in the stock market there is a risky asset, in which you can invest
100 Cent now. The asset pays you either 2.5 times the amount you invest
or it becomes valueless, i.e. your invested amount is lost. However, the
probability of either outcome is unknown.
You can keep whatever amount you decide not to invest in the risky asset.
How much of your endowment do you want to invest in the risky asset?
[Dropdown Menu of all possible combinations in 5 Cent steps]
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Life Orientation Test
Below we report the questions used in the revised version of the Life Orienta-
tion Test developed by Scheier et al. (1994). All questions were answered on a
5-point Likert scale from "do not agree at all" to "fully agree". Reverse-coded
items are indicated by [R]. Filler-items are indicated by [F]. The non-filler
items were added to a final score.
1. In uncertain times, I usually expect the best.
2. It’s easy for me to relax. [F]
3. If something can go wrong, it will. [R]
4. I’m always optimistic about my future.
5. I enjoy my friends a lot. [F]
6. It’s important for me to keep busy. [F]
7. I hardly ever expect things to go my way. [R]
8. I don’t get upset too easily. [F]
9. I rarely count on good things happening to me. [R]
10. Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad.
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Comprehension Questions for Bayesian Updating Task
Below we report the comprehension questions that participants had to an-
swer correctly after reading the instructions to proceed to the Bayesian Up-
dating task. Correct responses are displayed in italic.
1. If you see a series of +15 [−2 for Bust treatment], what is more likely?
(a) The risky asset is in the good state.
(b) The risky asset is in the bad state.
2. The correct probability estimate is let’s say 0.70. Which probability esti-
mate(s) would be in the range such that you earn 10 cents? [Note: You
can check multiple boxes.]
(a) 0.55
(b) 0.67
(c) 0.75
(d) 0.85
(e) 0.87
3. At the beginning of each block, the probability that the risky asset is in
the good state is 50%.
(a) True
(b) False
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Dow Jones Return Expectations Question in Experiment 1
The Dow Jones Industrial Average (Stock Market Index of the 30 largest US
companies) is currently trading at around 25,343.
In which price range would you expect this index to trade in 6 months from
now? [Dropdown]
• < 23,000
• 23,000 - 23,500
• 23,501 - 24,000
• 24,001 - 24,500
• 24,501 - 25,000
• 25,001 - 25,500
• 25,501 - 26,000
• 26,001 - 26,500
• 26,501 - 27,000
• 27,001 - 27,500
• 27,501 - 28,000
• > 28,000
A.3. Experimental Measures XIII
Dow Jones Return Expectations Question in Experiment 2
The Dow Jones Industrial Average (Stock Market Index of the 30 largest US
companies) is currently trading at around 26,770.
In which price range would you expect this index to trade in 6 months from
now? [Dropdown]
• < 24,500
• 23,000 - 23,500
• 24,500 - 25,000
• 25,001 - 25,500
• 25,501 - 26,000
• 26,001 - 26,500
• 26,501 - 27,000
• 27,001 - 27,500
• 27,501 - 28,000
• 28,001 - 28,500
• 28,501 - 29,000
• 29,001 - 29,500
• > 29,500
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Appendix B
Can Agents Add and Subtract
When Forming Beliefs?
B.1 Experimental Instructions and Screenshots
Instructions Bayesian Updating (Exemplary for Experiment 1)
In this part we would like to test your forecasting abilities. You will make
forecasting decisions in one block consisting of 6 rounds.
Suppose you find yourself in an environment, in which a risky asset with an
initial value of 50 can either increase by 5 or decrease by 5. The probability
of either outcome (5 or −5) depends on the state in which the asset is (good
state or bad state). If the risky asset is in the good state, then the probability
that the risky asset increases in value by 5 is 70% and the probability that
it decreases in value by 5 is 30%. If the risky asset is in the bad state, then
the probability that the risky asset increases in value by 5 is 30% and the
probability that it decreases in value by 5 is 70%.
The computer determines the state at the beginning of the block (consisting
of 6 rounds). Within a block, the state does not change and remains fixed.
At the beginning of the block, you do not know which state the risky asset
is in. The risky asset may be in the good state or in the bad state with equal
probability.
At the beginning of each round, you will observe the payoff of the risky asset
(5 or −5). After that, we will ask you to provide a probability estimate that
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the risky asset is in the good state and ask you how sure you are about your
probability estimate. While answering these questions, you can observe the
price development in a chart next to the question.
There is always an objective correct probability that the risky asset is in the
good state. This probability depends on the history of payoffs of the risky
asset already. As you observe the payoffs of the risky asset, you will update
your beliefs whether or not the risky asset is in the good state.
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Objective Bayesian Posterior Probabilities
This table provides all possible values for the objectively correct probability
that the asset is in the good state for every possible combination of trials and
outcomes. The initial prior for good and bad distribution is set to 50%. The
objective Bayesian posterior probability that the asset is in the good state,
after observing t high outcomes in n trials so far is given by:
1
1 + 1−pp · (
q
1−q )
n−2t ,
where p is the initial prior before any outcome is observed that the stock is in
the good state (50% here), and q is the probability that the value increase of
the asset is the higher one (70% in Experiment 1 & 3, and 60% in Experiment
2).
Experiment 1 and 3 (q = 70%) Experiment 2 (q = 60 %)
n (number of t (number of Probability [stock is good Probability [stock is good
trials so far) high outcomes so far) t high outcomes in n trials] t high outcomes in n trials]
0 0 50.00% 50.00%
1 0 30.00% 40.00%
1 1 70.00% 60.00%
2 0 15.52% 30.77%
2 1 50.00% 50.00%
2 2 84.48% 69.23%
3 0 7.30% 22.86%
3 1 30.00% 40.00%
3 2 70.00% 60.00%
3 3 92.70% 77.14%
4 0 3.26% 16.49%
4 1 15.52% 30.77%
4 2 50.00% 50.00%
4 3 84.48% 69.23%
4 4 96.74% 83.51%
5 0 1.43% 11.64%
5 1 7.30% 22.86%
5 2 30.00% 40.00%
5 3 70.00% 60.00%
5 4 92.70% 77.14%
5 5 98.57% 88.36%
6 0 0.62% 8.7%
6 1 3.26% 16.49%
6 2 15.52% 30.77%
6 3 50.00% 50.00%
6 4 84.48% 69.23%
6 5 96.74% 83.51%
6 6 99.38% 91.93%
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Screenshots of Experiment 1
Figures B.1 to B.3 present the screens of the forecasting task as seen by sub-
jects in the experiment (example round 4). One round consists of three se-
quential screens. First, subjects saw the payoff of the risky asset in the respec-
tive round. Second, the cumulated payoffs of the risky asset are shown in a
price-line-chart and subjects are asked to provide a probability estimate that
the risky asset pays from the good distribution. Finally, subjects are asked on
a 9-point Likert scale how confident they are in their probability estimate.
Figure B.1: Payoff Screen
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Figure B.2: Probability Estimate Screen
XX Appendix B. Can Agents Add and Subtract When Forming Beliefs?
Figure B.3: Confidence Level Screen
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Comprehension Questions for Bayesian Updating Task
Below we report the comprehension questions that participants had to an-
swer correctly after reading the instructions to proceed to the Bayesian Up-
dating task. Correct responses are displayed in italic.
1. If you see a series of +5, what is more likely?
(a) The risky asset is in the good state.
(b) The risky asset is in the bad state.
2. You observe a−5, how do you have to update your probability estimate
that the asset draws from the good distribution??
(a) I reduce the probability estimate that the asset is in the good distribution.
(b) In increase the probability estimate that the asset is in the good
distribution.
3. The correct probability estimate is let’s say 0.70. Which probability esti-
mate(s) would be in the range such that you earn 10 cents? [Note: You
can check multiple boxes.]
(a) 0.55
(b) 0.67
(c) 0.75
(d) 0.85
(e) 0.87
4. At the beginning of each block, the probability that the risky asset is in
the good state is 50%.
(a) True
(b) False
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Appendix C
Expectation Formation under
Uninformative Signals
C.1 Further Analyses
In this section we present results of further analyses.
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Table C.1: Uninformative Updating and Learning
Dependent Variable Log Odds Ratio (Subjective) λi,t
Active Treatment Passive Treatment
Round Round Round Round
1 to 5 6 to 10 1 to 5 6 to 10
Din f ormative; i,t (Inference) 0.412*** 0.340*** 0.604*** 0.536***
(8.39) (6.93) (10.58) (10.36)
λi,t−1 (Use of Priors) 0.701*** 0.789*** 0.520*** 0.689***
(19.51) (26.23) (11.92) (21.88)
Dunin f ormative; i,t 0.367*** 0.310*** 0.257*** 0.0831
(4.16) (3.93) (2.98) (1.19)
Dunin f ormative; i,t x -0.544*** -0.589*** -0.596*** -0.348***
negativei (-4.04) (-4.11) (-4.24) (-2.88)
Observations 1371 530 533 287
R2 0.698 0.454 0.580 0.538
Note: This table reports the results of four OLS regressions on how information signals and
their valence affect individuals’ beliefs. We report results split by the first five and the last
five rounds of the experiment. The dependent variable is participants’ subjective log-odds
ratio. Prior Signal is a variable taking the value 1 if the tth signal of subject i is good, 0 if
the tth signal is uninformative, and -1 if the tth signal is bad. Uninformative is a dummy if
the tth signal of subject i is uninformative, whereas Negative is a dummy if participant i is
in the negative treatment (and zero otherwise). The interaction term thus displays whether
participant i encountered a negative uninformative signal in round t. Controls include age,
gender, statistical skills, risk aversion, and participants’ financial literacy. Reported are co-
efficients and t-statistics (in parentheses). All standard errors are clustered at the individual
level. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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C.2 Experimental Instructions and Screenshots
Instructions Bayesian Updating (Exemplary for Positive Treat-
ment)
In this part we would like to test your forecasting abilities. You will make
forecasting decisions in ten consecutive rounds.
Suppose you find yourself in an environment, in which a risky asset can pay
a dividend of either−3, +1, or +5. The probability of each outcome depends
on the state in which the asset is (good state or bad state). If the risky asset
is in the good state, then the probability that it pays a dividend of +5 is 50%,
the probability that it pays a dividend of −1 is 30% and the probability that
it pays a dividend of −3 is 20%. If the risky asset is in the bad state, then the
probability that it pays a dividend of +5 is 20%, the probability that it pays
a dividend of −1 is 30% and the probability that it pays a dividend of −3 is
50%.
The computer determines the state of the risky asset before the first round.
Afterwards, the state does not change and remains fixed. At first, you do not
know which state the risky asset is in. The risky asset may be in the good
state or in the bad state with equal probability.
At the beginning of each round, you will observe a dividend payment of the
risky asset (−3, +1, or +5). After that, we will ask you to provide a proba-
bility estimate that the risky asset is in the good state and ask you how sure
you are about your probability estimate. While answering these questions,
you can observe the previous dividend payments next to the question.
There is always an objective correct probability that the risky asset is in the
good state. This probability depends on the history of payoffs of the risky
asset already. As you observe the payoffs of the risky asset, you will update
your beliefs whether or not the risky asset is in the good state.
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Objective Bayesian Posterior Probabilities
This table provides all possible values for the objectively correct probability
that the asset is in the good state for every possible combination of trials and
outcomes. The initial prior for good and bad distribution is set to 50%. The
objective Bayesian posterior probability that the asset is in the good state,
after observing t high outcomes in n trials so far is given by:
1
1 + 1−pp · (
q
1−q )
(n−u)−2t ,
where p is the initial prior before any outcome is observed that the stock is
in the good state (50% here), and q is the probability that the value increase
of the asset is the higher one (71.43% here). Finally, t and u are the number
of observed high signals and uninformative signals until trial n, respectively.
Displayed are results for 8 rounds, as probabilities converge quickly to 1.
n (number of t (number of Probability [stock is good
trials so far) high outcomes so far) t high outcomes in n trials]
0 0 50.00%
1 0 28.57%
1 1 71.43%
2 0 13.79%
2 1 50.00%
2 2 86.21%
3 0 6.02%
3 1 28.57%
3 2 71.43%
3 3 93.98%
4 0 2.50%
4 1 13.79%
4 2 50.00%
4 3 86.21%
4 4 97.50%
5 0 1.01%
5 1 6.02%
5 2 28.57%
5 3 71.43%
5 4 93.98%
5 5 98.99%
6 0 0.41%
6 1 2.50%
6 2 13.79%
6 3 50.00%
6 4 86.21%
6 5 97.50%
6 6 99.59%
7 0 0.16%
7 1 1.01%
7 2 6.02%
7 3 28.57%
7 4 71.43%
7 5 93.98%
7 6 98.99%
7 7 99.84%
8 0 0.07%
8 1 0.41%
8 2 2.50%
8 3 13.79%
8 4 50.00%
8 5 86.21%
8 6 97.50%
8 7 99.59%
8 8 99.93%
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Screenshots of the Experiment
Figures C.1 to C.5 present the screens of the forecasting task (screens that only
belong to the active treatment are marked as [active]) as seen by subjects in
the experiment. One round consists of three [five] sequential screens.
Figure C.1: Investment Screen
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Figure C.2: Payoff Screen
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Figure C.3: Accumulated Payoffs Screen
XXX Appendix C. Expectation Formation under Uninformative Signals
Figure C.4: Probability Estimate Screen
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Figure C.5: Confidence Level Screen
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Comprehension Questions for Bayesian Updating Task
Below we report the comprehension questions that participants had to an-
swer correctly after reading the instructions to proceed to the Bayesian Up-
dating task. Correct responses are displayed in italic.
1. If you see a series of +5, what is more likely?
(a) The risky asset is in the good state.
(b) The risky asset is in the bad state.
2. You observe a−5, how do you have to update your probability estimate
that the asset draws from the good distribution?
(a) I reduce the probability estimate that the asset is in the good distribution.
(b) In increase the probability estimate that the asset is in the good
distribution.
3. The correct probability estimate is let’s say 0.70. Which probability esti-
mate(s) would be in the range such that you earn 10 cents? [Note: You
can check multiple boxes.]
(a) 0.55
(b) 0.67
(c) 0.75
(d) 0.85
(e) 0.87
4. At the beginning of each block, the probability that the risky asset is in
the good state is 50%.
(a) True
(b) False
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C.3 Additional Experimental Measures
Risk Aversion
Below we report the risk aversion question adopted from Kuhnen (2015):
Imagine you have saved $10, 000. You can now invest this money over the
next year using two investment options: a U.S. stock index mutual fund,
which tracks the performance of the U.S. stock market, and a savings ac-
count. The annual return per dollar invested in the stock index fund will
be either +40% or -20%, with equal probability. In other words, it is equally
likely that for each dollar you invest in the stock market, at the end of the
one year investment period, you will have either gained 40 cents, or lost 20
cents. For the savings account, the known and certain rate of return for a one
year investment is 5%. In other words, for each dollar you put in the sav-
ings account today, for sure you will gain 5 cents at the end of the one year
investment period. We assume that whatever amount you do not invest in
stocks will be invested in the savings account and will earn the risk-free rate
of return. Given this information, how much of the $10, 000 will you invest in
the U.S. stock index fund? Choose an answer that you would be comfortable
with if this was a real-life investment decision.
[Please enter a value between 0 and 10,000 here]
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Financial Literacy
Below we report the financial literacy question adopted from Kuhnen (2015).
Correct responses are displayed in italic.
Let’s say that when you answered the prior question you decided to invest x
dollars out of the $10, 000 amount in the U.S. stock index fund, and therefore
you put (10,000 - x) dollars in the savings account. Recall that over the next
year the rate of return of the stock index fund will be +40% or -20%, with
equal probability. For the savings account, the rate of return is 5% for sure.
What is the amount of money you expect to have at the end of this one year
investment period?
Please choose one of the answers below
[A] 0.5(0.4x− 0.2x) + 0.05(10, 000− x)
[B] 1.4x + 0.8x + 1.05(10, 000− x)
[C] 0.4(10, 000− x)− 0.2(10, 000− x) + 0.05x
[D] 0.5(0.4(10, 000− x)− 0.2(10, 000− x)) + 0.05x
[E] 0.4x− 0.2x + 0.05(10, 000− x)
[F] 0.5(1.4x + 0.8x) + 1.05(10, 000− x)
[G] 1.4(10, 000− x) + 0.8(10, 000− x) + 1.05x
[H] 0.5(1.4(10, 000− x) + 0.8(10, 000− x)) + 1.05x
C.4. Derivations and Proofs XXXV
C.4 Derivations and Proofs
Sequential Bayesian Updating Behavior
Following Dave and Wolfe (2003) and Charness and Dave (2017), we briefly
sketch individuals’ sequential updating behavior as prescribed by Bayes’
Law:
Suppose there are two possible states of the world, denoted ’G’ (for good)
and ’B’ (for bad). Additionally, over the course of t rounds, individuals may
observe signals that are either indicative of a good state g, or of a bad state b,
or which are non-diagnostic about the underlying state u.
Within a given round t, Bayes’ Rule assumes that individuals posterior logs
π1t are formed as a function of their prior logs π0 and some likelihood Lk:
π1k = Lkπ0
Given that only two signals are indicative about the possibles states ’G’ and
’B’, the likelihood Lk takes the following form:
Lk =
(
θ
1− θ
)zt
,
where θ is the proportion of g signals to b signals and zt is the difference be-
tween the number of g signals and b signals as of the tth round. Note that only
the difference of informative signals is important for the likelihood function,
as the non-diagnostic signal u does not provide any relevant information for
the decision maker. Combining the above two equations yields the follow-
ing.
π1k =
(
θ
1− θ
)zt
π0
Taking logs now yields:
ln π1k − ln π0 = zt ·
(
θ
1− θ
)
Finally, first differencing the above equation yields,
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∆ ln π1k = ∆zt ·
(
θ
1− θ
)
where ∆zt ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. The first differenced equation demonstrates that – in
absolute terms – a Bayesian agent updates, in log odds terms, at a constant
of
(
θ
1−θ
)
.
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Deriving the Regression Equation
Equation 4.8 is obtained by taking the natural logarithm of equation 4.7:
ln
π(G|S)
π(B|S) = ln
([
p(S|G)
p(S|B)
]c0+I{u| desirable}c1+I{u| undesirable}c2 [ p(G)
p(B)
]d)
⇔ ln π(G|S)
π(B|S)
= (c0 + I{u| desirable}c1 + I{u| undesirable}c2) · ln
p(S|G)
p(S|B) + d · ln
p(G)
p(B)
Next, note that an agents’ prior belief about the objective state of the world
p(G)
p(B) is equal to the agents’ posterior belief from last period
π(G|s1,...,st−1)
π(B|s1,...,st−1)
.
⇔ ln π(G|S)
π(B|S)
= (c0 + I{u| desirable}c1 + I{u| undesirable}c2) · ln
p(S|G)
p(S|B)
+ d · ln π(G|s1, . . . , st−1)
π(B|s1, . . . , st−1)
Additionally, we accommodate the fact that a Bayesian agent updates his
beliefs, in log odds terms, at a constant of ∆zt ·
(
θ
1−θ
)
. To do so, we follow
Charness and Dave (2017) and Benjamin (2019), and replace ln p(S|G)p(S|B) with a
dummy Din f ormative taking the value 1 if the tth signal is g, 0 if the tth signal
is u, and -1 if the tth signal is b. This alternate specification is equivalent,
but the coefficient c0 needs to be interpreted relative to
(
θ
1−θ
)
instead of 1.
To test whether individuals update their prior beliefs in response to non-
diagnostic signals (i.e. when the tth signal is u), we additionally add two
dummies, Dunin f ormative|desirable and Dunin f ormative|undesirable which equal 1 if the
tth signal is u and if the signal is either in the positive domain, or in the
negative domain, respectively:
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⇒ ln π(G|S)
π(B|S)
= c0 · Din f ormative + c1 · Dunin f ormative|desirable
+ c2 · Dunin f ormative|undesirable + d · ln
π(G|s1, . . . , st−1)
π(B|s1, . . . , st−1)
Finally, note that the natural logarithm of subject’s i odds ratio, based on her
stated probability Pit (G|s1, . . . , st) that the asset is paying dividends from the
good state is:
λit = ln
(
λ (G|s1, . . . , st)
λ (B|s1, . . . , st)
)
= ln
(
Pit (G|s1, . . . , st)
1− Pit (G|s1, . . . , st)
)
which may differ from the objective Bayesian probability. Incorporating this
into the above equation, the final regression equation that we seek to estimate
is as follows:
⇒ ln λ(G|s1, . . . , st)
λ(B|s1, . . . , st)
= β̂1 · Din f ormative + β̂2 · ln
λ(G|s1, . . . , st−1)
λ(B|s1, . . . , st−1)
+ β̂3 · Dunin f ormative|desirable + β̂4 · Dunin f ormative|undesirable + εt
XXXIX
Appendix D
When Saving is Not Enough –
Wealth Decumulation in
Retirement
D.1 Further Analyses
In this section we present results of further analyses.
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Table D.1: Utility Parameters and Account Choice
Dep. Strategy 1: Strategy 2: Strategy 3:
Variable Risk-free – Constant Risky – Constant Risky – Dynamic
Risk 0.067*** 0.061*** −0.029*** −0.025*** −0.040*** −0.037***
Aversion (16.67) (15.18) (6.09) (5.19) (7.45) (6.79)
Bequest −0.007** −0.002 0.029*** 0.026*** −0.023*** −0.025***
(2.13) (0.53) (8.37) (6.85) (5.83) (5.93)
Planning −0.009*** −0.004** 0.001 −0.001 0.007*** 0.005**
Horizon (5.63) (2.40) (0.68) (0.70) (3.45) (2.11)
Controls? No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 3596 3592 3596 3592 3596 3592
pseudo R2 0.10 0.13 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02
Note: This table reports the marginal effect of six probit regressions. Dependent variables are
indicator variables which equal 1 if participants have selected a given phased withdrawal
strategy. Reported are coefficients and z-statistics (in parentheses). All standard errors are
robust. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%-level, respectively. We
have between 3596 and 3592 observations due to missing answers. We control for socio-
demographic variables and household composition whenever indicated.
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Table D.2: Retirement Preparation and Savings
Dependent (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Saving Plan Saving Plan Wealth (log) Wealth (log)
Fin. Literacy 0.0538*** 0.0389*** 0.186*** 0.145***
(7.51) (5.12) (14.76) (11.36)
Advice_Family −0.0682*** −0.0791*** −0.114*** −0.108***
(3.73) (4.34) (3.69) (3.48)
Advice_Work −0.0148 −0.0308 −0.150*** −0.157***
(0.58) (1.19) (3.69) (3.96)
Advice_Tool 0.207*** 0.179*** 0.0916*** 0.0762***
(13.04) (11.15) (3.34) (2.83)
Advice_Expert 0.0519*** 0.0507*** 0.0752** 0.0779**
(2.95) (2.91) (2.39) (2.53)
Advice_Media 0.0712*** 0.0650*** 0.0624** 0.0495
(3.85) (3.54) (1.97) (1.60)
Saving Plan 0.144*** 0.127***
(4.91) (4.39)
Controls? No Yes No Yes
N 3.578 3.578 3.578 3.578
R2 0.08 0.11 0.1 0.15
Note: This table reports results of four OLS regressions. Dependent variable in specification
(1) and (2) is Saving plan, a dummy variable, which equals 1 if participants report to stick to
a saving plan in preparing for retirement. Dependent variable in specification (2) is the log
of wealth. Reported are coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses). All standard errors are
robust. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%-level, respectively. We have
3578 observations due to missing answers. We control for socio-demographic variables and
household composition whenever indicated.
XLII Appendix D. When Saving is Not Enough
D.2 Survey Instructions and Screenshots
Welcome Insturctions
Dear participant,
on the following pages, you will find a survey of the University of
Mannheim in cooperation with FAZ.NET. The survey covers topics on
retirement planning. In particular, it deals with the questions of how to
convert our savings into a stream of income once we enter retirement, in
order to increase our standard of living.
Please note that the survey takes some time (approx. 15 minutes). Also, note
that you might encounter questions that require some time to answer (just as
your retirement planning!). In return, we will present you different ways on
how to convert your savings into a steady stream of income. Should you be
interested in further results, we will gladly send you a summary of the main
results after the completion of the study via email.
In addition, we are giving away ten Behavioral Finance volumes on the sub-
ject "Entsparen im Alter — Portfolioentnahmestrategien in der Rentenphase"
by Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Martin Weber from the University of Mannheim. All
data collected here is anonymous and exclusively used for research pur-
poses.
We are looking forward to your participation!
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Financial Literacy Questions
Below we report the financial literacy questions that were used to calculate
participants’ financial literacy score. Correct responses are displayed in italic.
1. Do you think the following statement is true of false? "Buying a single
company’s stock usually provides a safer return than a stock mutual
fund."
(a) The state is true
(b) The statement is false
(c) Do not know / Refuse to answer
2. If the interest rate falls, what should happen to bond prices?
(a) Rise
(b) Stay the same
(c) Fall
(d) None of the above
(e) Do not know / Refuse to answer
3. Consider a call-option with a stock as underlying. Please judge the
following statement: "The price of the call-option should increase if the
volatility of the underlying stock increases."
(a) The state is true
(b) The statement is false
(c) Do not know / Refuse to answer
4. Suppose you have 100e in a savings account and the interest rate is 4%
per year and you never withdraw money or interest payments. After
10 years, how much would you have in this account in total?
(a) More than 140e
(b) Exactly 140e
(c) Less than 140e
(d) Do not know / Refuse to answer
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5. Suppose you owe 3,000e on your credit card. You pay a minimum
payment of 30e each month. At an annual percentage rate of 12% (or
1% per month), how many years would it take to eliminate your credit
card debt if you made no additional new charges?
(a) Less than 5 years
(b) Between 5 and 10 years
(c) Between 10 and 15 years
(d) Never
(e) Do not know / Refuse to answer
6. A very volatile asset either increases in value by 70% or decreases in
value by 60% in every period, each growth rate realizing with a change
of one half. If the investor buys the asset she must hold it for 12 periods.
With an initial value of 10,000 what would the asset likely be worth at
the end of period 12?
(a) Up to 6,400
(b) Between 6,400 and 12,800
(c) Between 12,800 and 19,200
(d) Between 19,200 and 25,600
(e) Above 25,600
(f) Do not know / Refuse to answer
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Screenshots of the Phased Withdrawal Accounts and the An-
nuity
Figures D.1 and D.2 present the screen of the phased withdrawal account
choice and the annuity choice as seen in the survey.
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Figure D.1: Display of Phased Withdrawal Accounts
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Figure D.2: Display of Lifelong Annuity
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Self-reported Importance of Various Retirement Characteris-
tics
1. Please rate following statements on a scale from 1 (not very impor-
tant) to 7 (very important)
(a) "How important are high withdrawal rates for you?"
(b) "How important is it for you that the withdrawal amount remains
constant over time?"
(c) "How important are withdrawals which cannot deplete the capital
stock early?"
(d) "How important are bequests for you?"
2. Which factors not previously mentioned affected your choice?
3. Would you say your current health status is...
(a) Very Good
(b) Good
(c) Medium
(d) Rather Bad
(e) Very Bad
4. If you think about it, to what age do you expect to live?
Please tell us about the ways you tried to figure out how much your
household would need for retirement.
(a) Did you talk to family and relatives?
(b) Did you talk to co-workers or friends?
(c) Did you use calculators or worksheets that are computer- or
internet-based?
(d) Did you consult a financial planner or advisor or an accountant?
(e) Did you follow advice received from the media?
5. Have you ever tried to figure out how much your household would
need to save for retirement?
6. Do you work in the financial industry or do you have an education in
a financial domain?
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Need for Cognition Inventory (adopted from Epstein et al.,
1996)
Please rate the following statements on a scale from 1 (do not agree at all)
to 7 (do fully agree).
1. I don’t like to have to do a lot of thinking (R)
2. I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something
(R)
3. I prefer to do something that challenges my thinking rather than some-
thing that requires little thought
4. I prefer complex to simple problems
5. Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives me little sat-
isfaction (R)
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D.3 Construction of the Phased Withdrawal
Strategies
Strategy 1: Risk-Free – Constant
The withdrawal amount Ct in every period t is defined using the following
formula:
Ct =
(1 + r f )H−1 · r f
(1 + r f )H · −1
·W0,
where r f is the real risk-free rate of return, H is the planning horizon in
years, and W0 is the initial wealth that an agent wants to decumulate.
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Strategy 2: Risky – Constant
Strategy 2 was constructed such that the real withdrawal amount is a fixed
percentage of the initial wealth level. The percentage was chosen in a way
such that the default probability remains constant at 10% (determined with
simulations). In other words, as long as there is enough wealth, the real with-
drawal amount remains constant every year. If there is not enough wealth,
the remaining wealth is withdrawn and the strategy ends prematurely (i.e. it
defaults in our terminology).
Ct = w ·W0 |Wt > Ct, else
Ct = Wt
Given the underlying asset allocation, the resulting withdrawal rates are as
follows:
Planning Horizon Withdrawal Rate
20 Years 6.27%
25 Years 5.50%
30 Years 5.13%
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Strategy 3: Risky – Dynamic
The real withdrawal amount Ct in every period t is defined using the follow-
ing formula:
Ct =
(1 + E[r])H−t · E[r]
(1 + E[r])H+1−t − 1 ·Wt,
where E[r] is the real expected return of the underlying investment strategy,
H is the planning horizon, and Wt is the current wealth level in period t that
the agent wants to decumulate. Whenever the expected return in any given
period does not equal the realized return, the consumption does not equal
to the consumption in the previous period. In other words, the resulting
consumption pattern fluctuates and directly depends on the realized return
and the number of periods that are left (H − t).
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